426 U.S. 637 (1976)
On April 6, 1965, respondent Morgan killed Mrs. Ada Francisco in her home in Fulton County, New York.1 At the time, Morgan was 19 years old and substantially below average intelligence, with a reported functioning I.Q. between 68 and 72.2 He had previously been committed to the Rome State School for Mental Defectives where he was classified as retarded.3 He was later released to work as a farm laborer and had been employed on Mrs. Francisco's farm.4
After an argument in which she threatened to return him to state custody, Morgan decided to abscond.5 During the night he entered Mrs. Francisco's bedroom with a knife, intending to collect his earned wages before leaving. She awoke, began to scream, and he stabbed her.6 He took a small amount of money, fled in her car, and became involved in an accident about 80 miles away.7 The knife was found in the glove compartment of her car.8
Morgan was indicted for first-degree murder and arraigned on April 15, 1965.9 Two concededly competent attorneys were appointed to represent him.10 The indictment, which charged that he willfully stabbed his victim, was read in open court.11 His lawyers requested, and were granted, access to his written statement and to earlier psychiatric reports.12 A new psychiatric examination was requested and ordered.13 Respondent was found competent to stand trial.14 Defense counsel held a series of conferences with the prosecutors, with the respondent, and with members of his family.15 The lawyers thought manslaughter first would satisfy the needs of justice.16 They therefore endeavored to have the charge reduced to manslaughter, but the prosecution would agree to nothing less than second-degree murder and a minimum sentence of 25 years.17 The lawyers gave respondent advice about the different sentences which could be imposed for the different offenses, but did not explain the required element of intent.18
On June 8, 1965, respondent appeared in court with his attorneys and entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree in full satisfaction of the first-degree murder charge made in the indictment.19 In direct colloquy with the trial judge respondent stated that his plea was based on the advice of his attorneys, that he understood he was accused of killing Mrs. Francisco in Fulton County, that he was waiving his right to a jury trial, and that he would be sent to prison.20 There was no discussion of the elements of the offense of second-degree murder, no indication that the nature of the offense had ever been discussed with respondent, and no reference of any kind to the requirement of intent to cause the death of the victim.21 At the sentencing hearing a week later his lawyers made a statement explaining his version of the offense, particularly noting that respondent meant no harm to that lady when he entered her room with the knife.22
In 1970, respondent initiated proceedings in the New York courts seeking to have his conviction vacated on the ground that his plea of guilty was involuntary.23 The state courts denied relief on the basis of the written record.24 Having exhausted his state remedies, in 1973, respondent filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York.25 He alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was not aware of the sentence that might be imposed upon conviction of second-degree murder, or that intent to cause death was an element of the offense.26 Upon remand the District Judge heard the testimony of several witnesses including respondent, the two lawyers who had represented him in 1965, the prosecutor, and respondent's mother.27 In addition, the transcript of the state-court proceedings and psychological evaluations of respondent were made a part of the record.28 First, contrary to respondent's testimony, the court expressly found that he was advised that a 25-year sentence would be imposed if he pleaded guilty.29 Second, the court found that respondent was not advised by counsel or court, at any time, that an intent to cause the death or a design to effect the death of the victim was an essential element of Murder 2nd degree.30 On the basis of the latter finding, the District Court held as a matter of law that the plea of guilty was involuntary and had to be set aside.31
Whether a defendant may enter a voluntary plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree murder without being informed that intent to cause the death of his victim was an element of the offense?32
A guilty plea cannot be voluntary in the constitutional sense unless the defendant receives real notice of the true nature of the charge against him. This is the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.33 Notice of critical elements such as the intent to cause death is required for second-degree murder under former New York Penal Law § 1046.34
No. The rule requires real notice of the charge's true nature, including the intent element of second-degree murder.35 Morgan received no such notice because the indictment charged first-degree murder, the plea colloquy contained no discussion of second-degree murder elements or intent, and the district court expressly found that neither counsel nor the court advised him at any time that intent to cause death was an essential element.36 Although counsel were competent and advised the plea to avoid greater penalties, and although objective evidence of repeated stabbings existed, no admission or finding established that Morgan understood or admitted the intent element, and his low mental capacity forecloses any conclusion that the omission was harmless.37
Morgan's plea was therefore involuntary, and the judgment of conviction was entered without due process of law.38
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White concurred in the judgment on the ground that a defendant's factual guilt must be established either by a verdict after trial proving the elements beyond a reasonable doubt or by the defendant's own solemn admission in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense.39 The plea could not constitute such an admission because the district court found Morgan was never told and did not know that intent to kill was an element. Therefore the conviction rests only on strong evidence never presented to a trier of fact or on counsel's judgment rather than on any permissible method of establishing guilt under the Due Process Clause.40
White rejected any nonretroactivity argument. He noted that the principle that a guilty plea must provide a trustworthy basis for believing the defendant is in fact guilty is long-accepted and governs this and future cases.41
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the plea satisfied the pre-McCarthy standard of voluntariness requiring only that it be made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences. This test was met here because the district court found full understanding of the consequences, there was no coercion, and competent counsel provided advice based on a reasonable tactical judgment to avoid first-degree murder penalties.42 Rehnquist argued that the Constitution does not impose a requirement that every element be explained or admitted in a counseled plea.
Smith v. O'Grady addressed only accurate information about the offense and sentence. Invalidating the plea on this technical ground would open the door to countless collateral attacks releasing prisoners who had freely admitted their guilt years earlier.43