377 U.S. 218 (1964)
This litigation began in 1951 when a group of Negro school children living in Prince Edward County, Virginia, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.1 They alleged that they had been denied admission to public schools attended by white children.2 They charged that Virginia laws requiring such school segregation denied them the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court held that the Virginia segregation laws did deny equal protection.4 On May 31, 1955, the Court remanded the case to the District Court to enter orders necessary to admit the complainants to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed.5
Efforts to desegregate Prince Edward County’s schools met with resistance.6 In 1956 the Virginia Constitution was amended to authorize appropriations to assist students to attend nonsectarian private schools.7 The General Assembly enacted legislation to close any public schools where white and colored children were enrolled together, to cut off state funds to such schools, to pay tuition grants to children in nonsectarian private schools, and to extend state retirement benefits to teachers in newly created private schools.8 The legislation closing mixed schools and cutting off state funds was later invalidated by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.9 In April 1959 the General Assembly repealed much of the 1956 legislation and enacted a new tuition grant program.10 It also repealed the compulsory attendance laws and made school attendance a matter of local option.11
In June 1959 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit directed the District Court to enjoin discriminatory practices.12 It required the County School Board to take immediate steps toward admitting students without regard to race.13 The Supervisors of Prince Edward County refused to levy any school taxes for the 1959-1960 school year.14 As a result, the county’s public schools did not reopen in the fall of 1959 and have remained closed ever since.15 A private group, the Prince Edward School Foundation, was formed to operate private schools for white children.16 Colored children were without formal education from 1959 to 1963.17 In 1960 the General Assembly adopted a new tuition grant program.18 The County Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance providing additional tuition grants and allowing property tax credits for contributions to private schools.19
In 1961 petitioners filed a supplemental complaint.20 They sought to enjoin the respondents from refusing to operate an efficient system of public free schools and to enjoin payment of public funds to help support private schools which excluded students on account of race.21 The District Court enjoined the county from paying tuition grants or giving tax credits so long as public schools remained closed.22 The District Court later held that the public schools of Prince Edward County may not be closed to avoid the effect of the law of the land while other public schools remain open.23 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court should have abstained to await state court determination.24 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.25
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld as valid under state law the closing of the public schools, the tuition grants, and the tax concessions.26 It held that each county had an option to operate or not to operate public schools.27
Whether the amended supplemental complaint presented a new and different cause of action from the original complaint?28
Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure plainly permits supplemental amendments to cover events happening after suit, and it follows that persons participating in these new events may be added if necessary. Such amendments are well within the basic aim of the rules to make pleadings a means to achieve an orderly and fair administration of justice.29
Yes. The supplemental pleading added new parties and relied on transactions that occurred after the action began as part of continued efforts to circumvent the Brown holding that Prince Edward County could not operate racially segregated schools.30 The original complaint challenged segregation in admittedly public schools while the new complaint charged that the county continued using funds to assist private schools after closing its public schools to avoid the ordered desegregation.31
The amended complaint was not a new cause of action but merely part of the same old cause of action arising out of the continued desire of colored students to have the same opportunity for state-supported education.32
Whether a single district judge could adjudicate the issues raised by the supplemental complaint?33
Only a suit involving a statute of general application and not one affecting a particular municipality or district can invoke the three-judge court requirement under the statute then in force.34
Yes. What was attacked was not something the State commanded Prince Edward to do but rather something the county with state acquiescence undertook on its own volition, a decision not binding on any other county in Virginia.35 The case as it came to the Court concerned not a statewide system but a situation unique to Prince Edward County.36
The single district judge did not err in adjudicating this present controversy.37
Whether the action against state and county officials was barred by the Eleventh Amendment?38
It has been settled law since Ex parte Young that suits against state and county officials to enjoin them from invading constitutional rights are not forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment.39
No. The complaint charged that state and county officials were depriving petitioners of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment by closing public schools and supporting private segregated schools.40 It has been settled law since Ex parte Young that suits against state and county officials to enjoin them from invading constitutional rights are not forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment. The present action sought injunctive relief against such officials to protect the petitioners' constitutional rights.41
The action against state and county officials was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.42
Whether the District Court should have abstained from deciding the case pending state court determination?43
Abstention is not required where the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has already passed upon the state law with respect to all the issues here. The case has been delayed since 1951 by resistance at the state and county level, with the original plaintiffs having passed high school age.44
No. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had already passed upon the state law with respect to all the issues here.45 The case had been delayed since 1951 by resistance at the state and county level, by legislation, and by lawsuits. There had been entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed in enforcing the constitutional rights denied Prince Edward County Negro children.46
The District Court should not have abstained from deciding the case pending state court determination.47
Whether closing the public schools in Prince Edward County while public schools in all other Virginia counties remained open denied the Negro students equal protection of the laws?48
Whatever nonracial grounds might support a State's allowing a county to abandon public schools the object must be a constitutional one and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.49
Yes. Virginia law treated the school children of Prince Edward differently from the way it treated the school children of all other Virginia counties. Prince Edward children had to go to a private school or none at all, while all other Virginia children could go to public schools.50 The record showed that Prince Edward's public schools were closed and private schools operated in their place with state and county assistance.
This was done for one reason only: to ensure that white and colored children in Prince Edward County would not, under any circumstances, go to the same school.51
Closing the Prince Edward schools while contributing to the support of the private segregated white schools that took their place denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws.52
Whether the District Court had the power to order county officials to levy taxes to reopen and operate the public schools without racial discrimination?53
The District Court may, if necessary to prevent further racial discrimination, require the Supervisors to exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes. This would raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system in Prince Edward County like that operated in other counties in Virginia.54
Yes. The parties defendant had duties relating directly or indirectly to the financing, supervision, or operation of the schools in Prince Edward County.55 The Board of Supervisors had the special responsibility to levy local taxes to operate public schools or to aid children attending the private schools.56 The injunction against paying tuition grants and giving tax credits while public schools remained closed was appropriate and necessary.57
Those grants and tax credits had been essential parts of the county's program to deprive petitioners of the same advantages of a public school education enjoyed by children in every other part of Virginia.58
The District Court had the power to order county officials to levy taxes to reopen and operate the public schools without racial discrimination. This was required to assure petitioners that their constitutional rights would no longer be denied them.59