378 U.S. 478 (1964)
On the night of January 19, 1960, Danny Escobedo's brother-in-law was fatally shot.1 In the early hours of the next morning at 2:30 a.m., Escobedo was arrested without a warrant and interrogated by Chicago police.2 He made no statement and was released at 5 p.m. that afternoon after his retained lawyer Warren Wolfson obtained a writ of habeas corpus.3
On January 30, Benedict DiGerlando, who was then in police custody and later indicted for the murder along with Escobedo, told police that Escobedo had fired the fatal shots.4 Between 8 and 9 that evening Escobedo and his sister were arrested and taken to police headquarters.5 Officers handcuffed Escobedo behind his back and told him that DiGerlando had named him as the shooter.6
Escobedo's lawyer arrived at the Detective Bureau shortly after 9:30 p.m.7 He repeatedly requested permission to speak with his client from the desk sergeant, Homicide detectives, and Chief Flynn.8 Each request was refused on the ground that questioning had not been completed.9 The lawyer waited until approximately 1 a.m., filed a complaint with the police commissioner, and left without having spoken to Escobedo. The two briefly saw each other through an open door before it was closed.10
During the interrogation Escobedo, a 22-year-old of Mexican extraction with no prior police experience, remained handcuffed in a standing position and appeared nervous and upset.11 Officer Montejano, who knew Escobedo's family and spoke Spanish, conferred with him alone for about fifteen minutes.12 Escobedo later testified that the officer promised he and his sister could go home if he implicated DiGerlando.13
Escobedo was brought face to face with DiGerlando, denied shooting the victim, and then made additional statements implicating himself.14 An Assistant State's Attorney was summoned and took a formal statement by asking carefully framed questions without advising Escobedo of any constitutional rights.15 Escobedo moved before and during trial to suppress the statements, but the motions were denied and he was convicted of murder.16 The Illinois Supreme Court initially reversed the conviction on February 1, 1963, but on rehearing affirmed it, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Whether the refusal by the police to honor petitioner's request to consult with his lawyer during the course of an interrogation constitutes a denial of the Assistance of Counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment?17
Where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied the Assistance of Counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, and no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.18
Yes. The investigation had focused on Escobedo as the particular suspect once DiGerlando identified him as the shooter.19 Escobedo was in custody and subjected to interrogation aimed at eliciting a confession.20 He requested but was denied access to his lawyer throughout the process.21 He received no warning of his right to remain silent.22 These facts satisfy every element of the rule and require suppression of the statements.23
The refusal by the police to honor Escobedo's request to consult with his lawyer during the interrogation constituted a denial of the Assistance of Counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois on the basis of Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, decided by this Court only six years ago.25 He believes the rule announced today is most ill-conceived.26 In his view the decision seriously and unjustifiably fetters perfectly legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement.27
Harlan shares the concerns of the other dissenters regarding the adverse effects of the new rule on effective criminal law enforcement.28
Justice Stewart thinks this case is directly controlled by Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, and would therefore affirm the judgment.29 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, is not in point here because this case does not involve the deliberate interrogation of a defendant after the initiation of judicial proceedings against him. The confession which the Court today holds inadmissible was a voluntary one.30
It was given during the course of a perfectly legitimate police investigation of an unsolved murder.31 The Court converts a routine police investigation into a distorted analogue of a judicial trial and perverts constitutional guarantees.32
Joined by Justice Clark And Justice Stewart
In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, the Court held that as of the date of the indictment the prosecution is disentitled to secure admissions from the accused.33 The Court now moves that date back to the time when the prosecution begins to focus on the accused.34 Although the opinion purports to be limited to the facts of this case, it would be naive to think that the new constitutional right announced will depend upon whether the accused has retained his own counsel or has asked to consult with counsel in the course of interrogation.35
Justice White rejects this step and the invitation to go farther which the Court has now issued.36 The decision is another major step in the direction of barring from evidence all admissions obtained from an individual suspected of crime, whether involuntarily made or not.37