96 U.S. 727, 24 L. Ed. 877 (1877)
The petitioner was indicted in a federal court for violating a statute passed by Congress on March 3, 1873.1 The indictment charged him with knowingly depositing in the mail a circular that was prohibited under the terms of the act.2 After a trial, the petitioner was convicted of the offense.3 The court sentenced him to pay a fine ranging between one hundred and five thousand dollars.4 Upon his failure to pay the fine, he was committed to the county jail.5
Jackson subsequently presented a petition to the Supreme Court requesting the issuance of writs to obtain his discharge from custody.6 With the petition, he submitted an exemplified copy of the record from his indictment and conviction proceedings.7 The Supreme Court agreed to consider the merits of his case upon this application.8 No details were provided regarding the specific evidence that led to his conviction or the nature of the envelope used for the mailing.9
The case reached the Supreme Court through this ex parte petition process.10 The only matter presented for determination was the validity of the underlying statute.11 The procedural history shows that the lower court had already entered judgment against the petitioner before he sought relief from the high court.12
Whether Congress possesses the power to exclude obscene, lewd, lascivious, and indecent publications and articles from the mail?13
The power vested in Congress to establish post-offices and post-roads authorizes the regulation of the entire postal system.14 This includes the designation of what shall be carried and what shall be excluded from the mail.15 This power has been construed since the foundation of the government to include all measures necessary to secure the safe and speedy transit of the mail and the prompt delivery of its contents.16
Yes. The statute of March 3, 1873, which prohibits the mailing of obscene, lewd, or lascivious books, pamphlets, pictures, papers, prints, or other publications of an indecent character, as well as articles designed for immoral use, was applied to the petitioner who was indicted and convicted for knowingly depositing a prohibited circular in the mail.17 The court considered the merits upon the petition with the exemplified copy of the record, and determined that the imprisonment was legal under the statute's penalties, which include fines and imprisonment at hard labor.18
Congress has the constitutional power to exclude such matter from the mail.19
Whether regulations excluding matter from the mail may be enforced without violating the Fourth Amendment protections for letters and sealed packages?20
The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to letters and sealed packages in the mail.21 They can only be opened and examined under like warrant issued upon similar oath or affirmation as is required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own household.22 No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials authority to invade the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages.23
Yes. The regulations may be enforced upon competent evidence of their violation obtained in other ways, as from the parties receiving the letters or packages, or from agents depositing them in the post-office, or others cognizant of the facts, without requiring examination into letters or sealed packages without warrant.24 In the petitioner's case, there is no question before the court as to the evidence upon which the conviction was had, and it does not appear whether the envelope was sealed or left open, but the enforcement is consistent with the Fourth Amendment as the statute's application does not involve unauthorized inspection.25
The regulations can be enforced consistently with the Fourth Amendment.26
Whether the exclusion of printed matter from the mail interferes with the freedom of the press?27
Nor can any regulations be enforced against the transportation of printed matter in the mail, which is open to examination, so as to interfere in any manner with the freedom of the press, because liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing, and if printed matter be excluded from the mails, its transportation in any other way cannot be forbidden by Congress.28
No. The exclusion of objectionable printed matter, such as the prohibited circular in the petitioner's conviction under the 1873 act, does not interfere with the freedom of the press because the act only refuses the facilities of the mail for distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public morals, and does not prohibit transportation by other means.29 The court found no doubt as to the constitutionality of the act in this regard.30
The exclusion does not interfere with the freedom of the press.31
Whether Congress may prohibit the transportation by other means of matter excluded from the mail?32
Congress does not possess the power to prevent the transportation in other ways, as merchandise, of matter which it excludes from the mails, although it may prohibit the carriage by others for hire, over postal routes, of articles which legitimately constitute mail matter consisting of letters, and of newspapers and pamphlets, when not sent as merchandise.33
No. While the petitioner relied on views from 1836 Senate debate suggesting limitations on Congress's power, the court determined that the power of prohibition cannot extend to preventing transportation in other ways, as that would give a fatal blow to the freedom of the press, but in this case the statute only addresses the mail, and the conviction is upheld without extending to other transportation.34
Congress may not prohibit the transportation by other means of matter excluded from the mail.35