133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013)
In the early 1990s, Vernon Minton developed a computer program and telecommunications network known as the Texas Computer Exchange Network, or TEXCEN, designed to facilitate securities trading.1 In March 1995, he leased the system to R. M. Stark & Co., a securities brokerage.2 A little over a year later, Minton applied for a patent for an interactive securities trading system based substantially on TEXCEN, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued the patent in January 2000.3
Minton, represented by Jerry Gunn and the other petitioners, filed a patent infringement suit in Federal District Court against the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc.4 NASD and NASDAQ moved for summary judgment on the ground that the patent was invalid under the on-sale bar because Minton had leased TEXCEN more than one year prior to filing his application.56 The District Court granted the motion and declared the patent invalid in 2002.7
Minton then filed a motion for reconsideration arguing for the first time that the lease fell within the experimental-use exception, but the District Court denied the motion. Minton appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which affirmed on the ground that the experimental-use argument had been waived.8
Minton then brought this legal malpractice action in Texas state court against Gunn and the other lawyers.9 The defendants defended on the ground that the lease to Stark was not for an experimental use, and the trial court granted summary judgment after finding less than a scintilla of proof on that point.10
On appeal, Minton argued for the first time that the Texas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the malpractice claim arose under federal patent law.11 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals of Texas rejected the jurisdictional argument and affirmed on the merits.12 The Supreme Court of Texas reversed.13 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
Whether a state law claim alleging legal malpractice in the handling of a patent case must be brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)?15
A state-law claim arises under federal patent law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) only if it necessarily raises a federal issue that is actually disputed and substantial. A federal forum must be able to entertain the claim without disrupting the congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.16
No. Minton's malpractice claim necessarily raises the federal patent issue of whether the experimental-use exception applies to his lease of TEXCEN to Stark. That issue is actually disputed by the parties.17
The federal issue is not substantial because the malpractice claim is backward-looking and hypothetical. No matter how the state courts resolve the case-within-a-case question, Minton's patent will remain invalid.18 The resolution will not bind future patent cases or undermine the development of uniform patent law. State courts adjudicating such claims can be expected to apply the pertinent federal precedents. Any novel patent questions will ultimately be decided by federal courts in actual patent cases.19
The fourth Grable requirement is likewise not met. States have a special responsibility for maintaining standards among members of the licensed professions, including lawyers.20 Congress did not intend to bar state courts from hearing malpractice claims that require resolution of a hypothetical patent issue.21
Minton's state-law malpractice claim does not arise under federal patent law, so the Texas courts properly exercised jurisdiction and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas must be reversed.22