559 U.S. 77 (2010)
In September 2007, respondents Melinda Friend and John Nhieu, two California citizens, sued petitioner, the Hertz Corporation, in a California state court.1 They sought damages for what they claimed were violations of California’s wage and hour laws.2 They requested relief on behalf of a potential class composed of California citizens who had allegedly suffered similar harms.3
Hertz filed a notice seeking removal to a federal court.4 Hertz claimed that the plaintiffs and the defendant were citizens of different States.5 To support its position, Hertz submitted a declaration by an employee relations manager that sought to show that Hertz’s principal place of business was in New Jersey, not in California.6 The declaration stated, among other things, that Hertz operated facilities in 44 States and that California accounted for 273 of Hertz’s 1,606 car rental locations, about 2,300 of its 11,230 full-time employees, about $811 million of its $4,371 billion in annual revenue, and about 3.8 million of its approximately 21 million annual transactions.7 The declaration also stated that the leadership of Hertz and its domestic subsidiaries is located at Hertz’s corporate headquarters in Park Ridge, New Jersey, that its core executive and administrative functions are carried out there and to a lesser extent in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and that its major administrative operations are found at those two locations.89
The District Court of the Northern District of California accepted Hertz’s statement of the facts as undisputed.10 But it concluded that Hertz was a citizen of California.11 Applying Ninth Circuit precedent, the court found that the plurality of each of the business activities at issue was in California.12 The differential between the amount of those activities in California and the amount in the next closest state was significant.13 The District Court consequently remanded the case to the state courts.14 Hertz appealed the District Court’s remand order to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed in a brief memorandum opinion.15
Hertz filed a petition for certiorari, and in light of differences among the Circuits in the application of the test for corporate citizenship, the Supreme Court granted the writ.16 Respondents pointed out that the statute permitting Hertz to appeal the District Court’s remand order to the Court of Appeals constitutes an exception to a more general jurisdictional rule that remand orders are not reviewable on appeal.17 They argued that Congress intended to permit review of a remand order only by a court of appeals, not by the Supreme Court.18
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) precludes Supreme Court review of a court of appeals decision affirming a district court remand order?19
No. Respondents argued that § 1453(c) refers only to courts of appeals.22 The statute also imposes a 60-day deadline for issuance of a final judgment on appeal.23 Respondents concluded from these provisions that Congress intended to permit review of a remand order only by a court of appeals, not by the Supreme Court.24 The established facts show that after the District Court remanded the case to state court, Hertz appealed the remand order to the Ninth Circuit under § 1453(c).25 The Ninth Circuit affirmed in a brief memorandum opinion.26 Hertz then filed a petition for certiorari that the Supreme Court granted in light of circuit conflicts over the corporate citizenship test.27
The pre-existing jurisdictional grant in § 1254 replicates similar grants in older statutes.28 It supplies particularly strong reasons not to read § 1453(c)'s silence as limiting Supreme Court authority.29 The 60-day requirement is interpreted simply as directing a court of appeals to reach a decision within a specified time.30 This interpretation does not deprive the Supreme Court of subsequent review.31
Section 1453(c) does not preclude Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit's decision affirming the District Court's remand order.32
Whether the phrase "principal place of business" in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) refers to the place where a corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities?33
The phrase "principal place of business" in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) refers to the place where a corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities.34 This place is commonly called the corporation's "nerve center."35 In practice it is normally the corporation's headquarters provided it is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination rather than merely a board-meeting location.36
Yes. The established facts show that Hertz submitted an undisputed declaration stating that the leadership of Hertz and its domestic subsidiaries is located at its corporate headquarters in Park Ridge, New Jersey.37 Its core executive and administrative functions are carried out there and to a lesser extent in Oklahoma City.38 Its major administrative operations are found at those two locations. Hertz operates facilities in 44 states.39 Yet the declaration identifies New Jersey as the site of overall direction and control.40 The District Court instead applied Ninth Circuit precedent that looked to the plurality of business activities across states.41 It found California activities significantly larger than those in any other state.42 This led it to conclude Hertz was a California citizen and to remand the case.43
The nerve-center test adopted here replaces that multifactor business-activities approach with a single, administratively simple inquiry focused on the actual center of executive direction.44 Because the declaration establishes that New Jersey is the location where Hertz's high-level officers direct, control, and coordinate activities, that state is Hertz's principal place of business under the statute.45
The phrase "principal place of business" in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) refers to the place where a corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities.
Whether the District Court erred in concluding that Hertz Corporation was a citizen of California for diversity purposes?46
A corporation is a citizen of the state where it has its principal place of business.47 This place is defined as the single location that serves as the corporation's nerve center of direction, control, and coordination.48 When the undisputed facts identify that location as a state other than the one in which the plaintiffs reside, diversity jurisdiction exists and remand is improper.49
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that the District Court accepted Hertz's declaration as undisputed.50 Yet it applied a "total activities" test that measured the plurality of rental locations, employees, revenue, and transactions in California.51 It found those activities substantially predominated over those in any other state.52 That approach led the court to hold Hertz a California citizen and to remand the action.53 Under the nerve-center rule, however, the same declaration shows that core executive and administrative functions are centered in New Jersey.54 This makes New Jersey the principal place of business.55
Because the plaintiffs are California citizens and Hertz is a New Jersey citizen, complete diversity exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.56 The District Court possessed removal jurisdiction.57 The remand order was erroneous.58
The District Court erred in concluding that Hertz Corporation was a citizen of California for diversity purposes.59