332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797
Raymond Lennard Garnett was a twenty-year-old man with an I.Q. of 52 who attended special education classes and functioned socially at the level of an eleven or twelve year old.1
In November or December 1990 a friend introduced Garnett to thirteen-year-old Erica Frazier.2
On February 28, 1991 Garnett approached Frazier's house seeking a ride home.3 At her invitation he entered her bedroom through the window using a ladder.4 The two talked and later engaged in sexual intercourse.5 Garnett left at about 4:30 a.m. the following morning.6 On November 19, 1991 Frazier gave birth to Garnett's biological child.7
Garnett was tried in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on one count of second degree rape under the statutory provision addressing vaginal intercourse with a person under fourteen when the actor is at least four years older.8 The defense twice proffered evidence that Frazier and her friends had told Garnett she was sixteen and that he had acted with that belief.9 The trial court excluded the evidence as immaterial.10 The court found Garnett guilty and sentenced him to five years in prison, suspended the sentence, imposed five years of probation, and ordered restitution to Frazier and her family.11
Garnett noted an appeal.12 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior to intermediate appellate review by the Court of Special Appeals.13
Whether a reasonable mistake of age is a defense to second degree rape under Maryland Code Art. 27, § 463(a)(3)?14
Maryland's second degree rape statute under Art. 27, § 463(a)(3) defines a strict liability offense that does not require the State to prove mens rea as to the complainant's age and makes no allowance for a mistake-of-age defense.15
No. The plain language of § 463(a)(3) makes no reference to the actor's knowledge, belief, or other state of mind regarding the victim's age.1617
Garnett, age twenty, engaged in vaginal intercourse with Frazier, age thirteen and more than four years younger.18
The legislative history of the 1976 revision shows that the House of Delegates explicitly rejected a proposed mens rea requirement.19
Because the statute creates strict liability, evidence that Garnett had been told and believed Frazier was sixteen is immaterial to guilt.20
A reasonable mistake of age is not a defense to second degree rape under Maryland Code Art. 27, § 463(a)(3).21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Judges Rodowsky And Mcauliffe
Eldridge agrees that an ordinary defendant's mistake about the victim's age is not a defense but argues the statute still contains a mens rea requirement tied to the defendant's ability to appreciate the risk of engaging in sexual activity with a young person.22
He contends that Garnett's mental retardation with an I.Q. of 52 may have prevented him from appreciating that risk.23 The trial court's preclusion of all inquiry into Garnett's knowledge and comprehension was error requiring reversal and remand for a new trial.24
Eldridge emphasizes that the penalty of up to twenty years imprisonment indicates the General Assembly did not intend a pure strict liability offense where criminal liability attaches regardless of mental state.25
Bell dissents on constitutional grounds arguing that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Maryland Declaration of Rights precludes strict criminal liability for this felony.26
The statute relieves the State of proving the defendant's mental state and prevents the defendant from litigating mistake of age.27 He maintains that the defendant may defend on the basis that he was mistaken as to the age of the prosecutrix when the mistake was prompted by the victim and her friends telling him she was sixteen.28
Bell stresses that the felony stigma and severe penalty require proof of culpable mental state to satisfy due process.29
Whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the defendant had been told and believed the victim was sixteen years old?30
Because second degree rape under § 463(a)(3) is a strict liability offense as to the victim's age evidence of the defendant's reasonable belief that the victim was sixteen is immaterial and its exclusion is not error.31
No. The trial court correctly ruled that the victim's representations as to her age and the defendant's belief that she was sixteen amounted to no defense because the offense is one of strict liability.3233
The proffered testimony from Garnett's mother and friend that Frazier had told them she was sixteen along with Garnett's statements to police was therefore properly excluded as irrelevant to the only elements the State needed to prove.34
The trial court did not err in excluding evidence that the defendant had been told and believed the victim was sixteen years old.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Judges Rodowsky And Mcauliffe
Eldridge would hold that the trial court erred by taking the position that the defendant's mental state was wholly immaterial and by refusing to allow Garnett to testify concerning his knowledge or to explore how his retardation affected his comprehension even though an ordinary mistake-of-age defense is unavailable.36
He notes that the trial judge precluded exploration into whether Garnett's impairment negated the requisite mens rea tied to risk appreciation.37 Eldridge would reverse and remand for a new trial to permit inquiry into the defendant's actual mental state.38
Bell would hold that the exclusion violated due process because it prevented Garnett from presenting evidence that he acted under a mistake of fact as to the prosecutrix's age evidence that would have been viable if the statute were construed to require proof of the defendant's intent or knowledge.39
He argues the proffered testimony that the victim and her friends told Garnett she was sixteen should have been admitted to show lack of culpable mental state.40 Bell maintains that due process forbids relieving the State of its burden to prove intent in this felony context.41