201 U.S. 43 (1906)
In early 1906 the Supreme Court considered a habeas corpus petition brought by Hale after the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York remanded him to custody for contempt.1
A grand jury was investigating possible violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act involving the American Tobacco Company and the MacAndrews-Forbes Company.2 Hale, an officer of MacAndrews-Forbes Company, was served with a subpoena requiring both oral testimony and the production of corporate documents.3
Hale refused to answer the questions posed by the grand jury.4 He asserted that no specific charge was pending against any person and that his answers might tend to incriminate him.5 He also declined to produce the documents demanded by the subpoena duces tecum, stating that collection within the allotted time was impossible, that counsel had advised against production, and that the documents might incriminate him.6
The subpoena duces tecum directed Hale to bring all understandings, contracts, or correspondence between the MacAndrews & Forbes Company and six other companies, together with all reports made and accounts rendered by those companies from the date of the MacAndrews & Forbes Company's organization, and all letters received by that company since its organization from more than a dozen different companies located in seven states.7 The Circuit Court remanded Hale to custody for contempt. The Supreme Court affirmed the order remanding the petitioner.
Whether a grand jury may examine witnesses without a formal written charge or presentment previously laid before it?8
Under established practice in this country the grand jury may proceed upon its own knowledge or upon examination of witnesses to inquire whether a crime cognizable by the court has been committed.9 The result of the investigation may subsequently be embodied in an indictment.10 It is sufficient to apprise the witness of the names of the parties with respect to whom testimony will be given without indicating the nature of the charge.11
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that a grand jury was investigating possible violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act involving the American Tobacco Company and the MacAndrews-Forbes Company when Hale, an officer of MacAndrews-Forbes Company, received a subpoena that named those companies but contained no reference to any prior formal presentment or indictment.12 The grand jury therefore acted within its authority when it summoned the witness by identifying the parties under investigation rather than by presenting a previously drawn charge.13
A grand jury may examine witnesses without a formal written charge or presentment previously laid before it.14
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurred entirely with the court's statements concerning the powers and functions of the grand jury.15 He agreed that the grand jury possesses broad inquisitorial authority to investigate without a formal charge previously laid before it.1617 In his view this authority is essential to the historic role of the grand jury as an independent body charged with inquiring into possible crimes.18
Harlan stressed that limiting the grand jury to formal charges would impair its ability to protect both the government and the people by uncovering offenses that might otherwise remain hidden.19
Whether the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, protects a witness from self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment when testifying before a grand jury?20
The proviso in the Act of February 25, 1903, that no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty for any transaction concerning which he may testify in any proceeding under the antitrust acts affords absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates.21 This immunity therefore removes the protection of the Fifth Amendment.22
Yes. The established facts show that Hale refused to answer questions before the grand jury on Fifth Amendment grounds while the 1903 immunity statute was in force.23 Because that statute supplies complete protection against prosecution for any matter about which he testified, the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply and the questions should have been answered.24
The immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, protects a witness from self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment when testifying before a grand jury.25
Whether an officer of a corporation may refuse to answer questions or produce corporate documents on Fifth Amendment grounds that the testimony or documents would incriminate the corporation?26
No. The established facts establish that Hale, an officer of MacAndrews-Forbes Company, declined both to answer questions and to produce corporate documents on the ground that they might incriminate the corporation.29 Because the privilege is strictly personal, he could not invoke it on behalf of the corporation and the refusals were therefore improper.30
An officer of a corporation may not refuse to answer questions or produce corporate documents on Fifth Amendment grounds that the testimony or documents would incriminate the corporation.31
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice
Justice Brewer agreed that the protection accorded by the Fifth Amendment is personal to the individual and does not extend to an agent who seeks to justify refusal on the ground that the testimony would incriminate his principal.32 He emphasized that the privilege cannot be used by an officer to shield the corporation itself from examination.3334 Brewer viewed the personal nature of the privilege as fundamental to the constitutional scheme.35
Allowing an agent to assert it on behalf of the corporation would undermine the government's ability to enforce laws against corporate misconduct.36
Whether a subpoena duces tecum demanding production of all contracts, correspondence, reports, accounts, and letters between a corporation and multiple other companies over an extended period constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment?37
Although a subpoena duces tecum may constitute an unreasonable search and seizure when its terms are excessively broad, the Fourth Amendment does not forbid every subpoena for corporate documents.38 The writ must be tested by the standard of reasonableness and must describe the documents with sufficient particularity.39
Yes. The established facts recite that the subpoena required Hale to produce all understandings, contracts, correspondence, reports, accounts, and letters between MacAndrews-Forbes Company and six other companies plus all letters received from more than a dozen additional companies in seven states since the date of the company's organization.40 Because the demand swept in virtually every document in the company's files without any showing of necessity or materiality, it was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.41
A subpoena duces tecum demanding production of all contracts, correspondence, reports, accounts, and letters between a corporation and multiple other companies over an extended period constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.42
Related opinions on this issue
Justice McKenna concluded that the subpoena was sufficiently definite because each document sought would contribute proof of the alleged combination in restraint of trade.43 He noted that any temporary inconvenience to the company's business could be accommodated by the court and that the materiality of testimony is not for the witness to determine.4445 McKenna stressed that the grand jury's power to investigate should not be hampered by requiring a foundation for every piece of evidence in advance.46
He pointed out that Hale had refused to answer even basic questions about the company's business, making the objection to the subpoena's breadth an afterthought.47
Whether a corporation is entitled to the protections of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments against compelled production of its books and papers?48
A corporation is a creature of the state that holds its privileges subject to the reserved power of the state to investigate compliance with law.49 Although a corporation enjoys some Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches, it possesses no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and may not refuse production of its books and papers on that ground.50
No. The established facts show that Hale, as an officer of the New Jersey-chartered MacAndrews-Forbes Company, asserted both Fourth and Fifth Amendment objections to producing the company's documents.5152 While the corporation retains Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable demands, it enjoys no Fifth Amendment privilege and the state and federal governments retain authority to compel production of corporate records to determine compliance with law.53
A corporation is not entitled to the full protections of the Fifth Amendment against compelled production of its books and papers, though it retains limited Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.54
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan stated that a corporation is not part of the people within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and therefore cannot claim immunity under that provision when ordered by a court to produce its books and records in a grand jury investigation.55 He reasoned that allowing such a claim would greatly curtail the government's power to examine corporate compliance with law.5657 Harlan warned that extending Fourth Amendment protections to corporations in this context would effectively prevent meaningful oversight of corporate activities regulated by federal statute.58
He concluded that the subpoena should be enforced against the corporate officer without regard to any claimed corporate immunity.59
Joined by Chief Justice
Justice Brewer maintained that the immunities of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are available to a corporation so far as in the nature of things they are applicable, including protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against being compelled to give evidence against itself.60 He argued that the word person in the Amendments includes corporations and that federal power over commerce does not dispense with these protections.61 Brewer drew on prior decisions applying the Fourteenth Amendment to corporations to support his position that the same logic extends to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.62
He warned against any erosion of these protections through gradual encroachments.63