459 U.S. 460 (1983)
Aaron Helms was serving a term in the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania, administered by the petitioners.1 On December 3, 1978, a prisoner assaulted two guards, leading to a riot in which inmates attacked guards with table legs, flashlights, and barbells, attempted to seize the control center, and caused injuries including a broken nose, broken thumb, cuts, bruises, and possible skull fracture.2
Several hours after the riot was quelled with assistance from state police and local officers, Helms was removed from his cell and the general prison population for questioning by state police.3 He was then placed in restrictive confinement while an investigation into his role began.4
On December 4, 1978, Helms received a misconduct report charging him with assaulting officers and conspiracy to disrupt normal institution routine.5 A Hearing Committee of three prison officials convened on December 8, 1978, reviewed the report, made no finding of guilt due to insufficient information, and ordered continued confinement in restricted housing.6 On December 11, 1978, the Commonwealth filed state criminal charges against Helms for assaulting a correction officer and riot.7
On January 2, 1979, the Program Review Committee of three prison officials met to review Helms' status in administrative segregation and unanimously recommended continued confinement, citing that he posed a danger to staff and inmates, was to be arraigned the next day on criminal charges, and that further information on his role in the riot was awaited; the superintendent concurred.8 A second misconduct report charging assault on another officer was issued on January 19, 1979.9 On January 22, 1979, a Hearing Committee heard testimony from one guard and Helms, found him guilty of the second charge, imposed six months in disciplinary segregation effective December 3, 1978, and dropped the first misconduct charge without a finding.10
The state dropped the criminal charges on February 6, 1979.11 Helms sued the prison officials in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, claiming that his confinement to administrative segregation violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 The district court granted the officials' motion for summary judgment, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment itself creates a liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population rather than administrative segregation?14
Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources—the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States.15 The Due Process Clause does not create an interest in being confined to a general population cell rather than the more austere and restrictive administrative segregation quarters.16 Prison officials possess broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage.17 Lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests.18
No. The transfer of Helms to administrative segregation after the December 3, 1978 riot was well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence.19 The phrase administrative segregation may be used to protect the prisoner's safety, to protect other inmates from a particular prisoner, to break up potentially disruptive groups of inmates, or simply to await later classification or transfer.20 Accordingly, administrative segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration.21 This conclusion finds ample support in decisions regarding parole and good-time credits.22
Both of those subjects involve release from institutional life altogether.23 That change is a far more significant alteration in a prisoner's freedoms than the one at issue here.24 Yet neither situation involved an interest independently protected by the Due Process Clause.25
The Due Process Clause itself does not create a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population.26
Whether Pennsylvania statutes and prison regulations created a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population?27
A State may create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause through its enactment of statutory or regulatory measures.28 When a state employs language of an unmistakably mandatory character in its prison regulations, requiring that the procedures outlined in the regulations shall, will, or must be employed and that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates such as the need for control or the threat of a serious disturbance, the State has created a protected liberty interest.29
Yes. The Pennsylvania regulations governing the administration of state prisons used explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates.30 Title 37 Pa. Code § 95.104(b)(1) provided that an inmate who has allegedly committed a Class I Misconduct may be placed in Close or Maximum Administrative Custody upon approval of the officer in charge of the institution. This placement is not routine but based upon his assessment of the situation and the need for control pending application of procedures under § 95.103 of this title.31
Section 95.104(b)(3) stated that an inmate may be temporarily confined to Close or Maximum Administrative Custody in an investigative status upon approval of the officer in charge of the institution. This confinement occurs where it has been determined that there is a threat of a serious disturbance or a serious threat to the individual or others.32 The repeated use of such explicitly mandatory language demands the conclusion that Pennsylvania created a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population.33
Pennsylvania statutes and prison regulations created a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population.34
Whether the procedures afforded to an inmate confined to administrative segregation satisfied the minimum requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment?35
The requirements imposed by the Due Process Clause are flexible and variable dependent upon the particular situation being examined.36 In the prison context, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.37 Due process therefore requires only an informal, non-adversary review of the information supporting the inmate's administrative confinement, including whatever statement the inmate wished to submit, within a reasonable time after confining him to administrative segregation.38
Yes. Helms received notice of the charges against him the day after the misconduct took place when he was given a Misconduct Report on December 4, 1978.39 Only five days after his transfer to administrative segregation a Hearing Committee reviewed the existing evidence against him on December 8, 1978, including a staff member's statement describing Helms' involvement in the assault upon corrections officers.40 Helms had an opportunity to present a statement to the Committee as he acknowledged on the misconduct form that he had the opportunity to have his version reported as part of the record.41
On January 2, 1979, the Program Review Committee met to review the status of Helms' confinement in administrative segregation and unanimously concluded that he should remain there.42 This informal procedure permitted a reasonably accurate assessment of probable cause to believe that misconduct occurred and satisfied the due process requirements for continued confinement of Helms pending the outcome of the investigation.43
The procedures afforded to Helms satisfied the minimum requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.44
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan And Marshall, And Justice Blackmun As To Parts Ii And Iii
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall and by Justice Blackmun as to Parts II and III, dissented from the majority's conclusion that the procedures satisfied due process.45 He maintained that due process requires the inmate to be given the opportunity to present his views in person to the reviewing officials rather than limiting the inmate to a written statement.46 Stevens explained that as many prisoners have little education, limiting an inmate to a written statement is unlikely to provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard in accordance with due process principles.47
He further argued that the majority's due process analysis fails to provide adequate protection against arbitrary continuation of an inmate's solitary confinement.48 In his view the Due Process Clause requires a more searching review of the justifiability of continued confinement.49 At each periodic review due process requires that the prisoner be allowed to make an oral statement about the need for and the consequences of continued confinement.50
If the decisionmaker decides to retain the prisoner in segregation a brief written statement of reasons should be required.51 Stevens noted that the record does not clearly show whether Helms appeared in person before the Hearing Committee on December 8.52 He concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate because at least three issues of material fact remain unresolved.53