499 U.S. 244 (1991)
In 1979, petitioner Boureslan, a naturalized United States citizen born in Lebanon, was hired by respondent Aramco Service Company as a cost engineer in Houston, Texas.1 A year later, at his request, he was transferred to work for respondent Arabian American Oil Company in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where he remained until his discharge in 1984.2
After his discharge, Boureslan filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and then instituted suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against both companies.3 He alleged that he had been harassed and discharged on account of his race, religion, and national origin, seeking relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as state law.4
The respondents moved for summary judgment, contending that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Title VII does not extend to United States citizens employed abroad by American employers.5 The district court agreed, dismissed the Title VII claim, dismissed the state-law claims for lack of pendent jurisdiction, and entered final judgment for the respondents.6
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.7 After the panel decision was vacated and the case was reheard en banc, the Fifth Circuit again affirmed the district court's judgment.8
Both Boureslan and the EEOC petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted to resolve the question of Title VII's extraterritorial application.9
Whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies extraterritorially to regulate the employment practices of United States employers who employ United States citizens abroad?10
It is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.11 This canon of construction serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations.12 Unless there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed, courts must presume that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.13
No. Boureslan, a naturalized United States citizen, was hired by ASC in Houston in 1979 and transferred at his request to Aramco in Saudi Arabia in 1980, where he worked until his discharge in 1984.14 The definitions of employer and commerce in Title VII use boilerplate language that can be found in many statutes never held to apply overseas.15 They do not contain the clear affirmative expression of congressional intent required to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.16 The alien-exemption clause does not supply that clear expression because it is susceptible to alternative domestic-focused readings.17
It would produce anomalous results if read to extend coverage to foreign employers of United States citizens abroad.18 Title VII also lacks any mechanisms for overseas enforcement or provisions addressing conflicts with foreign law.19 This further confirms the absence of clear extraterritorial intent.20
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply extraterritorially to regulate the employment practices of United States employers who employ United States citizens abroad.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia joined the judgment and most of the opinion but declined to join the portion addressing deference to the EEOC.22 He would assume without deciding that the EEOC was entitled to deference on the particular point.23 He would still reject its interpretation because deference is not abdication.
It requires acceptance only of reasonable agency interpretations in light of the principles of construction courts normally employ.24 Given the presumption against extraterritoriality and the requirement that intent to overcome it be clearly expressed, it is not reasonable to give effect to mere implications from the statutory language as the EEOC has done.25
Joined by Justices Blackmun And Stevens
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, dissented.26 He argued that the presumption against extraterritoriality is not a clear-statement rule that relieves courts of the duty to consult all traditional tools of statutory interpretation.27 When those tools are applied, the alien-exemption provision supplies confirmation that Congress expected Title VII to reach United States employers employing United States citizens abroad, because the exemption would otherwise be unnecessary.28
The legislative history of the provision expressly states its purpose was to remove conflicts of law in the employment of aliens outside the United States by American enterprises, demonstrating that Congress contemplated extraterritorial application to citizens.29