397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
In March 1965, Mrs. Yvonne Edwards rented housing property from Nathan Habib on a month-to-month basis.1 Shortly thereafter she complained to the Department of Licenses and Inspections of sanitary code violations which her landlord had failed to remedy.2 In the course of the ensuing inspection, more than 40 such violations were discovered which the Department ordered the landlord to correct.3
Habib then gave Mrs. Edwards a 30-day statutory notice to vacate and obtained a default judgment for possession of the premises.4 Mrs. Edwards promptly moved to reopen this judgment, alleging excusable neglect for the default and also alleging as a defense that the notice to quit was given in retaliation for her complaints to the housing authorities.5 Judge Greene, sitting on motions in the Court of General Sessions, set aside the default judgment and concluded that a retaliatory motive, if proved, would constitute a defense.6
At the trial itself, however, a different judge deemed evidence of retaliatory motive irrelevant and directed a verdict for the landlord.7 Mrs. Edwards then appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court.8
We granted appellant leave to appeal that decision to this court.9 The case thus presented the question of whether retaliatory eviction could be barred as a defense.
Whether a tenant can be evicted for reporting housing code violations to the authorities?10
The promulgation of the housing code by the District of Columbia Commissioners at the direction of Congress impliedly effected a change in the relative rights of landlords and tenants.11 Proof of a retaliatory motive constitutes a defense to an action of eviction.12 A landlord is not free to evict in retaliation for his tenant's report of housing code violations to the authorities as a matter of statutory construction and for reasons of public policy.13
No. The court holds that such an eviction cannot be permitted.14 Applying the rule to the facts, Mrs. Edwards rented from Habib on a month-to-month basis and complained of sanitary code violations. More than 40 violations were discovered and ordered corrected.15 Habib gave notice to vacate after the complaints.16 The trial court rejected the retaliation defense by directing a verdict for the landlord.17
The housing code depends in part upon private complaints to call authorities' attention to violations.18 Permitting retaliatory evictions would frustrate the code's effectiveness in upgrading housing quality.19 The dominant motive for eviction determines whether it is barred.20 Here the procedural statutes do not compel assistance to a landlord seeking to penalize the tenant for exercising her right to report violations.21
Related opinions on this issue
The considerations bearing upon statutory construction have made it unnecessary for me to pursue in any degree the constitutional speculations contained in Parts I and II.24 The issue of statutory construction presented in this case has never seemed to me to be a difficult one, nor to require for its resolution the spur of avoidance of constitutional questions.25 A Congress which authorizes housing code promulgation and enforcement clearly cannot be taken to have excluded retaliatory eviction of the kind here alleged as a defense under a routine statutory eviction mechanism also provided by Congress.26
Basically at issue between my colleagues and me is a question as to the extent to which the power of the court may here be exercised.27 By their edict the landlord's right to his property is being denied.28 The majority today creates a new defense to an action for possession.29 I see no warrant for it in the common law or in the housing code.30
The landlord has a right to possession for his own use.31 The fact that the tenant has reported violations should not deprive him of that right.32 The housing code is enforced by the authorities.33
Private tenants should not be given a veto over the landlord's right to possession.34 If the landlord's right to recover is to be denied, Congress should provide the basis with appropriate standards and just compensation.35
The majority's decision will have far-reaching and unfortunate consequences for housing in the District.36 Landlords will be reluctant to rent to tenants who may report them to the authorities for code violations.37 This approach will not improve housing conditions in the city.38
Instead, it will make the housing situation worse by discouraging landlords from renting to potentially litigious tenants.39 The proper way to enforce the housing code is through increased governmental inspections and enforcement actions by public officials.40 It is not appropriate to create new tenant rights that interfere with traditional property rights of landlords.41
Whether evidence of a retaliatory motive on the part of the landlord is admissible as a defense in an action for possession?42
Proof of a retaliatory motive does constitute a defense to an action of eviction. The tenant should be permitted to try to prove to a jury that the landlord who seeks to evict harbors a retaliatory intent.43 The question of permissible or impermissible purpose is one of fact for the court or jury.44
Yes. The rule allows the defense even where the landlord has a legitimate ground for eviction, with the dominant motive controlling.45 Applying the rule to the facts, Mrs. Edwards alleged the notice to quit was given in retaliation for her complaints to the housing authorities.46 Judge Greene considered the defense sufficient to reopen the default judgment.47
At trial a different judge deemed evidence of retaliatory motive irrelevant and directed a verdict for the landlord.48 The court holds that the tenant must be permitted to prove retaliatory intent to a jury.49 The housing code's enforcement relies on such reports from tenants.50 The statutes are procedural only and do not preclude the defense.51
Evidence of a retaliatory motive on the part of the landlord is admissible as a defense in an action for possession.52
Related opinions on this issue
The considerations bearing upon statutory construction have made it unnecessary for me to pursue in any degree the constitutional speculations contained in Parts I and II. The issue of statutory construction presented in this case has never seemed to me to be a difficult one, nor to require for its resolution the spur of avoidance of constitutional questions. A Congress which authorizes housing code promulgation and enforcement clearly cannot be taken to have excluded retaliatory eviction of the kind here alleged as a defense under a routine statutory eviction mechanism also provided by Congress.
The majority creates a new defense to an action for possession without warrant in the common law or in the housing code.53 The landlord has a right to possession for his own use. The fact that the tenant has reported violations should not deprive him of that right.
The housing code is enforced by the authorities. Private tenants should not be given a veto over the landlord's right to possession. If the landlord's right to recover is to be denied, Congress should provide the basis with appropriate standards and just compensation.
The majority's decision will have far-reaching and unfortunate consequences for housing in the District. Landlords will be reluctant to rent to tenants who may report them to the authorities for code violations. This approach will not improve housing conditions in the city.
Instead, it will make the housing situation worse by discouraging landlords from renting to potentially litigious tenants. The proper way to enforce the housing code is through increased governmental inspections and enforcement actions by public officials. It is not appropriate to create new tenant rights that interfere with traditional property rights of landlords.