526 U.S. 559 (1999)
In July and August 1993, police officers observed Tyvessel Tyvorus White using his automobile to deliver cocaine on three separate occasions.1
These observations led the officers to develop probable cause to believe that White's car was subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.2 Several months later, officers arrested White at his place of employment on charges unrelated to the earlier drug transactions.3
At the time of the arrest, the officers seized White's automobile from his employer's parking lot without obtaining a warrant, acting pursuant to the provisions of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.4 During a subsequent inventory search of the seized vehicle, officers discovered two pieces of crack cocaine in the ashtray.5
Based on this discovery, White was charged with possession of a controlled substance.6 At trial on the possession charge, White moved to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing that the warrantless seizure of his car violated the Fourth Amendment.7
The trial court denied the motion after the jury returned a guilty verdict.8 On appeal, the Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction.9 The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the case after certification of a question from the district court of appeal.10
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Fourth Amendment issue presented.11
Whether the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband?12
The Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant to seize an automobile from a public place when officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle itself is forfeitable contraband under state law.13 Historical practice at the time of the Fourth Amendment's framing and precedents such as Carroll v. United States and G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States permit warrantless seizures of movable contraband in public areas.14
No. The officers developed probable cause to believe White's automobile was forfeitable contraband after observing him use the vehicle to deliver cocaine on three occasions in July and August 1993.15 Several months later the officers arrested White at his workplace on unrelated charges and seized the automobile without a warrant from the employer's parking lot pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.16 An inventory search then revealed crack cocaine.17 These facts establish that the vehicle was seized from a public place on probable cause that it was itself contraband, satisfying the rule that no warrant is required in such circumstances.18
The warrantless seizure of White's automobile from a public parking lot did not violate the Fourth Amendment.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Souter joined the Court’s opinion subject to a qualification against reading our holding as a general endorsement of warrantless seizures of anything a State chooses to call “contraband,” whether or not the property happens to be in public when seized.20 The Fourth Amendment does not concede any talismanic significance to use of the term “contraband” whenever a legislature may resort to a novel forfeiture sanction in the interest of law enforcement, as legislatures are evincing increasing ingenuity in doing.21
Moreover, G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States endorsed the public character of a warrantless seizure scheme by reference to traditional enforcement of government revenue laws and the legality of seizing abandoned contraband in public view.22
Joined by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented from the majority’s conclusion that no warrant was required.23 He emphasized that the seizure occurred more than two months after the last event giving rise to probable cause and while the owner was already in custody.24 The automobile exception cases cited by the majority involved contemporaneous searches for contraband inside a vehicle or brief seizures to facilitate such searches, not the delayed seizure of the vehicle itself as the ultimate prize of forfeiture.25
The absence of any exigent circumstances, combined with the risks of hindsight bias at post-seizure hearings and the pecuniary interest of law enforcement agencies in forfeiture proceeds, supported application of the warrant presumption.26 Requiring neutral magistrate review before such seizures would help guard against arbitrary intrusions without unduly burdening legitimate enforcement efforts.27