85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873)
Edward Lange was indicted in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York on twelve counts charging him with unlawfully stealing, purloining, embezzling, appropriating to his own use, or conveying away fifty mail-bags belonging to the Post-office Department, each of the value of fifty cents.1
A jury was duly impaneled on October 15, 1873, for the trial of the defendant upon that indictment.2 On October 22 the jury returned a verdict that the defendant was guilty and that the value of the mail-bags was less than twenty-five dollars.3
On November 3, 1873, the judge presiding at the trial sentenced the defendant to be imprisoned for the term of one year and to pay a fine of two hundred dollars.4 Lange paid the fine in full to the clerk on the following day, November 4, and the clerk certified under that date that the sum was on deposit in the registry of the court.5 Two days after the sentence was pronounced, on November 5, application was made on behalf of the defendant to the district judge for a writ of habeas corpus.6
The writ was granted and made returnable to the Circuit Court on November 8. On that date the Circuit Court ordered that the sentence pronounced on November 3 be vacated and set aside, and the court thereupon resentenced the prisoner to be imprisoned for the term of one year.7 Subsequent applications for a writ of habeas corpus and writ of certiorari were made to the circuit judge on December 17, leading to hearings before the Circuit Court on December 24 and December 29, at which the court denied the applications and remanded the prisoner.8
The petitioner then applied to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the marshal having the prisoner in custody.9 He also sought a writ of certiorari to the clerk of the Circuit Court to certify the record of the proceedings, to the end that the prisoner might be discharged from custody.10 Both writs were ordered by the Supreme Court.11
Whether the Circuit Court had authority to vacate its original criminal sentence and impose a new sentence after the petitioner had paid the fine in full and served five days of the imprisonment term under the first sentence?12
A court possesses general power during the term to vacate or modify its own judgments in criminal cases.13 This authority is strictly limited by the common-law and constitutional principle that no person may be twice punished for the same offense.14 Once a valid sentence has been partially executed through payment of a fine that has passed into the Treasury, the court's power to impose any further punishment on the same verdict is exhausted.15 The commencement of imprisonment reinforces this limit.16
No. The established facts show that Edward Lange was indicted on twelve counts for stealing fifty mail-bags valued at fifty cents each.17 A jury was impaneled on October 15, 1873, and returned a guilty verdict on October 22 with the value found to be less than twenty-five dollars.18 On November 3 the Circuit Court sentenced Lange to one year of imprisonment and a two-hundred-dollar fine.19 Lange paid the fine in full on November 4, after which the money passed beyond the court's control, and he had served five days of the imprisonment term when the court on November 8 vacated the original sentence and imposed a new one-year imprisonment term.20 Because the fine had been paid and imprisonment had begun under a valid judgment, the common-law maxim nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto, reinforced by the Fifth Amendment, barred any additional punishment, rendering the second sentence void for lack of authority.21
The facts further establish that subsequent habeas corpus applications were denied by the Circuit Court on December 24 and December 29, after which the Supreme Court granted certiorari and habeas corpus.22 Application of the rule to these concrete events demonstrates that the Circuit Court's attempt to resentence exceeded its power once partial execution had occurred, as the statute authorized only one of the two alternative punishments, not both, and certainly not a second round after the first had been carried out in part.23
The Circuit Court lacked authority to vacate the original sentence and impose a new one after partial execution, so the petitioner must be discharged.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Clifford dissented because the Circuit Court retained full power during the same term to vacate an erroneous sentence that imposed both punishments when the statute allowed only one.25 He emphasized that the writ of habeas corpus cannot review such a judgment for mere error when the court had jurisdiction of the person and offense and the final sentence was in proper statutory form.26 Clifford stressed that the first sentence was illegal but not void, and its prompt vacation within the term left the court free to impose the single lawful punishment authorized by Congress.27
He argued that the record showed a valid conviction on a proper indictment, so the corrected sentence provided no basis for discharge on habeas corpus.28 Clifford further maintained that allowing habeas to reach the merits would improperly convert the writ into an appellate mechanism never authorized by Congress for criminal cases.29
Whether the second sentence subjected the petitioner to punishment twice for the same offense after partial execution of the first sentence?30
The protection against double punishment is expressed in the common-law maxim nemo bis punitur pro eodem delicto.31 It is embodied in the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.32 This principle forbids a second judicial sentence imposing punishment for the same statutory offense on the same facts once a valid sentence has been partially executed.33
Yes. The established facts recite that the original November 3 sentence imposed both the one-year imprisonment and the two-hundred-dollar fine authorized as alternatives by the statute.34 Lange paid the fine on November 4 and served five days of imprisonment before the November 8 resentencing to a fresh one-year term.35 Enforcement of the second sentence would therefore have required Lange to pay the fine plus serve one year and five days of imprisonment. This exceeded the statutory maximum and constituted a second punishment for the identical offense under the same verdict.
The rule applies directly because the fine had already entered the Treasury and the imprisonment term had commenced under a judgment that, though erroneous in form, was valid as to jurisdiction and verdict. The constitutional and common-law shield therefore interposed to forbid any further exercise of the sentencing power.
The second sentence subjected the petitioner to double punishment in violation of the common law and the Constitution.36
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Clifford maintained that vacation of the illegal first sentence during the term left the court free to impose the single lawful punishment without implicating double-jeopardy protections.37 He explained that those protections apply only after a valid conviction has been followed by a fully executed sentence or by acquittal, not to the prompt correction of an unauthorized sentence within the same term.38 Clifford reasoned that the constitutional clause prevents a second trial or punishment after jeopardy has attached and terminated, but it does not bar a court from correcting its own error before the term ends.39
He concluded that the second sentence was the only lawful one and that habeas corpus could not reach the issue because the final judgment was within the court's jurisdiction and statutory authority.40