141 S. Ct. 1307, 209 L. Ed. 2d 390 (2021)
In August 2004, 15-year-old Brett Jones lived with his grandparents Bertis and Madge Jones in Shannon, Mississippi.1
On the morning of August 9, Bertis discovered Jones's girlfriend Michelle Austin in Jones's bedroom and ordered her out of the house.2 Later that afternoon, after another argument escalated from shouts to shoves to punches, Jones stabbed Bertis eight times with two kitchen knives.3 Bertis staggered outside, fell, and died.4
Jones did not call 911. He dragged the body back inside, washed blood from his arms with a hose, changed his bloody shirt, and moved Bertis's car over blood stains on the carport.5 Neighbors saw Jones and alerted police.6
Later that night, police located Jones and Austin at a gas station several miles away.7 When questioned, Jones and Austin provided fake names to the officer.8 After a police pat down revealed a knife in Jones's pocket, the officer asked Jones whether it was the knife that he 'did it with.'9 Jones responded, 'No, I already got rid of it.'10 Jones was charged with murder. At trial he claimed self-defense, but the jury convicted him of murder.11
Mississippi law then imposed a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for murder, and the trial judge imposed that sentence. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in 2006.12 Jones later sought post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied and the Court of Appeals affirmed.13
While Jones's case was pending before the Mississippi Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama in 2012.14 The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded Miller applied retroactively on state collateral review and ordered a new sentencing hearing so the judge could consider Jones's youth and exercise discretion.15
At the resentencing hearing, Jones's attorney argued that his chronological age and its hallmark features diminished the penological justifications for the harshest sentence and that nothing in the record supported a finding of irreparable corruption.16 The sentencing judge acknowledged he had discretion under Miller to impose a sentence less than life without parole. After considering factors relevant to the child's culpability, the judge determined life without parole remained the appropriate sentence.17
Jones appealed to the Mississippi Court of Appeals, citing both Miller and the subsequently decided Montgomery v. Louisiana.18 The Court of Appeals rejected Jones's arguments and affirmed the sentence.19
In light of disagreement among state and federal courts about how to interpret Miller and Montgomery, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.20
Whether Miller and Montgomery require a sentencer to make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing a life-without-parole sentence on a defendant who committed homicide when under 18?21
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court mandated only that a sentencer follow the process of considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before imposing a life-without-parole sentence.22 In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court stated that a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility is not required.23 Miller and Montgomery require consideration of an offender’s youth but not any particular factual finding of permanent incorrigibility.24
No. The resentencing judge in Jones's case acknowledged discretion under Miller to impose a sentence less than life without parole.25 Jones's attorney had argued that his chronological age and its hallmark features diminished the penological justifications for the harshest sentence and that nothing in the record supported a finding of irreparable corruption.26 After considering factors relevant to the child's culpability, the judge determined that life without parole remained the appropriate sentence for Jones.27 The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, relying on Montgomery's explicit statement that Miller did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child's incorrigibility.28
Miller and Montgomery do not require a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility before a sentencer imposes a life-without-parole sentence on a murderer under 18.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment that the Eighth Amendment does not require a finding that a minor be permanently incorrigible as a prerequisite to a sentence of life without parole.30 He argues that the majority adopts a strained reading of Montgomery v. Louisiana instead of outright admitting that it is irreconcilable with Miller v. Alabama and the Constitution.31 The better approach is to reject Montgomery as a demonstrably erroneous decision because it rewrote Miller into a substantive rule that is irreconcilable with prior retroactivity precedents.32
Joined by Justices Breyer And Kagan
Justice Sotomayor dissents, contending that the majority guts Miller and Montgomery by reducing them to a mere discretionary procedure requirement.33 This conclusion is contrary to explicit holdings in both decisions that life without parole is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption rather than transient immaturity.34 Sentencers must actually make that judgment to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not.35
Whether a sentencer must provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing a life-without-parole sentence on a defendant who committed homicide when under 18?36
No. At Jones's resentencing, the judge acknowledged discretion under Miller to impose a lesser sentence and determined life without parole was appropriate after considering relevant factors.39 The Court holds that such an explanation is not required because a discretionary sentencing system itself ensures consideration of youth.40 It is not mandated by Miller or Montgomery.41
It is not required by analogous death penalty precedents such as Woodson, Lockett, and Eddings.42 It is not dictated by historical or contemporary state sentencing practices.43
A sentencer need not provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing a life-without-parole sentence on a murderer under 18.44
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment but maintains that the majority's approach of leaving Montgomery intact while rejecting its logic is untenable.45 Montgomery's creation of a categorical exemption for juvenile offenders logically requires a determination whether Jones falls within that protected class.46 Otherwise the line between those who may and may not receive life without parole is more fanciful than real.47
The majority's solution overrules Montgomery in substance but not in name by admitting the tension with retroactivity precedents yet declining to disturb the holding.48 Thomas argues the better approach is to expressly reject Montgomery as demonstrably erroneous.49
Joined by Justices Breyer And Kagan
Justice Sotomayor dissents, arguing that the majority's refusal to require any form of determination, explicit or implicit, whether a juvenile's crime reflects permanent incorrigibility violates Miller's essential holding.50 She contends that sentencers must make that judgment to separate those who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not.51 The Court reduces Miller to a decision requiring just a discretionary sentencing procedure where youth is considered.52 This is contrary to Montgomery's clarification that even if a court considers a child's age, the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity.53
This abrupt break from precedent lacks special justification under stare decisis principles.54