468 U.S. 364 (1984)
In 1967 Congress enacted the Public Broadcasting Act, which created the Corporation for Public Broadcasting as a nonprofit entity authorized to disburse federal funds to noncommercial educational television and radio stations for station operations and educational programming.1 Section 399 of the Act as originally enacted barred any noncommercial educational broadcasting station from editorializing.2 In 1981 Congress amended the statute to confine the editorializing prohibition to stations that receive Corporation grants while adding a separate ban on political endorsements applicable to all noncommercial stations regardless of funding source.3
Pacifica Foundation is a nonprofit corporation that owns and operates noncommercial educational radio stations in New York, Berkeley and Los Angeles in California, Houston, and Washington, D.C.4 Its stations have received and continue to receive grants from the Corporation and are therefore subject to the editorializing restriction.5 In April 1979 the League of Women Voters of California, Pacifica Foundation, and Congressman Henry Waxman, a regular listener and viewer of the stations, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California challenging the constitutionality of section 399.6
The Department of Justice initially informed Congress and the District Court that it would not defend the statute.7 Senate counsel intervened as amicus curiae in support of the provision and obtained dismissal of the action for want of a justiciable controversy.8 After a change in administration the Department of Justice announced it would defend the statute.9 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case, the District Court vacated its dismissal order, and the plaintiffs amended their complaint to reflect the 1981 statutory changes and to challenge only the editorializing ban.10
The District Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs in 1982.11 The Federal Communications Commission appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252.12 The Supreme Court heard argument in January 1984.13
Whether 47 U.S.C. § 399's prohibition on editorializing by noncommercial educational broadcasting stations that receive grants from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting violates the First Amendment?14
Broadcast regulations restricting core First Amendment speech such as editorializing must be narrowly tailored to advance a substantial governmental interest.15
Yes. Section 399 directly bars stations operated by Pacifica Foundation, which receive Corporation grants, from expressing editorial opinions on matters of public importance.16 The asserted interests in shielding stations from governmental or private influence are not substantially advanced by the ban because the Public Broadcasting Act already contains multiple structural protections including the requirement of objectivity and balance in funding decisions, the prohibition on the Corporation owning stations, and the ban on federal direction or control.17 The restriction is not narrowly tailored because it sweeps in a wide range of non-partisan local editorials unrelated to those risks while leaving nationally distributed controversial programming untouched.18
The fairness doctrine already ensures balanced presentation without silencing station management.19
The prohibition violates the First Amendment.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice White
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that Congress had simply determined that public funds shall not be used to subsidize noncommercial educational broadcasting stations which engage in editorializing.21 He viewed the restriction as a legitimate exercise of the spending power analogous to Hatch Act limitations on political activity by employees of federally assisted state programs.22 The condition is content-neutral because it prohibits editorial views of no particular ideological bent.23
It is rationally related to preventing the appearance of government sponsorship of particular views or candidates.24 It does not suppress speech outside the subsidized medium because stations remain free to air programs, documentaries, and interviews on controversial subjects so long as management itself does not expressly endorse a viewpoint.25 Rehnquist concluded that the First Amendment does not prevent Congress from choosing to spend public moneys in that manner.26
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the overriding interest in preventing the creation of government-subsidized propaganda organs in the powerful medium of broadcasting justifies the neutral ban on all editorials.27 He stressed that Congress, not the judiciary, is best positioned to assess the risk that political considerations will influence funding decisions and that this provision is necessary to insulate grantees from political pressures in addition to the other safeguards.28 The statute protects the core First Amendment principle of keeping government out of the arena of partisan opinion.29
Stevens noted that the interest in maintaining government neutrality in the free market of ideas outweighs the impact on expression that results from this statute. He added that by simply terminating or reducing funding Congress could curtail much more expression with no risk of a constitutional transgression.30
Whether Congress may condition receipt of federal grants to noncommercial educational broadcasting stations on their agreement not to editorialize as a valid exercise of its spending power?31
No. Although Congress may choose not to fund editorializing activities, section 399 absolutely bars any station receiving even a small percentage of its income from Corporation grants from editorializing with its own private funds.34 Unlike the affiliate structure approved in Taxation With Representation, the statute provides no mechanism for segregating federal and nonfederal funds.35 It thereby regulates speech across all sources of income rather than merely declining to subsidize the restricted activity.36
The spending power does not justify the prohibition.37
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice White
Justice Rehnquist would have upheld the condition under the spending power.38 He reasoned that unrestricted Corporation grants support all aspects of station operations because they are used for salaries, training, equipment, promotion, and other expenditures that benefit every facet of programming, including management's editorials.39 The only practical way to prevent public money from subsidizing editorial speech is to bar the activity entirely for grant recipients given the impossibility of compartmentalizing programming expenses in any meaningful way.40
This restriction is rationally related to Congress's purpose in providing subsidies for public broadcasting.41 It is strictly neutral as to viewpoint because Congress has prohibited editorial views of no particular ideological bent.42