470 U.S. 480 (1985)
The present litigation began in May 1983 when the Democratic Party, the DNC, and Edward Mezvinsky filed suit against NCPAC and FCM, who had announced their intention to spend large sums of money to help bring about the reelection of President Ronald Reagan in 1984.1
Their amended complaint sought a declaration that § 9012(f) of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act was constitutional.2 The FEC intervened for the sole purpose of moving, along with the PACs, to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing.3
In June 1983 the FEC brought a separate action against the same defendants seeking identical declaratory relief.4 The cases were consolidated before the same three-judge District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.5 The parties submitted 201 stipulations and three books of exhibits as the factual record.6
NCPAC is a nonprofit, nonmembership corporation formed under the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act in August 1975 and registered with the FEC as a political committee.7 Its primary purpose is to attempt to influence directly or indirectly the election or defeat of candidates for federal, state, and local offices by making contributions and by making its own expenditures.8 It raises money by general and specific direct mail solicitations.9
FCM is incorporated under the laws of Virginia and is registered with the FEC as a multicandidate political committee.10 In all material respects it is identical to NCPAC.11 Both NCPAC and FCM are self-described ideological organizations with a conservative political philosophy.12
They solicited funds in support of President Reagan's 1980 campaign, and they spent money on such means as radio and television advertisements to encourage voters to elect him President.13 NCPAC and FCM expressed their intention to conduct similar activities in support of President Reagan's reelection in 1984, and we may assume that they did so.14
The district court held that the Democrats had standing under § 9011(b)(1) and Art. III of the Constitution to seek the requested declaratory relief, but that the Democrats and the FEC were not entitled to a declaration that § 9012(f) is constitutional.15 The court held that § 9012(f) abridges First Amendment freedoms of speech and association, that it is substantially overbroad, and that it cannot permissibly be given a narrowing construction to cure the overbreadth.16 The court did not, however, declare § 9012(f) unconstitutional because the PACs had not filed a counterclaim requesting such a declaration.17
The FEC appealed the determination that § 9012(f) was unconstitutional, and the Democrats appealed the standing issue as well.18 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction pursuant to the statutory appeal provision of § 9011(b)(2).19
Whether the Democratic Party of the United States and the Democratic National Committee have standing under 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(1) to institute an action seeking a declaratory judgment that 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) is constitutional?20
The plain language of the Fund Act and the FECA suggests quite emphatically that the Democrats do not have standing to bring a private action against another private party.21 In addition to the FEC, § 9011(b)(1) applies only to the national committee of any political party and to individuals eligible to vote for President.22 But such actions must be appropriate to implement or construe the provision of the Fund Act at issue.23 Title 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1) provides that the FEC shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to the Fund Act and confers on the FEC exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of the Act.24 Accordingly, private suits of this kind are inappropriate interference with the FEC's responsibilities.25
No. The Democratic Party is not included in the statute's authorization, and while the DNC and Mezvinsky are authorized, their action is not appropriate because it interferes with the FEC's exclusive enforcement role.26 The Democrats forced the FEC's hand by filing first.27 There is no indication that the FEC would have filed a complaint against the PACs for a declaratory judgment if the Democrats had not done so first.28 The FEC might have chosen to focus its resources elsewhere or to pursue an enforcement action at a later date.29
The scheme provides an administrative complaint procedure in 2 U.S.C. § 437g through which the Democrats could have pursued their dispute with the PACs.30 If the FEC failed to act, only then could they bring a civil action directly against the PACs after petitioning for an order directing the FEC to pursue the complaint.31
The Democrats lack standing under the statute to bring the action.32
Related opinions on this issue
As I read it, the plain language of 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(1) confers standing on the Democratic National Committee.33 The fact that the Federal Election Commission also has standing is not, in my opinion, a sufficient reason for concluding that it was not appropriate for DNC to commence this action regardless of whether or not the FEC elected to participate.34 This, however, is just my tentative opinion because it really is not necessary to decide the issue discussed in Part I of the Court's opinion in view of the fact that the disposition of the appeal in No. 83-1122 is controlled by our decision in No. 83-1032.35
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 16 (1963).36
Joined by Brennan And Marshall, Jj., Joined In Part I
Section 9011(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the national committee of any political party, and individuals eligible to vote for President to institute actions to implement or construe the Fund Act.37 By its plain terms, § 9011(b)(1) confers standing on the DNC.38 The DNC's suit is an action for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief, brought by the national committee of a political party, to implement or construe a provision of the Fund Act.
The majority exalts the requirement of appropriateness by ignoring the term's context.39 Section 9011(b)(1) does not impose a free-floating requirement that any action brought thereunder meet some undefined standard of sound policy.40 Rather it merely refers to such actions as may be appropriate to implement or construe the Fund Act.41
The term appropriate limits the type of suit permissible to those aimed at implementing or construing the Act.42
Justice Marshall joins Part I of Justice White's dissent on the standing of the Democratic National Committee.43 He disagrees with the majority's holding that only the FEC properly invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court.44 The majority concludes that only the FEC's action satisfies the appropriateness requirement.45
By its plain terms, § 9011(b)(1) confers standing on the DNC to bring the declaratory judgment action.46 The majority's reading of the statute improperly restricts the authorization granted to party committees and individual voters.47
Whether 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) violates the First Amendment by prohibiting independent expenditures by political committees in excess of $1,000 in support of a presidential candidate who has accepted public financing?48
There can be no doubt that the expenditures at issue in this case produce speech at the core of the First Amendment.49 The PACs' expenditures are entitled to full First Amendment protection.50 Preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.51 In Buckley we struck down the FECA's limitation on individuals' independent expenditures because we found no tendency in such expenditures, uncoordinated with the candidate or his campaign, to corrupt or to give the appearance of corruption.52 For similar reasons, we also find § 9012(f)'s limitation on independent expenditures by political committees to be constitutionally infirm.53 Even were we to determine that the large pooling of financial resources by NCPAC and FCM did pose a potential for corruption or the appearance of corruption, § 9012(f) is a fatally overbroad response to that evil.54
Yes. The expenditures at issue produce speech at the core of the First Amendment.55 The PACs in this case spend substantial amounts of money to communicate their political ideas through sophisticated media advertisements.56 The contributions to the PACs are overwhelmingly small contributions, well under the $1,000 limit on contributions upheld in Buckley, and the contributions are by definition not coordinated with the campaign of the candidate.57 The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate.58 It also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.59
Section 9012(f) is a fatally overbroad response to that evil.60 It is not limited to multimillion dollar war chests.61 Its terms apply equally to informal discussion groups that solicit neighborhood contributions to publicize their views about a particular Presidential candidate.62 The evidence supporting an adjudicative finding of corruption or its appearance is evanescent.63 The effort to link either corruption or the appearance of corruption to independent expenditures by PACs, whether large or small, simply does not pass the rigorous standard of review when the First Amendment is involved.64
Section 9012(f) violates the First Amendment.65
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Brennan And Marshall, Jj., Joined In Part I
Section 9012(f) of the Internal Revenue Code limits to $1,000 the annual independent expenditures a PAC can make to further the election of a candidate receiving public funds.66 Because these expenditures produce speech at the core of the First Amendment, the majority concludes that they can only be regulated to avoid real or apparent corruption.67 Perceiving no such danger, since the money does not go directly to political candidates or their committees, it strikes down § 9012(f).68
My disagreements with this analysis, which continues this Court's dismemberment of congressional efforts to regulate campaign financing, are many.69 First, I continue to believe that Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), was wrongly decided.70 Congressional regulation of the amassing and spending of money in political campaigns without doubt involves First Amendment concerns, but restrictions such as the one at issue here are supported by governmental interests, including but not limited to the need to avoid real or apparent corruption, sufficiently compelling to withstand scrutiny.71
Second, even were Buckley correct, I consider today's holding a mistaken application of that precedent.72 The provision challenged here more closely resembles the contribution limitations that were upheld in Buckley, and later cases, than the limitations on uncoordinated individual expenditures that were struck down.73 Finally, even if Buckley requires that in general PACs be allowed to make independent expenditures, I do not think that that proposition applies to § 9012(f).74
As part of an integrated and complex system of public funding for Presidential campaigns, § 9012(f) is supported by governmental interests that were absent in Buckley, which was premised on a system of private campaign financing.75
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), this Court upheld congressional limitations on contributions to candidates for federal office but struck down limitations on independent expenditures made on behalf of such candidates.76 Relying on Buckley, the Court today strikes down a limitation on expenditures by political committees.77 Although I joined the portion of the Buckley per curiam that distinguished contributions from independent expenditures for First Amendment purposes, I now believe that the distinction has no constitutional significance.78
The contribution/expenditure distinction in Buckley was grounded on two factors.79 First, the Court reasoned that independent expenditures offer significantly less potential for abuse than contributions.80 Undoubtedly, when an individual interested in obtaining the proverbial ambassadorship had the option of either contributing directly to a candidate's campaign or doing so indirectly through independent expenditures, he gave money directly.81
It does not take great imagination, however, to see that, when the possibility for direct financial assistance is severely limited, as it is in light of Buckley's decision to uphold the contribution limitation, such an individual will find other ways to financially benefit the candidate's campaign.82 The second factor supporting the distinction between contributions and expenditures was the relative magnitude of the First Amendment interest at stake.83 I disagree that the limitations on contributions and expenditures have significantly different impacts on First Amendment freedoms.84
First, the underlying rights at issue, freedom of speech and freedom of association, are both core First Amendment rights.85 Second, in both cases the regulation is of the same form: It concerns the amount of money that can be spent for political activity.86 Thus, I do not see how one interest can be deemed more compelling than the other.87
In summary, I am now unpersuaded by the distinction established in Buckley.88 I have come to believe that the limitations on independent expenditures challenged in that case and here are justified by the congressional interests in promoting the reality and appearance of equal access to the political arena, id., at 287 (opinion of MARSHALL, J.), and in eliminating political corruption and the appearance of such corruption.89 Therefore, I dissent, substantially for the reasons expressed in Parts II-A, II-C, and II-D of JUSTICE WHITE's dissent, from the Court's decision today to strike down § 9012(f)'s limitation on independent expenditures by political committees.90
Accordingly, I join only Part II of the Court's opinion.91 As I read it, the plain language of 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(1) confers standing on the Democratic National Committee. The fact that the Federal Election Commission also has standing is not, in my opinion, a sufficient reason for concluding that it was not appropriate for DNC to commence this action regardless of whether or not the FEC elected to participate.
This, however, is just my tentative opinion because it really is not necessary to decide the issue discussed in Part I of the Court's opinion in view of the fact that the disposition of the appeal in No. 83-1122 is controlled by our decision in No. 83-1032.