439 U.S. 357 (1979)
In 1975 petitioner Duren was indicted in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, for first-degree murder and first-degree robbery.1 He filed a pretrial motion to quash his petit jury panel on the ground that Missouri law granting women an automatic exemption from jury service denied him a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.2 He renewed the claim in a post-conviction motion for a new trial.3 Both motions were denied.4
The Jackson County jury-selection process began each year with the mailing of approximately 70,000 questionnaires to persons randomly selected from the county voter registration list.5 The questionnaire contained a prominently addressed paragraph "TO WOMEN" that states in part "Any woman who elects not to serve will fill out this paragraph and mail this questionnaire to the jury commissioner at once." A parallel provision applied to men over age 65.6 Summonses mailed to prospective jurors repeated the opt-out instructions for women.7 Women who failed to appear on the appointed day were treated as having claimed the exemption even without returning the summons.8
The 1970 census showed that women constituted 54% of the adult population of Jackson County.9 During the periods June–October 1975 and January–March 1976, 11,197 persons were summoned for jury service, of whom 2,992 (26.7%) were women.10 Of those who actually appeared, only 14.5% were women.11 In March 1976, when Duren’s trial began, women comprised 15.5% of the weekly venires.12 Duren’s own 53-person panel contained five women, and the twelve jurors ultimately seated were all men.13
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the representation of women on jury venires remained above constitutional standards even accepting Duren’s statistics.14 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1978.15
Whether a state jury selection system granting women an automatic exemption from service upon request, resulting in jury venires averaging less than 15% female, violates the fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?16
To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show three elements.17 The group alleged to be excluded must be a distinctive group in the community.18 The representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected must not be fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community.19 This underrepresentation must be due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.20 Once a prima facie case is made, the state bears the burden of demonstrating that a significant state interest is manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury-selection process that result in the disproportionate exclusion.21
Yes. Women are a distinctive group in the community under the first element.22 This satisfies the requirement that their systematic elimination from jury panels violates the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section guarantee.23
In Jackson County the second element is met because women constituted 54 percent of the adult population.24 Yet they appeared on only 14.5 percent of postsummons venires during the periods June-October 1975 and January-March 1976.25 They comprised 15.5 percent of venires in March 1976 when Duren was tried.26 This produced a gross discrepancy in which 85 percent of average jury venires were male.27 The third element is satisfied because the underrepresentation was systematic.28 It occurred consistently across every weekly venire for nearly a year.29 This was a direct result of the exemption procedures.30 The procedures began with the questionnaire's prominent opt-out paragraph addressed to women.31 They continued at the summons stage where women who failed to appear were treated as exempted without further action.32
The state offered no proof that the automatic exemption for women advanced any significant interest that could not be served by narrower, sex-neutral exemptions.33 The broad exemption for all women based on the domestic responsibilities of some is insufficient justification.34
The Missouri jury-selection system violates the fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.35
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the majority created an unworkable hybrid doctrine blending Sixth Amendment and equal-protection analysis.36 He noted that the 15 percent figure represents underrepresentation rather than outright exclusion of women.37 Rehnquist argued that the decision would force states either to treat men and women identically for jury service, imposing substantial burdens especially in smaller communities, or to engage in an arbitrary constitutional numbers game distinguishing permissible percentages below 50 percent.38
He further warned that the ruling would pressure states to abandon not only gender-based but also occupation-based exemptions.39 This would replace efficient broad classifications with burdensome case-by-case opt-outs that increase administrative costs and inconvenience without demonstrable improvement in jury fairness.40