361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
In 1923, the appellant created a trust.1 The income terms of the trust instrument are of a spendthrift character, directing the trustees to pay to the settlor for life all the income from the trust estate for her own use and benefit without the power to her to anticipate, alienate or charge the same.2 Upon the death of the settlor-life tenant, the trustees are to pay over the corpus as the settlor may appoint by will; if she fails to exercise this testamentary power of appointment, the corpus is to go to such of her next of kin as by the law in force in the District of Columbia at the death of the settlor shall be provided for in the distribution of an intestate's personal property therein.3 No power to appoint the corpus by deed, nor any power to revoke, alter, amend or modify the trust, was expressly retained by appellant, and the instrument states that she conveys the property to the trustees irrevocably.4
Subsequently, the appellant brought an action seeking modification of the trust to obtain an additional $5000 a year from corpus to accommodate recently incurred expenses and to live more nearly in accordance with her refined but yet modest tastes.5 At the time, the appellant resided in a one-bedroom apartment in a modest residential section of Long Beach, California, and possessed only limited jewelry, furniture, personal effects, and a medium-priced automobile.6 She had initially also sought an additional $50,000 from corpus to purchase a residence but dropped that request at the hearing.7 The District Court sympathized with the appellant's situation but granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees.8
The appellant then appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.9 The appeal was heard by Circuit Judge Leventhal.10
Whether the doctrine of worthier title applies to the trust created by the appellant?11
The doctrine of worthier title originated in the feudal system that shaped the English common law.12 In its common law form, the doctrine provided that a conveyance of land by a grantor with a limitation over to his own heirs resulted in a reversion in the grantor rather than creating a remainder interest in the heirs.13 The doctrine of worthier title forms no part of the law of trusts in the District of Columbia, either as a rule of law or as a rule of construction.14
No. The court examined the historical origins of the doctrine in the feudal system and its modern rationale as a rule of construction to effectuate intent and promote alienability of property.15 However, the court found the doctrine pernicious because it is questionable whether it accords with the intent of the average settlor and because it leads to uncertainty and a volume of litigation, as demonstrated by the experience in New York following Doctor v. Hughes.16
The doctrine of worthier title does not apply to the trust created by the appellant.17
Whether the appellant is the sole beneficiary of the trust?18
Any act or words of the settlor of a trust which would validly create a remainder interest in a named third party may create a valid remainder interest in the settlor's heirs.19 The District Court was correct in granting summary judgment for appellees in this case, since appellant's action is based on the theory that she was the sole beneficiary and hence could revoke the irrevocable trust she had created.20
No. Because the doctrine of worthier title is rejected, the gift over to the settlor's next of kin creates a valid remainder interest in those heirs.21
The appellant is not the sole beneficiary of the trust.22
Whether the consent of the appellant's heirs is required for revocation or modification of the trust?23
It is hornbook law that any trust, no matter how irrevocable by its terms, may be revoked with the consent of the settlor and all beneficiaries.24 The beneficiaries of the trust created by appellant are herself, as life tenant, and her heirs, as remaindermen.25 Their consent is necessary to revocation, since they are at least the persons who would be beneficiaries if the settlor died today.26
Yes. The beneficiaries include the life tenant and the heirs as remaindermen, whose consent is required for revocation or modification.27 The appellant's two sisters are the persons who would be heirs if she died today, and their consent along with protection for other potential heirs is necessary before any modification such as the requested additional $5000 annual stipend from corpus can be approved.28
The consent of the appellant's heirs is required for revocation or modification of the trust.29
Whether a guardian ad litem may be appointed to represent the interests of unborn and unascertained beneficiaries in connection with a proposed modification of the trust?30
Courts of justice as an incident of their jurisdiction have inherent power to appoint guardians ad litem.31 The efficacy of a guardian ad litem appointed to protect the interests of unborn persons is no different whether he be appointed pursuant to statute or the court's inherent power.32 Given such protection, the equitable doctrine of representation embraces the flexibility, born of convenience and necessity, to act upon the interests of unborn contingent remaindermen to the same effect as if they had been sui juris and parties.33
Yes. Upon an adequate showing by the party petitioning to revoke or modify the trust that the present heirs consent and that the proposed modification adequately protects the interests of those who might be heirs at distribution, the District Court may appoint a guardian ad litem.34 The appellant's proposed modification increasing her annual income could be structured to transfer assets in trust for the benefit of the heirs without any power of alteration in the settlor.35
A guardian ad litem may be appointed to represent the interests of unborn and unascertained beneficiaries in connection with a proposed modification of the trust.36