483 U.S. 868, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1987)
Joseph Griffin had previously been convicted of a felony. On September 4, 1980, a Wisconsin state court convicted him of resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and obstructing an officer and placed him on probation.1 Wisconsin statutes placed probationers in the legal custody of the State Department of Health and Social Services and made them subject to conditions set by the court and rules and regulations established by the department.2
Department regulations permitted any probation officer to search a probationer's home without a warrant provided the supervisor approved and reasonable grounds existed to believe contraband was present.3 The regulations identified factors to consider in assessing reasonable grounds, such as information from an informant and the officer's experience with the probationer.4 Separate regulations prohibited a probationer from possessing a firearm without advance approval and treated refusal to consent to a home search as a violation of probation terms.5
On April 5, 1983, probation supervisor Michael Lew received a tip from a Beloit Police Department detective that guns might be in Griffin's apartment.6 Lew, accompanied by another probation officer and three plainclothes policemen, went to the apartment. Griffin answered the door, and the probation officers searched the home and found a handgun.7
Griffin was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the handgun, a jury convicted him of the offense, and the court sentenced him to two years' imprisonment.8 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.9
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also affirmed. It upheld the denial of the suppression motion after concluding that the search satisfied applicable standards.10 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Fourth Amendment question presented by the search.11
Whether the warrantless search of a probationer's home by probation officers, conducted pursuant to a state regulation authorizing searches on reasonable grounds to believe contraband is present, violated the Fourth Amendment?12
The Fourth Amendment requires that searches be reasonable, and while a warrant supported by probable cause is the usual standard, exceptions exist when special needs beyond normal law enforcement make the warrant and probable-cause requirements impracticable, allowing instead a standard of reasonable grounds under a valid regulatory scheme.13
No. The operation of a probation system presents special needs that justify warrantless searches of a probationer's home on reasonable grounds rather than probable cause.14 Joseph Griffin had been placed on probation after his 1980 convictions.15 He was subject to Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services regulations that permitted any probation officer to search a probationer's home without a warrant when a supervisor approved and reasonable grounds existed to believe contraband was present.16 On April 5, 1983, supervisor Michael Lew received a tip from a Beloit police detective that guns might be in Griffin's apartment.17 Lew, accompanied by another probation officer, went to the apartment.18 He informed Griffin of the search, and the probation officers located a handgun.19
The search satisfied the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to the regulation.20 The regulation itself meets the reasonableness requirement given the special needs of probation supervision that render the warrant requirement impracticable and support replacement of probable cause with the lesser reasonable-grounds standard.21
The warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun dissented on the ground that special needs justify only a reduced suspicion standard for probationer searches but do not justify dispensing with the warrant requirement to protect privacy in the home.23 He concluded that the unverified tip from an unknown source failed to satisfy even reasonable suspicion.24 The probation supervisor made no effort to follow the regulatory factors for evaluating the information or the informant.25
He drew on no special knowledge of the probationer.26
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that mere speculation by a police officer that a probationer may have had contraband is not a constitutionally sufficient basis for a warrantless search of a private home.27 He simply could not understand how five Members of this Court could reach a contrary conclusion on the facts presented.28 Stevens stressed that the information amounted to nothing more than conjecture from an unknown source.29
Such speculation could never justify the serious intrusion of a nonconsensual search into the sanctity of a private residence.30 He viewed the majority's result as inexplicable given the complete absence of any verified or reliable basis for the officers' actions.31