304 U.S. 458 (1938)
Johnson, while imprisoned in a federal penitentiary, sought habeas corpus relief from the District Court after his conviction for possessing and uttering counterfeit money.1
Johnson and Bridwell were arrested in Charleston, South Carolina, on November 21, 1934, charged with feloniously uttering and passing four counterfeit twenty-dollar Federal Reserve notes and possessing twenty-one such notes.2 Both were enlisted men in the United States Marine Corps on leave at the time.3 They were bound over to the grand jury but remained in jail due to inability to give bail.4 They were indicted on January 21, 1935.5 On January 23, 1935, they were taken to court, arraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced to four and one-half years in the penitentiary without the assistance of counsel.6
The accused had been represented by counsel in preliminary hearings but were unable to employ counsel for trial.7 They lived in distant cities, had little education, and lacked funds or local connections.8 Upon arraignment they pleaded not guilty, informed the court they had no lawyer, and stated they were ready for trial.9 No request for appointed counsel was made to the trial judge, though one was made to the District Attorney.10
Following conviction, Johnson and Bridwell were remanded to jail and sought unsuccessfully to contact a lawyer.11 On January 25th, they were transported by automobile to the Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta, Ga., arriving the same day.12 There, as is the custom, they were placed in isolation and so kept for sixteen days without being permitted to communicate with any one except the officers of the institution.13 Their applications for appeal filed May 15, 1935, were denied as untimely because the time for filing a motion for new trial and taking an appeal was limited to three and five days.14
The District Court denied the petition for habeas corpus, finding that it did not substantially differ from an earlier petition and that any deprivation of counsel constituted trial errors or irregularities correctable only on appeal.15 The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, after which the Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether the Sixth Amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel to an accused in a federal criminal prosecution?17
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.18 This is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.19 The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts in all criminal proceedings the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.20
Yes. Johnson was convicted in a United States District Court for possessing and uttering counterfeit money without the assistance of counsel.21 Johnson and Bridwell were arraigned, tried, convicted and sentenced the same day after informing the court they had no lawyer and were ready for trial.22 The Sixth Amendment applies directly to this federal criminal prosecution and required counsel absent a valid waiver.23
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel to an accused in a federal criminal prosecution.24
Whether a defendant may waive the right to counsel, and what facts determine whether such a waiver is intelligent and competent?25
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.26 The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.27 Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.28
Yes. The District Court made no finding that Johnson waived his right to counsel. Given that Johnson had little education, lacked funds, lived in a distant city, and made no request for appointed counsel to the trial judge though one was made to the District Attorney, these facts show no intelligent and competent waiver occurred under the required standard.29
A defendant can waive the right to counsel but the waiver must be intelligent and competent based on the particular facts and circumstances of the case.30
Whether a conviction without counsel or valid waiver may be attacked by habeas corpus in federal court?
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.31 If the accused is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence. A judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus.32
Yes. Johnson was convicted without counsel and without a valid waiver.33 The District Court denied habeas corpus on the ground that deprivation of counsel constituted only trial error correctable on appeal.34 The Supreme Court held habeas corpus available because the trial court lost jurisdiction. The burden rests on the petitioner to establish by a preponderance of evidence that he did not competently and intelligently waive the right.
A conviction without counsel or valid waiver may be attacked by habeas corpus in federal court.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Reed concurred in the reversal.35 His position supports remanding the case to permit Johnson an opportunity to prove lack of a competent and intelligent waiver of counsel rather than affirming the denial of relief. The concurrence aligns with treating the absence of counsel as a jurisdictional defect addressable through habeas corpus proceedings.
Justice McReynolds dissented and would have affirmed the judgment of the court below.36 This dissent diverges from the majority by concluding that the District Court properly denied habeas corpus relief and that the judgment should stand without remand for further waiver findings. The view treats the proceedings as not subject to collateral attack despite the lack of counsel at trial.
Justice Butler dissented and would have affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals because the record showed that petitioner waived the right to have counsel, that the trial court had jurisdiction, and that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be affirmed.37 This dissent diverges from the majority by finding a valid waiver on the facts and rejecting the jurisdictional bar analysis that permits habeas corpus relief.