2013 WL 5506613 (Ala.)
In 2010, Carolyn Sue Christopher and Charles Phillip Christopher were divorced by a judgment of the trial court.1 At the time of the divorce they had one adult child and two children under the age of majority, a son C.C. and a daughter Ca.C.2
On April 18, 2011, four days before C.C.’s 19th birthday, Phillip petitioned the trial court to order Carolyn to pay a portion of C.C.’s college expenses.3 Carolyn answered that she was financially unable to contribute to C.C.’s college education and that this Court’s holding in Bayliss authorizing awards of postminority educational support was unconstitutional.4
After a trial, the court entered a judgment requiring Carolyn to pay 25% of C.C.’s college expenses of $9,435 per semester.5 The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the college-expense award as a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion under Bayliss.6
Carolyn petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming the order.7 The Supreme Court granted the petition to consider whether Bayliss was correctly decided.8
Whether Ex parte Bayliss correctly interpreted § 30-3-1, Ala. Code 1975, to authorize a trial court in a divorce proceeding to require a noncustodial parent to pay college expenses for children past the age of majority?9
Section 30-3-1 authorizes a trial court upon divorce to give custody and education of the children of the marriage to either parent.10 The plain and ordinary meaning of 'children' is minors, confirmed by dictionary definitions of the parent-child relationship and by the common law under which parental support obligations end at majority.11 The age of majority is fixed exclusively by statute at 19, and courts may not supply statutory omissions or alter that designation.12
No. The established facts show that Carolyn Sue Christopher and Charles Phillip Christopher divorced in 2010.13 At the time of the divorce they had one adult child and two children under the age of majority, a son C.C. and a daughter Ca.C. On April 18, 2011, four days before C.C.’s 19th birthday, Phillip petitioned the trial court to order Carolyn to pay a portion of C.C.’s college expenses. After a trial, the court entered a judgment requiring Carolyn to pay 25% of C.C.’s college expenses of $9,435 per semester, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the award under Bayliss.14 Because the statute's plain meaning limits support to minors and the legislature alone sets the age of majority, the Bayliss expansion to postminority college support was erroneous.15
Ex parte Bayliss was incorrectly decided, is overruled, and the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed.16
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Moore concurs specially to provide further support for the decision to overrule Bayliss on constitutional grounds.17 He maintains that Bayliss violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by redefining the statutory term 'child' instead of applying existing law.18 The Court usurped the legislative function when it engaged in policy-making through its subjective 'conscience and feeling of justice' test.19
Bayliss also infringed the fundamental rights of parents by authorizing trial courts to intrude into internal family decisions about education and by breaching the boundary between state and family authority.20
Justice Stuart concurs specially to explain her reasons for joining the decision to overrule Bayliss.21 Although she disagreed with the holding when it was decided in 1989 while serving as a trial court judge, she followed the precedent under the principle of stare decisis.22 Now that the petitioner has specifically asked the Court to overrule Bayliss, she believes this is the proper occasion to admit the prior mistake and correct it, consistent with the view expressed in Jackson v. City of Florence that there is merit in admitting and correcting errors rather than perpetuating an erroneous precedent.23
Justice Bolin concurs specially with Justice Stuart’s special writing.24 He agrees with the identical initial reaction to this Court’s decision in Ex parte Bayliss when it was released. He also agrees that this is the time to admit prior mistakes and correct them, consistent with the principle that there is merit in admitting and correcting errors rather than perpetuating an erroneous precedent.
Justice Murdock dissents and agrees with much of Justice Shaw's analysis but would treat the phrase 'children of the marriage' as ambiguous.25 He would resolve the case by applying the acquiescence doctrine as a tool to measure legislative intent rather than as an unconstitutional means of amending the statute.26 The majority's rejection of acquiescence and its separation-of-powers reasoning could render prior statutory interpretations void and undermine the finality of judgments.27
He also notes concerns about consistency with Brewington and the proper role of common-law meanings in statutory construction.28
Justice Shaw dissents and maintains that the plain language of § 30-3-1 referring to 'the children of the marriage' encompasses adult offspring.29 The statute contains no age restriction on the children or the type of education that may be ordered.30 Dictionaries support a broader definition that includes descendants.31
The constitutional challenge to the statute fails on the facts presented in this case because the dispute concerns funding between parents who had already agreed the child would attend college.32