493 U.S. 474, 110 S. Ct. 803, 107 L. Ed. 2d 905 (1990)
Petitioner Daniel Holland was charged in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, with aggravated kidnaping, rape, deviate sexual assault, armed robbery, and aggravated battery.1 A venire of 30 potential jurors was assembled for his trial, two of whom were black.2 Holland's counsel objected to the State's use of peremptory challenges to strike both black venire members, asserting a Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community.3 The trial judge overruled the objection.4 Holland was convicted on all charges except aggravated battery.5
The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, reversed the convictions on grounds unrelated to the jury selection issue.6 On further appeal by the State, the Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the convictions after rejecting Holland's challenges under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Sixth Amendment.7 Holland, who is white, then petitioned for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted limited to the Sixth Amendment question.8
The procedural path began with the trial court's denial of the peremptory challenge objection, proceeded through state appellate reversal and supreme court reinstatement, and culminated in the federal certiorari grant focused solely on the Sixth Amendment claim.9
Whether a white defendant has standing to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude all black potential jurors from his petit jury?10
The Sixth Amendment entitles every defendant to object to a venire that is not designed to represent a fair cross section of the community. This right exists whether or not the systematically excluded groups are groups to which the defendant himself belongs.11
Yes. Holland, a white defendant, challenged the exclusion of black venire members from his petit jury on Sixth Amendment grounds after the trial judge overruled his objection to the peremptory strikes.12 The claim concerns the fairness of the venire selection process rather than any personal racial correlation with excluded jurors.13 Precedent establishes standing for any defendant to assert that the venire fails to represent a fair cross section of the community, as the objection targets the assembly of the pool from which the jury is drawn.14
The white defendant has standing to raise the Sixth Amendment claim.15
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy joins the majority in rejecting the Sixth Amendment claim on standing and merits grounds.16 He writes separately to clarify that the disposition leaves intact the rule that exclusion of a juror on the basis of race violates the juror's constitutional rights under equal protection.17 A defendant of a different race from the excluded juror may raise such a Fourteenth Amendment claim to vindicate the rights of the jurors and preserve public confidence in the jury system.18
Whether such exclusion violates his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury?19
The fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment applies only to the venire and does not extend to the petit jury. The traditional use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors believed to favor the other side does not violate the right to an impartial jury.20
No. The prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude the two black venire members from Holland's petit jury after the venire had been assembled.21 The rule limits the fair-cross-section guarantee to the venire stage.22 Precedents confirm that the Sixth Amendment demands a representative pool but permits both sides to exercise peremptory challenges to shape the final jury without creating a representative petit jury requirement.23 The exclusion occurred at the petit jury stage through peremptory strikes, a mechanism the Sixth Amendment has never prohibited.24
The exclusion does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury.25
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Brennan, Blackmun
Justice Marshall dissents on the merits and argues that the fair-cross-section requirement serves purposes beyond mere impartiality, including guarding against arbitrary governmental power, preserving public confidence in the criminal justice system, and ensuring civic participation.26 Racially motivated peremptory challenges of Afro-American venire members undermine all three purposes equally whether accomplished at the venire or petit jury stage.27 He contends that the majority ignores the clear import of precedents such as Taylor, Duren, and Lockhart by refusing to apply fair-cross-section principles to the petit jury.28
Justice Stevens dissents and argues that petitioner's equal protection claim is meritorious and that the same showing establishes a Sixth Amendment violation.29 A jury produced through a racially discriminatory selection process cannot possibly be an impartial jury within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.30 The operation of a facially neutral peremptory challenge procedure in a discriminatory manner is no less a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury chosen from a fair cross section of the community than it is a violation of the juror's right to equal protection.31
He maintains that the fair-cross-section principle requires neutral selection mechanisms at every stage of jury formation to ensure the jury best reflects the views of the community.32