60 U.S. 393 (1857)
Dred Scott, along with his wife Harriet and their children Eliza and Lizzie, was held as a slave in Missouri by Dr. Emerson.1 In 1834 Emerson took Scott to Rock Island in Illinois where Scott remained until 1836.2 Emerson then took Scott to Fort Snelling in the territory north of the latitude of 36°30' and Scott stayed there until 1838 when Emerson returned with Scott and his family to Missouri.3 Later Sandford purchased Scott and his family.4
Before filing the federal action Scott had sued for his freedom in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County a Missouri state court.5 That court entered a verdict and judgment in Scott's favor.6 On writ of error the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court.7
Scott subsequently brought this action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Missouri.8 His declaration contained three counts alleging that Sandford had assaulted Scott his wife Harriet and their children Eliza and Lizzie.9 Scott averred that he was a citizen of Missouri and Sandford a citizen of New York.10 Sandford responded with a plea in abatement asserting that Scott was not a citizen of Missouri because he was a negro of African descent whose ancestors had been imported into the country and sold as slaves.11 The court sustained Scott's demurrer to the plea.12 Sandford then pleaded not guilty and that the plaintiffs were his slaves.13 The parties submitted the case on an agreed statement of facts and the jury returned a verdict for Sandford.14
The case reached the Supreme Court of the United States on Scott's writ of error from the judgment of the Circuit Court.15 The case was argued twice and then reargued because of its importance.16
Whether the Circuit Court of the United States had jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between these parties?17
Federal courts possess only limited jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and statutes.18 A plaintiff invoking diversity jurisdiction must plead and prove citizenship of different states in the constitutional sense.19 Courts must examine jurisdiction even if the parties do not contest it on appeal.20
No. The rule requires the plaintiff to show by pleadings that the suit falls within federal jurisdiction.21 Consent or waiver cannot confer power where the Constitution withholds it.22 The established facts show Scott averred citizenship of Missouri while Sandford was a citizen of New York.23 The plea in abatement alleged Scott was a negro of African descent whose ancestors were imported and sold as slaves.24 The Court determined that such persons were not members of the political community at the Constitution's formation and therefore could not be citizens entitled to sue in federal court.25
Because the record disclosed this jurisdictional defect, the Circuit Court had no authority to proceed to judgment on the merits.26
The Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction, and its judgment must be reversed with directions to dismiss the suit.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Wayne concurred entirely with the opinion of the Court as written and read by the Chief Justice.28 He stated that he would neither read nor file an opinion of his own.29 The opinion of the Court meets and decides every point made in argument by counsel on either side.30
Nothing has been left undecided that the record called for.31 The Court has simply discharged its judicial duty as a distinct and efficient department of government, as intended by the Constitution and the States which adopted it.32 He noted that two of the judges dissented while a third filed a separate opinion on a single point.33
Six justices declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional.34 The case involves private rights of value and constitutional principles of the highest importance.35
Justice Daniel agreed the demurrer to the plea in abatement should have been overruled and the plea sustained.36 The plea alleged that the plaintiff was not a citizen because he was a negro of African descent and his ancestors were brought into the country and sold as slaves.37 By the Constitution and laws the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction in cases where the record shows this defect.38
The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must rely on the Constitution and statutes for their powers.39 Parties cannot by consent give jurisdiction which the Constitution has not granted.40
Justice Catron maintained that the judgment sustaining the demurrer to the plea in abatement was not open for review on the plaintiff's writ of error.41 That ruling favored the plaintiff, who therefore could not assign error on it.42 The record shows the declaration disclosed a case within the jurisdiction.43
The plea impugning those averments was waived when the defendant afterwards answered to the declaration.44 The proceedings on the plea remain as technical history of the case but cannot be reviewed on this writ of error.45
Justice McLean dissented, contending the plea in abatement was not before the Court because the defendant had not assigned error on the sustaining of the demurrer.46 In any event the plea was fatally defective for failing to negate directly the declaration's averment of citizenship or to state that Scott himself remained a slave at the time of suit.47 The gravamen of the plea is that the plaintiff is a negro whose ancestors were slaves and were imported and sold as slaves.48
The plea does not aver that the plaintiff himself was a slave at the time of the action or that he had no domicil in Missouri.49 It is not permissible to supply by inference from antecedent averments the substantive fact that might be necessary to defeat the plaintiff's right to sue.50
Justice Curtis dissented on the ground that the Court had a duty to examine jurisdiction sua sponte whenever the record revealed a potential defect.51 When the record contains a plea to the jurisdiction and a ruling thereon, it is this Court's duty to examine whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction.52 If it appears on the face of the record that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction, its judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for dismissal.53
He rejected the majority's conclusion that persons of African descent whose ancestors were imported as slaves were forever excluded from state or federal citizenship under the Constitution.54
Whether the facts stated in the plea in abatement showed that Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri entitled to sue in federal court?55
At the time of the Constitution's adoption, members of the African race whose ancestors were imported and sold as slaves were universally regarded as an inferior class not forming part of the political community entitled to the rights and immunities of citizens, including access to federal courts under the diversity clause.56
Yes. The rule examines the historical treatment of the African race under state laws, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution's own clauses recognizing the slave trade until 1808 and requiring return of persons held to service.57 The established facts recited in the plea match precisely those persons whose ancestors were imported and sold as slaves.58 The Court held that neither emancipation nor birth to free parents after importation could elevate such descendants to citizenship status within the meaning of Article III.59
Consequently the plea demonstrated that Scott could not maintain the action as a citizen of Missouri.60
The facts in the plea in abatement established that Scott was not a citizen entitled to invoke federal jurisdiction.61
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Nelson declined to reach the plea in abatement and instead proceeded directly to the merits.62 He concluded that the question of status after residence in a free jurisdiction was governed exclusively by Missouri law.63 The federal court was bound to follow Missouri law under settled conflict-of-laws principles.64
In the absence of a constitutional restriction the State of Missouri has the right to determine the status and condition of persons domiciled within it.65 The laws of other States are of no force within Missouri unless Missouri so consents.66 Comity does not compel recognition where it would be prejudicial to Missouri.67
Justice Grier concurred that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional and that, accepting the facts as stated, the plaintiff could not sue as a citizen of Missouri in federal court.68 He noted the practical result would be the same whether the judgment was affirmed or the case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.69 As to form, the record shows a prima facie case of jurisdiction which required the court to decide the legal questions arising in it.70
The court's decision on the pleas in bar shows the plaintiff to be a slave and thus not entitled to sue in a federal court.71
Justice Campbell joined the judgment and opinion.72 He stressed that the status of a person is governed by the law of the domicil in which he is found.73 Except where the Constitution or a valid act of Congress provides otherwise, each State has exclusive authority to determine the status of persons domiciled within it.74
The Constitution confers no power on the United States to abolish slavery within the States.75 Nor does it confer power to control the duration of slavery within a State.76 The question whether a temporary or permanent removal of a master with his slave into a free jurisdiction emancipates the slave depends on the law of the State to which the parties return.77
Whether the act of Congress prohibiting slavery in the territory north of 36°30' was constitutional?78
The Constitution's Territories Clause applies only to territory ceded by the original states and does not authorize Congress to prohibit citizens from taking their lawfully held property, including slaves, into territory acquired from foreign powers.79 Any such prohibition violates the Fifth Amendment protection of private property.80
No. The rule limits the Territories Clause to lands ceded under the Confederation and arrangements such as the Northwest Ordinance, excluding territory later acquired by treaty.8182 The established facts show Emerson took Scott into the Louisiana Territory north of 36°30', an area acquired from France, and the Missouri Compromise purported to prohibit slavery there.83 Because the Constitution recognizes the master's property right in slaves and contains no grant of power to destroy that right in federal territory, the act exceeded congressional authority and was void.84
The act of Congress known as the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional and could not emancipate Scott.85
Whether Scott's residence with his master in Illinois and the northern territory entitled him to freedom upon return to Missouri?86
The status of a person is determined by the law of the state of domicil.87 When a master takes a slave into a free jurisdiction temporarily and returns to a slave state, the law of the slave state governs upon return.88 Missouri courts had held that such temporary residence did not produce emancipation.89
No. The rule requires application of Missouri law to determine status after return from a free jurisdiction.9091 The established facts establish that Emerson took Scott to Rock Island, Illinois, and Fort Snelling for military service and then returned with him to Missouri, after which Sandford purchased the family.92 Missouri's highest court had already ruled in the prior state proceeding that this temporary absence did not emancipate Scott.93 That determination was conclusive in the federal action.94
Therefore the residence conferred no freedom under controlling state law.95
Scott's residence in Illinois and the northern territory did not entitle him to freedom upon return to Missouri.96
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Curtis dissented, agreeing that status questions were governed by Missouri law but rejecting the broader holding that persons of African descent could never be citizens.97 He would have affirmed the Circuit Court judgment on the ground that the state court's prior decision controlled the federal proceeding.98 Under settled conflict-of-laws principles, the State in which a person resides determines his status and capacity.99
The courts of the United States sitting in the State must follow its law.100 The Missouri court had previously held that temporary military service did not produce a domicil or emancipation and that on return the status of slavery continued.101