139 S. Ct. 738 (2019)
In early 2015, petitioner Gilberto Garza, Jr., signed two plea agreements arising from criminal charges brought by the State of Idaho, each including a clause stating that Garza waived his right to appeal.1 The Idaho trial court accepted the agreements and sentenced Garza to terms of prison in accordance with the agreements.2
Shortly after sentencing, Garza told his trial counsel that he wished to appeal.3 In the days that followed, Garza continuously reminded his attorney of this directive via phone calls and letters, and his trial counsel acknowledged that Garza had told him he wanted to appeal the sentences.4 Garza’s trial counsel did not file a notice of appeal, instead informing Garza that an appeal was problematic because he waived his right to appeal.5 The period of time for Garza’s appeal to be preserved came and went with no notice having been filed.6
Roughly four months after sentencing, Garza sought postconviction relief in Idaho state court, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file notices of appeal despite Garza’s requests.7 The Idaho trial court denied relief, and both the Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed that decision.8
The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Garza, given the appeal waivers, needed to show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice and concluded that he could not.9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split of authority regarding whether the presumption of prejudice applies when a defendant has signed an appeal waiver.10
Whether the presumption of prejudice recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega applies when a defendant has signed an appeal waiver?11
Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must prove both that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that any such deficiency was prejudicial to the defense.12 In Sixth Amendment contexts such as when the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage or when counsel's constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, prejudice is presumed, as held in Roe v. Flores-Ortega.13 This presumption applies even when the defendant has signed an appeal waiver because no waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims, the language of waivers can leave many claims unwaived, and filing a notice of appeal is a purely ministerial task that does not necessarily breach a plea agreement.14
Yes. Garza's counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to file the notice of appeal despite Garza's clear and repeated requests via phone calls and letters.15 The ultimate authority to decide whether to take an appeal belongs to the defendant.16 Although Garza signed appeal waivers in the two plea agreements, he retained the right to appeal at least some issues, such as challenges to whether the waiver itself was knowing and voluntary.17 Counsel's failure therefore deprived Garza of an appellate proceeding altogether.18
Because there is no dispute that Garza wished to appeal, Flores-Ortega's presumption of prejudice applies directly without any further showing from Garza of the merits of his underlying claims, regardless of the appeal waivers.19
The presumption of prejudice recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega applies when a defendant has signed an appeal waiver, so the judgment of the Idaho Supreme Court is reversed and the case is remanded.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Gorsuch, And Justice Alito As To Parts I And Ii
Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that Flores-Ortega does not control this case because the defendant in Flores-Ortega had not signed an appeal waiver.21 The proximate cause of the lost appeal was therefore the defendant's own agreement rather than counsel's inaction.22 Thomas would require Garza to identify specific nonwaived claims or show involuntariness or breach to establish prejudice under a standard Strickland analysis.23
He concluded that counsel acted reasonably to protect the plea bargain benefits and that Garza suffered no prejudice from his self-inflicted waiver.24 Thomas further contended that the majority's per se rule undermines the finality of criminal judgments and deviates from the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment.25