425 U.S. 501 (1976)
In November 1970, respondent David L. Williams was arrested in Harris County, Texas, after striking his former landlord with a knife during a quarrel at an apartment complex, severely wounding him.1
Unable to post the $5,000 bail set by the magistrate, Williams was confined in the Harris County jail for the ensuing six weeks.2 Upon learning he was to go on trial, Williams asked a jail officer for his civilian clothes, but the request was denied, resulting in his appearance at trial in January 1971 wearing a white T-shirt and white pants distinctly marked with "Harris County Jail" stenciled across the back and down the legs.3
Neither Williams nor his retained, experienced counsel made any objection to the prison attire before or during the trial, even though the prosecutor referenced the jail clothing during voir dire and the trial judge noted the clothing on the record in a colloquy with Williams.4 A jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of assault with intent to commit murder with malice.5 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction.6
Williams then sought release through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.7 Following an evidentiary hearing that explored the practices in Harris County courts regarding prison clothing, the district court denied relief on the ground that any error was harmless.8 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the State had compelled Williams to stand trial in identifiable prison clothing.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether an accused is denied due process when tried in jail clothing and the significance of the absence of an objection to such attire.10
Whether an accused who is compelled to wear identifiable prison clothing at his trial by a jury is denied due process or equal protection of the laws?11
The Fourteenth Amendment secures the right to a fair trial, which includes the presumption of innocence that courts must protect by guarding against factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process, such as compelling an accused to stand trial in identifiable prison clothes.12
No. The record in this case is entirely devoid of any indication that Williams was compelled to wear jail clothing.13 There is no evidence that he was unable to post bail, that he had no suit of his own, or that he was unable to obtain civilian clothing.14 The failure to object negates any claim of compulsion.15
The State did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment by trying Williams in prison clothing.16
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Stewart
Justice Powell concurred in the opinion of the Court.17 He wrote separately to identify the considerations he deemed controlling.18 Powell noted that respondent was represented by retained, experienced counsel who was fully aware of the prison garb issue.19
Counsel elected to raise no objection because he thought it would be futile.20 The state judge had a practice of allowing defendants to stand trial in civilian clothing if requested.21 Thus, a timely objection would have allowed a cure.22
Powell viewed the failure to object as a tactical choice or procedural default that should preclude later raising of the substantive right.23
Whether the failure of a defendant to make an objection to the trial court as to being tried in prison garb, for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation?24
Although the State cannot compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes, the failure of the defendant to make an objection to the trial court as to being tried in such clothes, for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation.25
Yes. Williams and his counsel never objected at any time before or during trial to the prison attire.26 The record contains no indication that the State compelled the appearance in jail clothing or that Williams was unable to obtain civilian clothing.27 The absence of an objection therefore negates compulsion and precludes a constitutional violation.28
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed because the failure to object negates compulsion.29
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the State compelled the respondent to stand trial in identifiable prison clothing in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 The respondent was in the custody of the State.31 He had been unable to post bail.32
He had no civilian clothing of his own.33 The State provided him with clothing that unmistakably marked him as a prisoner.34 Under these circumstances, the State compelled the respondent to stand trial in prison garb.35
The Court holds that the respondent waived his right to be tried in civilian clothing by failing to object.36 But the record shows that the respondent was unaware of his right to be tried in civilian clothing.37 The trial judge made no inquiry as to whether the respondent had civilian clothing or desired to be tried in civilian clothing.38
Under these circumstances, the respondent cannot be said to have waived a known right.39