540 U.S. 551 (2004)
In February 1997, a concerned citizen informed ATF Special Agent Jeff Groh that on multiple visits to the ranch of Joseph Ramirez and his family in Butte-Silver Bow County, Montana, the visitor had observed a large stock of weaponry including an automatic rifle, grenades, a grenade launcher, and a rocket launcher.1
Groh prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search the ranch for any automatic firearms or parts, destructive devices including grenades, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and receipts pertaining to their purchase or manufacture.2 He supported the application with a detailed affidavit setting forth the basis for his belief that the listed items were concealed on the premises.3
Groh also completed a warrant form that, in the portion calling for a description of the person or property to be seized, contained a description of the respondents' two-story blue house rather than the stockpile of firearms.4 The warrant did not incorporate the application by reference.5 The magistrate judge signed the warrant form after reviewing the documents, and the affidavit was placed under seal.6
The day after the magistrate issued the warrant, Groh led a team of federal agents and local sheriff's deputies in executing the search on the Ramirez ranch while Joseph Ramirez was absent but his wife and children were present.7 The officers uncovered no illegal weapons or explosives. Groh gave Mrs. Ramirez a copy of the search warrant but not the sealed application.8 The following day he faxed respondents' attorney a copy of the page of the application listing the items to be seized.9
Respondents Joseph Ramirez and his family brought this action against Groh and the other officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the search violated their Fourth Amendment rights.10 The District Court entered summary judgment for all defendants on all claims.11 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment as to all defendants and claims except the Fourth Amendment claim against Groh, on which it reversed.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity questions.13
Whether the search of respondents' home violated the Fourth Amendment?14
The Fourth Amendment requires that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.15 The particularity requirement demands that the warrant itself identify the items to be seized rather than relying on an unincorporated application or sealed affidavit.16
Yes. The warrant issued in this case described only the two-story blue house on the Ramirez ranch rather than the automatic firearms, grenades, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and related receipts listed in Groh's application.17 The application was not attached to the warrant and had been placed under seal, so neither the Ramirezes nor the executing officers had the itemized list available during the search.18 Groh led the team that entered the home while Mrs. Ramirez and the children were present, yet the officers uncovered no illegal items and seized nothing.19
Because the warrant failed to describe any items at all in the space provided for that purpose, the search must be treated as warrantless and therefore presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.20
The search violated the Fourth Amendment.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy concurs in the Court's holding that the Fourth Amendment was violated.22 He writes separately to emphasize that the particularity requirement is not a mere formality but instead constitutes a fundamental protection against general warrants.23
The warrant in this case was the equivalent of a general warrant because it authorized the officers to search for anything they wanted.24 Kennedy notes that this is precisely the type of abuse the particularity clause was designed to prevent.25 He stresses that the requirement serves to assure individuals that the executing officer's authority is limited and properly authorized by a magistrate.26
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J., And Scalia, J.
Justice Thomas dissents from the holding that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.27 He maintains that the application and affidavit supplied the required particular description of the items to be seized.28
Thomas argues that the magistrate reviewed those documents before signing the warrant.29 In his view, the search therefore satisfied the core protections of the Warrant Clause even though the warrant form itself was defective.30 He contends that the Fourth Amendment does not mandate that the description appear in the warrant itself when the supporting documents provide adequate notice.31
Whether petitioner Groh is entitled to qualified immunity from damages?32
An officer is entitled to qualified immunity unless the constitutional right was clearly established and it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted.33 When a warrant is so facially deficient in particularity that no reasonable officer could believe it valid, qualified immunity does not apply.34
No. The warrant was obviously deficient on its face because it described the Ramirez residence instead of any items to be seized.35 Groh himself prepared both the application and the warrant form yet failed to notice or correct the error before presenting the documents to the magistrate.36 Department guidelines in force at the time warned agents that they were liable for executing a search warrant that was insufficient on its face.37
The guidelines instructed them not to proceed if any deficiency would likely invalidate the warrant.38 Because the defect was glaring and Groh had prepared the warrant, a reasonable officer in his position would have recognized that the warrant was invalid.39
Petitioner Groh is not entitled to qualified immunity from damages.40
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J.
Justice Kennedy dissents from the denial of qualified immunity.41 He views the error as a straightforward clerical mistake of fact rather than a mistake of law.42
In his view, an officer who otherwise fulfills the demanding responsibilities of obtaining and executing a search warrant can reasonably fail to notice a typographical error on the warrant form.43 Kennedy argues that the officer trained the search team and executed the warrant based on his mistaken belief that the warrant contained the proper description.44 He concludes that Groh should receive qualified immunity because the mistake was reasonable under the circumstances of a complex investigation.45
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J., And Scalia, J.
Justice Thomas dissents from the denial of qualified immunity as well.46 He argues that even if a constitutional violation occurred, Groh's actions were objectively reasonable.47
Groh prepared a detailed affidavit and application, briefed the search team on the intended scope, executed the search within those limits, and promptly provided the missing information once the defect was discovered.48 He notes that the Court should not impose a novel proofreading requirement on officers who have otherwise acted with diligence.49