409 U.S. 524 (1973)
Petitioner Ham was convicted in a South Carolina trial court of possession of marihuana in violation of state law and sentenced to eighteen months' confinement.1 His conviction was affirmed by a divided South Carolina Supreme Court.2 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of whether the trial judge’s refusal to examine jurors on voir dire as to possible prejudice against petitioner violated his federal constitutional rights.3
Petitioner is a young, bearded Negro who has lived most of his life in Florence County, South Carolina.4 He was well known locally for his work in civil rights activities including the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Bi-Racial Committee of the City of Florence.5 He had never previously been convicted of a crime.6 His defense at trial was that law enforcement officers were out to get him because of his civil rights activities and that he had been framed on the drug charge.7
Prior to the trial judge’s voir dire examination of prospective jurors, petitioner’s counsel requested the judge to ask four questions relating to possible prejudice against petitioner.8 The first two questions sought to elicit any possible racial prejudice against Negroes.9 The third question related to possible prejudice against beards.10 The fourth dealt with pretrial publicity relating to the drug problem.11 The trial judge put to the prospective jurors three general questions as to bias, prejudice, or partiality specified in the South Carolina statutes but declined to ask any of the four questions posed by petitioner.12
The record before the Supreme Court contained neither the newspaper articles nor any description of the television program in question regarding pretrial publicity.13 There was a brief colloquy between petitioner’s counsel and the trial judge in which the former offered newspaper accounts and an editorial, but the judge did not consider the items submitted prejudicial.14 The Supreme Court of South Carolina noted that the two newspaper clippings and one editorial concerning drug abuse did not name the defendant or refer in any way to his trial.15
Whether the trial judge’s refusal to examine jurors on voir dire as to possible racial prejudice violated the petitioner's federal constitutional rights?16
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that when a state has created a statutory framework for voir dire and challenges for cause, a trial judge must interrogate prospective jurors on racial bias upon timely request by a defendant whose circumstances implicate that form of prejudice.17 One purpose of the Amendment is to prohibit invidious racial discrimination.18 Another purpose is to secure the essential demands of fairness in criminal trials.19
Yes. Petitioner Ham, a Negro defendant well known for civil rights work, timely requested two questions aimed at racial prejudice.20 The trial judge asked only the three general statutory questions on bias and refused the specific racial inquiries.21 South Carolina law authorizes voir dire examination by the trial judge, yet no inquiry into racial bias occurred despite the defendant’s defense that police framed him because of his civil rights activities.22
The Fourteenth Amendment therefore required the omitted interrogation on racial prejudice.23
The trial judge’s refusal violated the petitioner's federal constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24
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Justice Douglas concurred in the portion of the majority opinion holding that the trial judge was constitutionally compelled to inquire into the possibility of racial prejudice on voir dire.25 He stressed that a defendant possesses the constitutional right to a trial by a neutral and impartial jury.26 Criminal convictions have been reversed when limitations on voir dire unreasonably infringed this right.27
Such reversals have not been confined to racial prejudice cases.28 In Morford v. United States and Dennis v. United States, defendants obtained the right to inquire into possible prejudices concerning alleged ties to the Communist party.29 The Court has clarified that voir dire aimed at disclosing prejudices of a serious character must be allowed upon request.30
Justice Marshall concurred that the trial judge was constitutionally required to inquire into racial prejudice on voir dire.31 He emphasized that the right to an impartial jury protects against all classes of prejudice and extends to all groups in the population.32 It makes little difference whether the jury prejudged the defendant because of skin color or another characteristic.33
The right to an impartial jury carries the concomitant right to take reasonable steps to ensure impartiality.34 The opportunity to prove actual bias through relevant voir dire questions is essential.35 The Court has reversed convictions when the right to query on voir dire has been unreasonably infringed, and this principle applies to the present case.36
Whether the trial judge’s refusal to examine jurors on voir dire as to possible prejudice against beards violated the petitioner's federal constitutional rights?37
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a trial judge to interrogate prospective jurors about possible prejudice against beards.38 Such bias lacks the specific constitutional foundation that attaches to racial prejudice through precedent and the history of the Fourteenth Amendment.39 Trial judges retain broad discretion over the form and number of voir dire questions.40
No. Petitioner requested one question on beard prejudice.41 The trial judge declined after posing the three general bias questions required by statute.42 Although the defendant wore a beard, possible prejudice against beards does not derive from the Aldridge line of cases or from the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to address racial discrimination.43 The refusal therefore did not reach the level of a constitutional violation.44
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Justice Douglas dissented on the beard issue.47 He concluded that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to preclude the defendant from inquiring into prejudice against hair growth.48 Prejudices involving hair growth are of a serious character.49
Nothing indicates the importance attached to hair growth more than the barrage of cases reaching the courts.50 Prejudices invoked by non-conventional hair growth are deeply felt and symbolize rebellion against traditional society.51 Hair growth may become a real personal threat to those supporting the status quo.52
For those people it symbolizes unreliability, dishonesty, lack of moral values, and drug use.53 Denying the defendant the right to examine this aspect of a prospective juror’s personality denies the most effective means of voir dire examination.54
Justice Marshall dissented on the beard issue.55 He concluded that the judge abused his discretion by foreclosing inquiry into beard prejudice.56 The defendant was in fact bearded and the questions were plainly relevant.57
The defense attorney wished to ask no more than four questions requiring only fifteen additional minutes.58 The right to an impartial jury includes the right to take reasonable steps such as targeted voir dire to uncover disqualifying bias.59 The first Justice Harlan stated that the right to challenge is one of the most important rights secured to the accused.60
An absolute ban on questions designed to uncover such prejudice does not properly balance the competing demands of fairness and expedition.61 It would be far more injurious to permit persons entertaining disqualifying prejudice to serve as jurors.62
Whether the trial judge’s refusal to examine jurors on voir dire as to possible prejudice from pretrial publicity violated the petitioner's federal constitutional rights?63
A claim that the Due Process Clause requires voir dire questions on pretrial publicity cannot be sustained when the record contains neither the newspaper articles nor any description of the television program.64 The record therefore supplies no basis for finding prejudicial publicity directed at the defendant.65
No. Petitioner requested a question on pretrial publicity relating to the drug problem.66 The record supplied to the Supreme Court contained neither the articles nor any description of the program.67 The state supreme court noted that the items did not name the defendant or refer to his trial.68 Without substantiating material showing prejudice to this petitioner, no constitutional violation arose from the refusal to pose the question.69
The trial judge’s refusal did not violate the petitioner's federal constitutional rights.
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Justice Marshall agreed that on this record the judge was not required to ask questions about pretrial publicity.70 He noted that the record lacked any substantiating material showing prejudice directed at the defendant.71 The two newspaper clippings and one editorial did not name the defendant or refer to his trial.72
The right to an impartial jury is basic to the system of justice.73 A variety of techniques is available to ensure the jury is impartial, but the judge has broad discretion to refuse questions that are irrelevant.74 Where the claimed prejudice is of a novel character, the judge might require a preliminary showing of relevance.75
Under these circumstances the refusal to pose the question did not violate any constitutional right.76