492 U.S. 195 (1989)
Late on May 16, 1982, James Eagan contacted a Chicago police officer to report seeing the naked body of a dead woman on a Lake Michigan beach.1 He denied any involvement in criminal activity and led several Chicago police officers to the beach, where the woman was found alive and crying for help. Upon seeing Eagan she exclaimed that he had stabbed her.2 After the Chicago police realized the crime had occurred in Indiana, they turned the investigation over to the Hammond, Indiana, Police Department the next morning.3 Eagan repeated his exculpatory story to the Hammond officers, filled out a battery complaint at a local station, and agreed to go to Hammond police headquarters for further questioning.
At about 11 a.m. on May 17, 1982, Hammond police read Eagan a waiver form entitled "Voluntary Appearance; Advice of Rights."4 The form contained Miranda warnings plus the statement that the police had "no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court."5 Eagan signed the form and gave an exculpatory statement. He was then placed in the lockup.6
Approximately twenty-nine hours later, at about 4 p.m. on May 18, officers read Eagan a second set of warnings that omitted the "if and when you go to court" language.7 The warnings informed him of his right to stop answering at any time and stated that an attorney would be provided if he did not hire one.8 Eagan read the form back to the officers and signed it.9 He confessed to stabbing the woman nine times after she refused sexual relations.10 The next morning Eagan led officers to the Lake Michigan beach where they recovered the knife used in the stabbing and several items of his clothing.11
At his Indiana state-court trial for attempted murder and rape, the court admitted over objection Eagan's first statement, his confession, the knife, and the clothing.12 The jury convicted him of attempted murder, acquitted him of rape, and sentenced him to thirty-five years' imprisonment.13 Eagan moved to suppress his statements at a pretrial hearing on the ground that the Miranda warnings were inconsistent and contradictory.14 The trial court denied the motion after finding that he had been fully and properly advised of his rights.15 On appeal the Indiana Supreme Court initially reversed the conviction, holding the warnings defective because of the "if and when you go to court" language and the absence of advice about the right to stop answering questions.16 After this Court's decision in California v. Prysock, the Indiana Supreme Court reaffirmed its reversal.17 Eagan later sought federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, which denied the petition.18 A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the first warnings were constitutionally defective and remanding for a determination whether the second statement was tainted.19 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among lower courts concerning the validity of Miranda warnings containing the phrase "if and when you go to court."20
Whether Miranda warnings that include the phrase "if and when you go to court" for the appointment of counsel satisfy the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona?21
Miranda v. Arizona requires that a suspect be clearly informed of the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney before custodial interrogation.22 The Court has never mandated a precise formulation of the warnings, as held in California v. Prysock where the rigidity of Miranda does not extend to the exact language used.23
Yes. The warnings provided to Eagan in the first interview contained all the information Miranda requires, including the right to counsel before and during questioning.24 The additional phrase accurately described the Indiana procedure for appointment of counsel at the initial appearance without suggesting that the right was contingent on future events or the filing of charges.25
The warnings satisfied the requirements of Miranda, and Eagan's statements were properly admitted at trial.26
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Scalia, J.
Justice O’Connor wrote separately to emphasize that the Miranda warnings given to respondent were sufficient to apprise him of his right to have counsel present during questioning.27 The warnings informed respondent that he had the right to an attorney and that one would be appointed for him if he could not afford one.28 The additional phrase did not render these warnings inadequate as it simply informed respondent of the procedure for appointment of counsel under Indiana law.29
It did not suggest that counsel would not be provided until some later time.30
Joined by Brennan, Blackmun, And Stevens, Jj.
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the Miranda warnings given to respondent in this case were constitutionally deficient.31 The warnings informed respondent that an attorney would be appointed for him if and when you go to court.32 This language suggested that respondent’s right to counsel was contingent upon some future event, such as appearing in court.33
Such a suggestion is inconsistent with Miranda’s requirement that a suspect be clearly informed of his immediate right to the presence of counsel during questioning.34 The majority’s conclusion that this language merely described the procedure for appointment of counsel under Indiana law is unpersuasive.35 A suspect in custody cannot be expected to know the intricacies of state law regarding when counsel will be appointed.36
Whether Miranda requires that a suspect be expressly advised of the right to stop answering questions at any time?37
Miranda requires warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.38 It does not require an express statement that the suspect may stop answering at any time because the opinion describes the obligations of the interrogating officer rather than additional warning content that must be given.39
Miranda does not mandate an express warning of the right to stop answering questions at any time.42