500 U.S. 352 (1991)
Petitioner Dionisio Hernandez was convicted in a New York state court of two counts of attempted murder and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon.1 On a Brooklyn street, petitioner fired several shots at Charlene Calloway and her mother, Ada Saline.2 Calloway suffered three gunshot wounds. Petitioner missed Saline and instead hit two men in a nearby restaurant. The victims survived the incident.3 The trial was held in the New York Supreme Court, Kings County.4
During jury selection, after 63 potential jurors had been questioned and 9 had been empaneled, defense counsel objected that the prosecutor had used four peremptory challenges to exclude Latino potential jurors.5 Two of the Latino venirepersons challenged by the prosecutor had brothers who had been convicted of crimes.6 The brother of one of those potential jurors was being prosecuted by the same District Attorney's office for a probation violation.7 Petitioner does not press his claim with respect to those prospective jurors. The focus remained on the other two excluded individuals.8
The prosecutor volunteered his reasons for striking the two jurors without waiting for a ruling on a prima facie case.9 He explained that he felt very uncertain that they would be able to listen and follow the interpreter, especially where there were going to be Spanish-speaking witnesses.10 He stated that from their answers and demeanor, including looking away with hesitancy, he believed they would have trouble accepting the interpreter as the final arbiter of what was said.11 The prosecutor further noted that all complainants and civilian witnesses were Hispanic.12
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the conduct of the District Attorney.13 Following a recess, the trial court denied the motion.14 On appeal, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, noted that the prosecutor had challenged the only three prospective jurors with definite Hispanic surnames, which made out a prima facie showing of discrimination, but affirmed on the ground that the prosecutor had offered race-neutral explanations.15 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, deferring to the factual findings of the lower courts.16
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the New York state courts' rejection of the Batson claim.17
Whether the prosecutor's explanation that he challenged bilingual jurors because of their ability to understand Spanish-language testimony without the aid of an interpreter satisfies the neutral explanation requirement under Batson v. Kentucky?18
Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), the prosecutor must articulate a race-neutral explanation for peremptory strikes once a prima facie case is shown.19
Yes. The prosecutor volunteered that he felt very uncertain the two jurors would accept the interpreter as the final arbiter of Spanish-language testimony from witnesses, citing their answers and demeanor during voir dire.20 This explanation rests on the jurors' bilingual ability and specific responses rather than ethnicity.21 The criterion separates jurors who might hesitate to defer to the official translation from those who would not, encompassing both Latino and non-Latino individuals.22
The prosecutor's explanation satisfied the neutral explanation requirement under Batson.23
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Joined by Justice Scalia
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment. She agreed that the prosecutor's explanation for striking the two bilingual jurors was race-neutral on its face.24 Justice O’Connor emphasized that the trial court's finding of no discriminatory intent constitutes a factual determination entitled to great deference on appeal.
The trial judge is best situated to evaluate the prosecutor's demeanor and the credibility of his explanation.25 She noted that the concern about interpreter accuracy was plausible given the Spanish-speaking witnesses in the case.26 Disparate impact alone does not prove discriminatory intent under established equal protection principles.27
The focus must remain on the prosecutor's intent rather than on any disproportionate impact alone.28
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens dissented. He argued that the explanation was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case because it would disproportionately exclude Spanish-speaking Latinos.29 The concern could have been addressed by less drastic means such as jury instructions directing bilingual jurors to alert the court to translation issues.30
The justification would have supported a for-cause challenge if genuine.31 He viewed the explanation as a proxy that failed to dispel the inference of racial animus arising from the pattern of strikes.32 He would have reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.33
Whether the state courts' decision to accept the prosecutor's explanation for the peremptory challenges should be sustained on review?34
Once the prosecutor offers a race-neutral basis, the trial court must determine whether the defendant proved purposeful discrimination.35
Yes. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, found a prima facie case from the pattern of strikes against jurors with Hispanic surnames yet accepted the prosecutor's bilingual-related reasons as race-neutral.36 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, deferring to the trial court's factual findings that the explanation was credible.37 The Supreme Court sustained these rulings because the explanation was not inherently discriminatory and the trial court permissibly credited it.38
The state courts' decision to accept the prosecutor's explanation should be sustained on review.39
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Justice Blackmun dissented essentially for the reasons stated by Justice Stevens in Part II of his opinion.40 He concluded that the prosecutor's explanation was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination.41 The explanation would inevitably result in a disproportionate disqualification of Spanish-speaking venirepersons and functioned as a proxy for a discriminatory practice.42
The concern could have been accommodated by less drastic means such as jury instructions, and it would have supported a for-cause challenge if genuine.43 Justice Blackmun viewed the justification as failing to dispel the inference of racial animus arising from the pattern of strikes against Latino potential jurors and would have reversed.44
Whether the trial court's finding of no purposeful discrimination is entitled to deference and sustainable under a clear error standard?45
A trial court's finding on discriminatory intent is a factual determination that is entitled to great deference on appeal and is reviewed for clear error.46
Yes. The trial court denied the mistrial motion after hearing the prosecutor's volunteered explanation and observing his demeanor.47 The court credited the reasons as genuine, noting the Hispanic victims and witnesses undercut any motive to exclude Latinos.48 No clear error appears because the prosecutor offered the explanation without prompting, did not know the jurors' ethnicity with certainty, and the record supports a permissible view that the strikes were not racially motivated.49
The trial court's finding of no purposeful discrimination is entitled to deference and sustainable under a clear error standard.50
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Joined by Justice Scalia
Justice O’Connor wrote separately to emphasize that the trial court's finding of no discriminatory intent is a factual determination entitled to great deference on appeal.51 The trial judge is best situated to evaluate the prosecutor's demeanor and the credibility of the explanation offered.52 She agreed that the finding of no discriminatory intent was not clearly erroneous in this case.53
An unwavering line of cases holds that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause requires state action motivated by discriminatory intent; disproportionate effects alone are not sufficient.54 The focus must remain on the prosecutor's intent rather than on any disproportionate impact alone. If the trial court believes the prosecutor's nonracial justification and that finding is not clearly erroneous, that is the end of the matter.55
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens maintained that the explanation should have been rejected as a matter of law without reaching pretext.56 Its inevitable disproportionate impact on bilingual Latinos, the availability of less drastic accommodations such as jury instructions, and its equivalence to a for-cause challenge rendered it inadequate to dispel the prima facie inference of discrimination.57 He argued that the Court errs by focusing the entire inquiry on the subjective state of mind of the prosecutor.58
By requiring that the prosecutor's explanation itself provide additional direct evidence of discriminatory motive, the Court imposed an added requirement on the defendant.59 He would have reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.