540 U.S. 419 (2004)
On Saturday, August 23, 1997, just after midnight, an unknown motorist traveling eastbound on a highway in Lombard, Illinois, struck and killed a 70-year-old bicyclist and drove off without identifying himself.1 About one week later at about the same time of night and at about the same place, local police set up a highway checkpoint designed to obtain more information about the accident from the motoring public.2
Police cars with flashing lights blocked lanes of the highway, forcing traffic to slow and creating lines of up to 15 cars in each lane.3 As each vehicle drew up to the checkpoint, an officer stopped it for 10 to 15 seconds, asked the occupants whether they had seen anything happen there the previous weekend, and handed each driver a flyer that said "ALERT . . . FATAL HIT & RUN ACCIDENT" and requested assistance in identifying the vehicle and driver involved in the accident that killed the bicyclist.4
Robert Lidster was stopped at the checkpoint.5 As he approached, his van swerved and nearly hit one of the officers.6 The officer smelled alcohol on Lidster's breath, directed him to a side street where another officer administered a sobriety test, and arrested him.7 Lidster was tried and convicted in Illinois state court of driving under the influence of alcohol.8
Lidster challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and conviction on the ground that the government had obtained much of the evidence through use of a checkpoint stop that violated the Fourth Amendment.9 The trial court rejected that challenge.10 An Illinois appellate court reached the opposite conclusion.11 The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court by a vote of 4 to 3.12 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because lower courts had reached different conclusions about similar checkpoint stops.13
Whether the rule announced in Indianapolis v. Edmond applies to an information-seeking checkpoint rather than one whose primary purpose is to detect criminal wrongdoing by the stopped motorists?14
The rule in Indianapolis v. Edmond forbids checkpoint stops whose primary purpose is general crime control to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing by the vehicle's occupants without individualized suspicion.15 The rule does not apply to stops whose primary purpose is to ask the public for information about a crime committed by others.
No. The checkpoint stop here differs significantly from that in Edmond.16 The stop's primary law enforcement purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle's occupants were committing a crime. Instead it was to ask vehicle occupants for their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others. The police expected the information elicited to help them apprehend other individuals rather than the vehicle's occupants.
Edmond's language, as well as its context, makes clear that the constitutionality of this latter, information-seeking kind of stop was not then before the Court.17
The rule announced in Indianapolis v. Edmond does not apply to this information-seeking checkpoint.18
Whether a highway checkpoint at which police stopped motorists to ask for information about a recent hit-and-run accident is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment?19
A highway checkpoint stop is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment if it is reasonable based on the individual circumstances.20 The court considers the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.21
Yes. The stop was constitutional.22 The public concern was grave because police were investigating a crime that had resulted in a human death.23 The stop advanced this grave public concern to a significant degree as the police appropriately tailored their checkpoint stops to fit important criminal investigatory needs by setting it up one week later at the same time and place.24
Most importantly, the stops interfered only minimally with liberty of the sort the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect since each stop required only a brief wait in line and contact with the police lasted only a few seconds.25
The highway checkpoint at which police stopped motorists to ask for information about a recent hit-and-run accident is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.26
Whether the checkpoint stop at issue was reasonable under the balancing test set forth in Brown v. Texas?27
Yes. The public concern was grave because police were investigating a crime that had resulted in a human death.30 The stop's objective was to help find the perpetrator of a specific and known crime.31 The stop advanced this grave public concern to a significant degree.32
The police appropriately tailored their checkpoint stops to fit important criminal investigatory needs by conducting them about one week after the hit-and-run accident, on the same highway near the location of the accident, and at about the same time of night.33 Most importantly, the stops interfered only minimally with liberty of the sort the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect.34 Each stop required only a brief wait in line of a very few minutes at most.35 Contact with the police lasted only a few seconds.
Police contact consisted simply of a request for information and the distribution of a flyer.36
The checkpoint stop at issue was reasonable under the balancing test set forth in Brown v. Texas.37
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens joined Parts I and II of the Court's opinion explaining why the decision in Indianapolis v. Edmond is not controlling in this case.38 However, he finds the issue discussed in Part III closer than the Court does and believes it would be wise to remand the case to the Illinois state courts to address that issue in the first instance.39 In contrast to pedestrians, motorists who confront a roadblock are required to stop and remain stopped for as long as the officers choose to detain them.40
On the other side of the equation, the likelihood that questioning a random sample of drivers will yield useful information about a hit-and-run accident that occurred a week earlier is speculative at best.41 In short, the outcome of the multifactor test prescribed in Brown v. Texas is by no means clear on the facts of this case, and the case should be remanded to the Illinois courts to undertake the initial analysis.42