406 U.S. 356 (1972)
Appellant Johnson was arrested at his home on January 20, 1968, without an arrest warrant after the victim of an armed robbery identified him from photographs.1 He was then identified at a lineup, where he had the assistance of counsel, by the victim of a second robbery that formed the basis of the prosecution in this case.2 Johnson pleaded not guilty to the charges.3
Johnson was tried on May 14, 1968, before a jury of twelve men and convicted of armed robbery by a vote of nine to three.4 Under Louisiana law, such a verdict was permitted in cases where the crime was punishable by hard labor.5 The trial court sentenced Johnson to thirty-five years at hard labor.6
Johnson challenged the Louisiana constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing nonunanimous verdicts on due process and equal protection grounds, as well as raising a claim regarding his arrest and lineup identification.7 The Louisiana courts rejected these challenges.8
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Johnson's conviction in State v. Johnson, 255 La. 314, 230 So. 2d 825 (1970).9 Johnson appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction over the case in 1970.10
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials?11
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials.12
No. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials. The Court determined that the nine jurors who voted to convict followed their instructions and reached an honest belief that guilt had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.13 The three dissenting votes do not demonstrate that the majority failed to apply the reasonable doubt standard or that the verdict lacks integrity.14
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials.
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Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in Apodaca v. Oregon.15 He added that he does not regard a State's split-verdict system as a wise one as a matter of policy.16 His vote means only that he cannot conclude that the system is constitutionally offensive under the Fourteenth Amendment.17
He noted that a 7-5 standard would afford him great difficulty because it would not ensure a substantial majority of the jury.18 In his view a 9-3 verdict satisfies due process because a substantial majority remains convinced of guilt after deliberation.19
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment of affirmance.20 He would not extend the holding of Williams v. Florida to permit less-than-unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials under the Due Process Clause.21 In his view the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict to convict in a federal criminal trial because history establishes unanimity as an essential attribute of the common-law jury.22
The Fourteenth Amendment does not impose the same requirement on the States.23 He noted that Duncan v. Louisiana is not retroactive, foreclosing the classic fundamental fairness argument for this pre-Duncan trial, and that the reasonable-doubt standard remains satisfied by a 9-3 verdict.24
Joined by Justices Brennan And Marshall
Justice Douglas dissented for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Apodaca v. Oregon.25 He argued that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimity of criminal verdicts are basic features of the accusatorial system that protect individual liberty against governmental overreaching.26 These features should not be altered without constitutional amendment because they are embedded in constitutional law and touch all citizens directly.27
Allowing nonunanimous verdicts diminishes the reliability of jury factfinding and permits convictions on a lower effective standard of proof.28
Joined by Justices Douglas And Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Apodaca v. Oregon.29 He emphasized that when less than unanimity is sufficient, consideration of minority views may become nothing more than a matter of majority grace rather than a genuine deliberative process.30 This undermines the right of all groups in the Nation to have their voices heard in the criminal process.31
A unanimous verdict vindicates that right by ensuring every juror participates meaningfully, while majority verdicts risk corroding community confidence when verdicts split along group lines.32
Whether Louisiana's provisions establishing different jury verdict requirements according to the severity of the crime violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?33
Louisiana's statutory scheme serves a rational purpose and is not subject to constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause.34
No. Louisiana's statutory scheme serves a rational purpose and is not subject to constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause.35 The Court examined the facts that Louisiana permits less serious crimes to be tried by five jurors with unanimous verdicts.36 More serious crimes require the assent of nine of twelve jurors.37 For the most serious crimes a unanimous verdict of twelve jurors is stipulated.38
The classification is not invidious because the number of jurors who must be convinced increases with the seriousness of the crime.39 The State may treat capital offenders differently without violating the constitutional rights of those charged with lesser crimes.40
Louisiana's provisions do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.41
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Joined by Justices Brennan And Marshall
Justice Stewart dissented for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Apodaca v. Oregon.42 He argued that if a State purports to accord the right of trial by jury in a criminal case, then only a unanimous jury can return a constitutionally valid verdict under the Fourteenth Amendment.43 The guarantee against systematic discrimination in jury selection is a fundamental protection of the Fourteenth Amendment that ensures universal citizen participation.44
Eliminating the unanimity requirement allows nine jurors to ignore the views of fellow panel members of a different race or class, undermining both fair trials and public confidence in criminal justice.45
Whether the appellant's lineup identification was the fruit of an unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment?46
The lineup identification was not the fruit of an unlawful arrest because the detention was under the authority of a commitment from a magistrate, purging any taint under Wong Sun v. United States.47
No. The lineup identification was not the fruit of an unlawful arrest because the detention was under the authority of a commitment from a magistrate, purging any taint under Wong Sun v. United States. The Court looked to the facts that Johnson was brought before a committing magistrate to advise him of his rights and set bail prior to the lineup.48 The detention at the time of the lineup was under the authority of this commitment.49 The lineup was therefore conducted not by exploitation of the challenged arrest but by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.50
The lineup identification was not the fruit of an unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment.51
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Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Apodaca v. Oregon.52 He argued that the Court cuts the heart out of the right to submit a case to a jury and the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt by permitting nonunanimous verdicts.53 The Court strips these safeguards of life and meaning.54
When three jurors entertain doubts after hearing all the evidence, it does violence to language and logic to say that the government has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.55 The doubts of dissenting jurors create a constitutional bar to conviction at the trial that produced those doubts.56