497 U.S. 177, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990)
On July 26, 1985, police officers responded to a call at the residence of Dorothy Jackson on South Wolcott in Chicago.1 They encountered her daughter, Gail Fischer, who displayed signs of a severe beating.2 Fischer informed the officers that she had been assaulted earlier that day by Edward Rodriguez in an apartment on South California Avenue, where Rodriguez was then asleep.3 She agreed to accompany the officers to the apartment and use her key to unlock the door so they could enter and arrest him.4 She referred to the apartment as "our" apartment and indicated she had clothes and furniture there.5
The officers proceeded to the South California apartment without obtaining an arrest or search warrant.6 Upon arrival, Fischer unlocked the door with her key and permitted the officers to enter.7 Inside the living room, the officers observed drug paraphernalia and containers of white powder believed to be cocaine.8 In the bedroom they found Rodriguez asleep along with additional containers of the substance.9
Rodriguez was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.10 He filed a motion to suppress the seized evidence, asserting that Fischer had moved out of the apartment several weeks earlier and lacked authority to consent to the entry.11
The Cook County Circuit Court granted the suppression motion after finding that Fischer was an infrequent visitor rather than a usual resident.12 The court relied on evidence that her name was not on the lease, she did not pay rent, she could not invite others without Rodriguez present, she lacked access when he was away, and she had removed some of her possessions.13 The court rejected the argument that the officers' reasonable belief in Fischer's authority would validate the entry.14
The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the Circuit Court's ruling in all respects.15 The Illinois Supreme Court denied the State's petition for leave to appeal, after which the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.16
Whether the Appellate Court of Illinois rested its decision on an adequate and independent state ground?17
When a state-court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law, the Court requires a plain statement that the decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds.18 Absent such a statement, the Court accepts as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case because it believed federal law required it to do so.19
No. The Appellate Court’s opinion contains no plain statement that its decision rests on state law.20 The opinion does not rely on or even mention any specific provision of the Illinois Constitution, nor the Illinois Constitution generally.21 Even the Illinois cases cited by the opinion rely upon no constitutional provisions other than the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.22
The Appellate Court of Illinois rested its decision on federal law rather than an adequate and independent state ground.23
Whether a warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises but who in fact does not?24
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and reasonableness does not demand that government agents always be factually correct in their assessments.25 It requires only that their judgment be reasonable, a principle that applies to factual determinations regarding whether a third party possesses authority to consent to entry.26
Yes. Although Fischer did not in fact have common authority over the apartment because she had moved out on July 1, 1985, taken her clothing, lacked access when Rodriguez was away, and never contributed to rent or had her name on the lease, the officers could still rely on her consent if their belief that she possessed authority was reasonable under the circumstances presented to them at the time of entry.27 The officers encountered Fischer at her mother’s residence showing signs of a severe beating, heard her refer to the apartment as our apartment and state that she had clothes and furniture there, and observed her use a key to unlock the door, all of which supplied an objective basis for their belief that she had authority to consent.28
A warrantless entry is valid under the Fourth Amendment when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises. This holds even if that belief turns out to be factually incorrect.29
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Stevens
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented.30 He argued that third-party consent searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment only because the individual has voluntarily limited his expectation of privacy by allowing others joint access or control over his possessions.31 The majority misconceives the basis for such searches by treating them as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.32
Absent an exigency, the warrant requirement applies, and police must secure a warrant rather than rely on consent.33 A reasonable but mistaken belief by officers that a third party possesses authority cannot validate the search of a home.34 Rodriguez’s expectation of privacy remained undiminished when Fischer lacked actual authority to consent.35