513 N.E.2d 833, 838-39, 841 (Ill. 1987)
In March 1921, Frank P. Hixon and Alice Green entered into an antenuptial agreement and married.1 The agreement created a trust funded with 200 shares of preferred stock of Pioneer Investment Company.2 The trust provided that Alice would receive the net income for life and could dispose of $50,000 of the fund as she deemed fit.3 If Alice survived Hixon, the balance of the trust fund on her death was to be divided among the heirs of Hixon.4
On May 31, 1926, Hixon created a second trust funded with 300 shares of Pioneer Investment Company stock.5 This trust provided Alice with income from the principal for life, and upon her death the trust fund was to be distributed equally among Hixon's heirs.6 In 1930, Hixon executed a will that left specific gifts and divided the residue of his estate equally among his daughters Ellen Glore and Dorothy Clark and in trust for Alice.7
Hixon died in 1931 at age 69. He was survived by Alice, then 49 years old, by daughters Dorothy and Ellen, then 38 and 36, and by three minor grandchildren.8 Alice lived for another 51 years until her death in February 1982.9 At that time, Hixon's living descendants were grandchildren Frances Glore Beach and Robert Hixon Glore and great-grandchildren Charles F. Glore III, Sallie Glore Farlow, and Edward R. Glore.10
The trustees of the two trusts, Harris Trust and Savings Bank, Robert Hixon Glore, and William Gray III, filed an action in the circuit court of Cook County seeking instructions on distribution of the trusts.11 All parties seeking distribution filed motions for summary judgment.12 The circuit court granted summary judgment to the four charities that were devisees under Dorothy's will.13 The grandchildren and great-grandchildren appealed.14 The appellate court ruled that the remainder reverted to Hixon's estate.15 The Illinois Supreme Court granted the great-grandchildren's petition for leave to appeal.16
Whether the heirs are those surviving Hixon's death or Alice's death?17
In construing a trust the primary task is to find the settlor's intent and give it effect if not against public policy.18 When the instrument is ambiguous courts resort to rules of construction.19 Such rules are merely presumptions that must yield when a preponderance of the evidence shows the settlor intended a different meaning.20 The technical meaning of heirs fixes the class at the settlor's death.21 This presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence that the settlor used the term in a nontechnical sense pointing to a later time.22
Yes. Upon entering an antenuptial agreement in March 1921, Frank P. Hixon and Alice Green married. The agreement created a trust funded with 200 shares of preferred stock of Pioneer Investment Company. The trust provided that Alice was to receive the net income for life and could dispose of $50,000 of the fund as she deemed fit. If Alice survived Hixon, the balance of the trust fund was to be divided among Hixon's heirs.
Subsequently, on May 31, 1926, Hixon created a second trust funded with 300 shares of Pioneer Investment Company stock. This trust provided Alice with income from the principal for life. Upon her death the trust fund was to be distributed equally among Hixon's heirs.
In 1930 Hixon executed a will leaving specific gifts and dividing the residue equally among his daughters Ellen Glore and Dorothy Clark and in trust for Alice. Hixon died in 1931 at age 69. He was survived by Alice then 49 years old, by daughters Dorothy and Ellen then 38 and 36, and by three minor grandchildren. Alice lived another 51 years until her death in February 1982.
At that time Hixon's living descendants were grandchildren Frances Glore Beach and Robert Hixon Glore and great-grandchildren Charles F. Glore III, Sallie Glore Farlow, and Edward R. Glore. The trustees filed an action in the circuit court of Cook County seeking instructions on distribution.
The circuit court granted summary judgment to the charities. The grandchildren and great-grandchildren appealed and the appellate court ruled that the remainder reverted to Hixon's estate. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the great-grandchildren's petition for leave to appeal.
The trusts revolve totally around Alice's life and death.23 Hixon was 20 years older than Alice and therefore expected the trusts to continue long after his death during which family changes through births and deaths would occur.24 Alice's power of appointment over $50,000 of principal made it uncertain whether any assets would remain for the heirs.25 The direction to divide and distribute the principal equally among the heirs at a future time invokes the divide and pay over rule.26 The reversionary clause conditioned the trust on Alice surviving Hixon and showed that Hixon intended a different result if she survived.27
These circumstances together supply preponderant proof that Hixon intended his heirs to be ascertained at Alice's death rather than his own.28
The heirs are those surviving at Alice's death.29
Whether the doctrine of worthier title is applicable, and if so, whether it applies as a rule of construction or a rule of law?30
The doctrine of worthier title voids a gift to the grantor's heirs when the devisees would take exactly the same estate by devise as they would by descent.31 The doctrine is not applicable where there is a difference in kind or quality of the estate.32 The doctrine is not applicable where the heirs are determined after the termination of a life estate so that the takers are not the same persons who would take under the laws of descent and distribution.33
No. Because the class of heirs is determined at Alice's death, the persons who take are the grandchildren and great-grandchildren rather than the persons who would have taken under the laws of descent and distribution at Hixon's death.34 The doctrine therefore does not apply.35 It is unnecessary to decide whether the doctrine operates as a rule of construction or a rule of law.36
The doctrine of worthier title is not applicable.37
Whether, if the heirs are determined at Alice's death, the shares should be distributed per stirpes or per capita?38
When a testator leaves property to his heirs courts presume the testator intended distribution in accordance with the laws of descent and distribution which provide for per stirpes distribution.39 Words such as equally or share and share alike do not rebut this presumption when the gift is made to the class of heirs.40
Yes. Hixon left the remainder to his heirs.41 Although he used the words share and share alike and equally, those words are consistent with per stirpes distribution under the statute in effect at the time the trusts were executed.42 The gift to the class of heirs itself indicates that Hixon intended the remainder to be divided according to the laws of descent and distribution.43 The great-grandchildren therefore take one-ninth each and the grandchildren take one-third each.44
The shares should be distributed per stirpes.45