455 U.S. 603 (1982)
In the course of a fight in a nightclub parking lot, Ronnie Buchanan pinned respondent Weir to the ground. Buchanan then jumped to his feet and shouted that he had been stabbed; he ultimately died from his stab wounds. Respondent immediately left the scene, and did not report the incident to the police.1
At his trial for intentional murder, respondent took the stand in his own defense. He admitted stabbing Buchanan, but claimed that he acted in self-defense and that the stabbing was accidental. This in-court statement was the first occasion on which respondent offered an exculpatory version of the stabbing. The prosecutor cross-examined him as to why he had, when arrested, failed either to advance his exculpatory explanation to the arresting officers or to disclose the location of the knife he had used to stab Buchanan. Respondent was ultimately found guilty by a jury of first-degree manslaughter. The conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky.2
The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky then granted respondent a writ of habeas corpus, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 658 F. 2d 1126 (1981).3 The record does not indicate that the arresting officers had immediately read respondent his Miranda warnings.4
The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.5 The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.6
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from permitting a prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant about his post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes, when the record does not indicate that Miranda warnings were given?7
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the use of a defendant's post-arrest silence for impeachment is prohibited only when the silence was induced by Miranda warnings.8 Doyle v. Ohio established that Miranda warnings carry an implicit assurance that silence will not be penalized, making it fundamentally unfair to use such silence against the defendant at trial.9 Post-Doyle decisions have clarified that this prohibition does not extend to situations where no Miranda warnings were given, as there is no governmental action inducing the silence.10 States retain the authority to determine under their evidence rules whether post-arrest silence may impeach a defendant's testimony when the defendant chooses to take the stand.11
No. The record does not indicate that respondent Weir received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent immediately after his arrest.12 The prosecutor's cross-examination as to respondent's post-arrest silence therefore did not implicate any implicit assurances from the government.13 In the absence of Miranda warnings, the state was entitled to permit the impeachment of respondent's testimony by reference to his earlier silence under its own rules of evidence.14 This approach aligns with the principle that only affirmative governmental assurances trigger the due process protection recognized in Doyle.15
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit a state from permitting a prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant about his post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes when the record does not indicate that Miranda warnings were given.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall dissents from the summary reversal of this case.17 His position reflects the view that the constitutional question of whether the Due Process Clause extends to prohibit impeachment use of post-arrest silence absent Miranda warnings presented sufficient complexity and importance to require full briefing and oral argument.18 Rather than joining the per curiam disposition that reversed the Court of Appeals on the basis of post-Doyle precedent, Justice Marshall would have set the matter for plenary consideration to allow more thorough exploration of the governmental action and fairness issues raised by the lower court's holding.19