411 U.S. 778 (1973)
In July 1965, Gerald Scarpelli pleaded guilty to a charge of armed robbery in Wisconsin.1 The trial judge sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment but suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for seven years in the custody of the Wisconsin Department of Public Welfare.2 At that time, Scarpelli signed an agreement specifying the terms of his probation and a travel permit allowing him to reside in Illinois under an interstate compact supervision arrangement.3 On August 5, 1965, he was accepted for supervision by the Adult Probation Department of Cook County, Illinois.4
On August 6, 1965, Illinois police apprehended Scarpelli and Fred Kleckner, Jr., during the burglary of a house.5 After being advised of his constitutional rights, Scarpelli admitted that he and Kleckner had broken into the house for the purpose of stealing merchandise or money, although he later asserted that his statement was made under duress and is false.6 On September 1, 1965, the Wisconsin Department revoked his probation without a hearing on the stated grounds that he had associated with known criminals in violation of his probation regulations and was involved in and arrested for the burglary while associating with Kleckner.7 On September 4, 1965, Scarpelli was incarcerated in the Wisconsin State Reformatory at Green Bay to begin serving the fifteen-year sentence.8
Some three years later, on December 16, 1968, Scarpelli applied for a writ of habeas corpus.9 After the petition had been filed but before it was acted upon, the Department placed him on parole.10 The District Court found that his status as a parolee was sufficient custody to confer jurisdiction and that the petition was not moot because the revocation carried collateral consequences.11 On the merits, the District Court held that revocation without a hearing and counsel was a denial of due process.12 The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Whether a previously sentenced probationer is entitled to a hearing when his probation is revoked?14
Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution but does result in a loss of liberty, entitling a probationer to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer.15
Yes. In July 1965, Gerald Scarpelli pleaded guilty to armed robbery in Wisconsin and received a suspended fifteen-year sentence with seven years of probation.16
On August 6, 1965, he was apprehended during a burglary in Illinois and admitted involvement, though he later claimed the statement was made under duress.17 Probation was revoked on September 1, 1965, without a hearing, leading to his incarceration on September 4, 1965.18
Three years later, Scarpelli sought habeas corpus relief, and after being placed on parole, the lower courts found a due process violation in the revocation process without hearing or counsel.19 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issues.20
The rule from Morrissey applies directly because the established facts show a complete absence of any preliminary or final hearing, which are required to protect the interests in accurate factfinding and informed discretion.21
A previously sentenced probationer is entitled to a hearing when his probation is revoked.22
Whether an indigent probationer or parolee has a due process right to be represented by appointed counsel at a probation or parole revocation hearing?23
The decision whether to appoint counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of sound discretion by the state authority charged with administering the probation and parole system. Counsel is presumptively required when the probationer makes a timely and colorable claim that he has not committed the alleged violation or that substantial reasons justify or mitigate the violation and make revocation inappropriate because those reasons are complex or difficult to develop.24
No. The established facts reveal that Scarpelli had admitted to the burglary, creating the sort of situation where counsel need not ordinarily be provided.25 The Court rejected a per se rule requiring counsel in every revocation case, citing critical differences between revocation hearings and criminal trials, including the absence of a prosecutor, formal evidence rules, and the predictive focus of the hearing body.26
In this instance, the admission to another serious crime suggests that the general guidelines would not require counsel, although the subsequent assertions regarding duress warrant re-examination on remand under the case-by-case standard.27
An indigent probationer or parolee does not have an automatic due process right to appointed counsel at every probation or parole revocation hearing; appointment is determined case by case.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissented in part.29 He believed that due process requires the appointment of counsel in this case because of the claim that respondent’s confession of the burglary was made under duress.30 This position focuses on the specific facts of the case involving a potential duress claim in the admission to burglary.31
Douglas cross-referenced his separate opinion in Morrissey v. Brewer to underscore the necessity of counsel when such claims arise during revocation proceedings.32