923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
In 1996, Appellant and Appellee began living together in York County for approximately nine years, during which they underwent a commitment ceremony in Pittsburgh and entered into a civil union in Vermont.1 The four children involved are A.J. and L.J., nephews of Appellee whom she adopted, and Co.J. and Ca.J., Appellee's biological children conceived with Appellee Carl Frampton, a longtime friend of Appellant's who agreed to act as sperm donor at her instigation and has been involved in the children's lives since their birth.2
In February 2006, Appellee relocated with the children from York County to Dauphin County.3 Shortly after, Appellant filed a complaint in York County seeking sole legal and primary physical custody of all four children, naming both Appellee and Carl Frampton as defendants.4 At a conciliation conference on March 20, temporary legal and primary physical custody of all children went to Appellee with partial physical custody to Appellant, while Frampton received shared legal and physical custody of Co.J. and Ca.J.5 Appellant's petition for special relief was denied on March 23.6 Appellee later voluntarily relinquished L.J. to Appellant's care and provided a stipend for his support.7
On April 3, Appellee filed a complaint in Dauphin County seeking child support from Appellant for Co.J. and Ca.J. and was awarded approximately $983 per month.8 Appellant appealed for de novo review, arguing Frampton was a third parent obligated to contribute support, and was permitted to file a formal joinder request after the hearing.9 Following receipt of the request and Appellee's response, joinder was denied on July 31.10
A two-day custody trial was held on August 1 and 2.11 The trial court awarded shared legal custody of all four children to the parties.12 Appellant received primary physical custody of L.J. only with partial physical custody to Appellee, who received primary physical custody of the other three children with partial custody to Appellant.13 Frampton was awarded partial physical custody of Co.J. and Ca.J. one weekend per month.14 Appellant appealed both the custody and support orders.15
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Appellant only partial physical custody of three children while granting her primary physical custody of one child?16
In custody disputes between a biological parent and a third party with in loco parentis status, the biological parent has a prima facie right to custody.17 This right will be forfeited only if convincing reasons appear that the child's best interests will be served by an award to the third party.18 In loco parentis status confers standing but not parity with the natural parent.19
No. The established facts show that the trial court determined the evidence was not sufficient to override the presumption in favor of the biological parent Appellee.20 The court emphasized the fitness of both parties as parents.21 It characterized their differences as mere matters of parenting style.22 Although A.J. who suffers from AD/HD might benefit from a more structured environment, the household offered by Appellee is certainly more than adequate.23
Appellant argued that the best interests of the children lay with her.24 However, the only attempt to demonstrate lesser parental aptitude by Appellee referenced an order restricting contact due to a delinquency adjudication involving L.J. and Ca.J.25 The custody order addressed this by prohibiting simultaneous custody of those children.26
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning the custody arrangements.27
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit the custody expert's report into evidence at trial?28
No. The established facts establish that Dr. Shienvold testified at length during the custody trial on August 1 and 2.31 Appellant was offered an opportunity to recall him after the report was not admitted.32 The trial court specifically states that it considered the testimony offered by the expert. It noted that the observations of the professional have mirrored this Court's observation of the parties.33
Appellant provides no explanation as to what benefit admission of the report would have afforded her.34
The trial court did not err in refusing to admit the custody expert's report into evidence.35
Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to join the biological father as an indispensable party in the child support proceedings?36
An indispensable party is one whose rights or interests are so pervasively connected with the claims of the litigants that no relief can be granted without infringing on those rights or interests.37 A biological parent who has exercised parental rights appurtenant to that status and received an award of partial custody is obligated to provide support under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(2) and principles of equitable estoppel.38
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Appellee Carl Frampton is the biological father of Co.J. and Ca.J. and has been involved in the children's lives since their birth.39 Frampton has contributed in excess of $13,000 in the last four years, was present at the birth of Co.J., has been awarded partial physical custody one weekend a month, encourages the children to call him Papa, and supplies funds and items when Appellee expresses a need.40 These facts establish that Frampton has exercised the rights appurtenant to biological parenthood and therefore must be joined as an indispensable party so that his support obligation can be recalculated along with the others.41
The trial court erred in denying the motion to join the biological father as an indispensable party.42
Whether the biological father of two children, who has been involved in their lives since birth and received partial custody, is obligated to contribute to their financial support?43
Parents are liable for the support of their children who are unemancipated and 18 years of age or younger under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(2).44 Biological parents who have exercised the rights appurtenant to that status are bound by the same equitable estoppel principles that impose support obligations on third parties with in loco parentis status.45
Yes. The established facts show that Appellee Carl Frampton agreed to act as sperm donor at Appellant's instigation and has been involved in Co.J. and Ca.J.'s lives since their birth.46 He has contributed in excess of $13,000 over four years, borrowed money to provide a vehicle for transporting the children, received an award of partial physical custody one weekend per month, and has expressed interest in relocating closer to facilitate additional contact.47 These actions demonstrate a settled intention to demonstrate parental involvement far beyond the merely biological, triggering the statutory support obligation and estoppel from disclaiming financial responsibility.48
The biological father is obligated to contribute to the financial support of Co.J. and Ca.J.49