363 U.S. 335, 80 S. Ct. 1084, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1254 (1960)
Respondents Blaski and others, residents of Illinois, brought this patent infringement action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against one Howell and a Texas corporation controlled by him, alleging that the defendants are residents of, and maintain their only place of business in, the City of Dallas, in the Northern District of Texas, where they are infringing respondents' patents.1 After being served with process and filing their answer, the defendants moved, under § 1404(a), to transfer the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, stating that if and when the case be so transferred, they would waive all objections to the venue of the Illinois District Court over the action and would enter their appearance in the action in that court.2 The District Court granted the motion.3 The plaintiffs then moved in the Fifth Circuit for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the vacation of that order, which the Fifth Circuit denied.4
Upon receipt of a certified copy of the pleadings and record, the Illinois District Court assigned the action to Judge Hoffman's calendar.5 Respondents promptly moved for an order remanding the action.6 After expressing his view that the weight of reason and logic favored retransfer of this case to Texas, Judge Hoffman denied the motion.7 Respondents then filed in the Seventh Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Hoffman to reverse his order.8 After hearing and rehearing, the Seventh Circuit granted the writ.9
In the companion case, respondents Behimer and Roberts, residents of Illinois and New York respectively, brought this stockholders' derivative action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Standard Oil Company and Standard Oil Foundation, Inc., Indiana corporations but licensed to do and doing business in the Northern District of Illinois.10 After being served with process and filing their answer, the defendants moved, under § 1404(a), to transfer the action to the United States District Court for the District of Utah, stating that in the event of the transfer they would waive all objections to the venue of the Utah court and enter appearances in the action in that court.11 The court granted the motion.12 Respondents then filed in the Seventh Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to reverse its order, which the Seventh Circuit granted following its decision in the Blaski case.13
To settle the conflict that has arisen among the circuits respecting the proper interpretation and application of § 1404(a), the Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
Whether a district court may transfer a civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to a district in which the plaintiff did not have a right to bring it?15
Section 1404(a) authorizes a district court to transfer a civil action only to another district or division where the action might have been brought, meaning a forum in which the plaintiff possessed a right to institute the suit at the time of filing, determined by applicable venue statutes and amenability to process, rather than by any subsequent consent or waiver by the defendant.16
No. The established facts demonstrate that in the Blaski action the plaintiffs could not have brought suit in the Northern District of Illinois.17 The defendants neither resided nor maintained a place of business there and could not have been served with process in that district at the commencement of the case.18 The defendants' post-filing stipulations waiving objections to venue and jurisdiction in the proposed transferee courts do not expand the statutory phrase.19 The power to transfer depends on the situation existing when suit was instituted, not on later conduct by the defendants.20
The legislative history tying the statute to the doctrine of forum non conveniens reinforces that an alternative forum must have been available to the plaintiff as of right from the outset.21
A district court lacks authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer an action to a district where the plaintiff did not have a right to bring it.22
Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denying mandamus precluded the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit from granting mandamus in the same case?23
An interlocutory order by one court of appeals denying leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus does not bind a coordinate court of appeals reviewing a later district-court ruling in the identical case. Such orders are not final judgments on the merits, and principles of res judicata therefore do not apply.24
No. The established facts show that the Fifth Circuit's denial of leave to file mandamus was an interlocutory determination that did not purport to adjudicate the jurisdiction of the transferee Illinois court.25 When the Seventh Circuit later reviewed Judge Hoffman's denial of the remand motion, it possessed independent authority to decide whether the transfer had been valid.26 The orders in question were entered by courts of coordinate jurisdiction in the same ongoing litigation and were neither final nor on the merits, so no preclusive effect attached.27
The Fifth Circuit's denial of mandamus did not preclude the Seventh Circuit from granting mandamus directing remand of the action.28