500 U.S. 248, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991)
Officer Frank Trujillo of the Dade County police force overheard respondent Enio Jimeno arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone.1 Believing that Jimeno might be involved in illegal drug trafficking, Officer Trujillo followed his car. The officer observed Jimeno make a right turn at a red light without stopping. He then pulled Jimeno over to the side of the road to issue him a traffic citation.2
Officer Trujillo told Jimeno that he had been stopped for committing a traffic infraction. The officer went on to say that he had reason to believe that Jimeno was carrying narcotics in his car and asked permission to search the car. He explained that Jimeno did not have to consent to a search of the car. Jimeno stated that he had nothing to hide and gave Trujillo permission to search the automobile.3 After Jimeno’s spouse, respondent Luz Jimeno, stepped out of the car, Officer Trujillo went to the passenger side, opened the door, and saw a folded, brown paper bag on the floorboard.4
The officer picked up the bag, opened it, and found a kilogram of cocaine inside.5 The Jimenos were charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of Florida law. Before trial, they moved to suppress the cocaine found in the bag on the ground that Jimeno’s consent to search the car did not extend to the closed paper bag inside of the car.6
The trial court granted the motion. It found that, although Jimeno could have assumed that the officer would have searched the bag at the time he gave his consent, his mere consent to search the car did not carry with it specific consent to open the bag and examine its contents.7 The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence of the cocaine.8
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, relying upon its decision in State v. Wells.9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether consent to search a vehicle may extend to closed containers found inside the vehicle.10
Whether a criminal suspect’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches is violated when, after he gives a police officer permission to search his automobile, the officer opens a closed container found within the car that might reasonably hold the object of the search?11
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.12 The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?13 The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object.14
Yes. Officer Trujillo informed Jimeno that he believed Jimeno was carrying narcotics in his car and would be looking for narcotics.15 Jimeno gave permission to search the automobile without placing any explicit limitation on the scope of the search.16 The folded brown paper bag on the floorboard might reasonably hold narcotics, as a reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container.17
Therefore, it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the scope of Jimeno's consent permitted opening the paper bag.18
The criminal suspect’s Fourth Amendment right was not violated by the officer opening the closed container.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall dissented, contending that an individual’s general consent to a search of the interior of his car for narcotics should not reasonably be understood as consent to a search of closed containers inside the car.20 He emphasized the distinct privacy expectations that attach to cars and closed containers, noting that a heightened expectation of privacy attaches to the contents of a closed container.21 Marshall argued that because these privacy interests are independent and divisible, a police officer who wishes to search a suspicious container found during a consensual automobile search must obtain additional consent to search the container.22
He rejected the majority's rationale that a reasonable person would know narcotics are carried in containers, observing that the same logic could extend to searching the person or body cavities.23 Marshall concluded that the majority's approach permits the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens rather than encouraging knowing consent.24