172 Md. App. 269, 914 A.2d 184
James J. Dougherty, III (“James”), the decedent, had one son, James J. Dougherty, IV (“Jay”).1 In October 1990 James executed a will appointing his sister Janet C. Rubenstein as personal representative and leaving his estate to Jay.2 Throughout the 1990s James’s health deteriorated from alcohol abuse; on March 20, 1996 he executed a power of attorney naming Jay his attorney-in-fact, and on January 11, 1997 he designated Jay primary beneficiary of his life insurance policy.3
On December 9, 1997, James suffered a minor stroke and was admitted to Fallston General Hospital. He was diagnosed with congestive heart failure and dilated cardiomyopathy (an enlarged heart caused by alcohol abuse).4 On December 18 he was transferred to Harford Memorial Hospital’s psychiatric unit; doctors there diagnosed dementia, executed physician’s certificates of disability stating the condition was permanent, and recommended nursing-home placement.5 Jay and his wife instead placed James at Cantler’s Personal Care Home on January 5, 1998.6
James was miserable at the Cantler Home and repeatedly asked family members to remove him.7 While Jay and his wife were away on a ski trip, Rubenstein took James back to his own house.8 When Jay later visited and attempted to return financial records, James accused him of stealing money, declared that Jay “didn’t exist,” and stated he was “dead” to him; the two never saw each other again.9 On January 23, 1998 James executed a new power of attorney naming Rubenstein; in late spring 1998 he met alone with longtime friend and lawyer Ed Seibert and on June 9, 1998 executed a new will leaving virtually all assets to his three sisters.10
James died October 29, 2004.11 On December 10, 2004 Jay petitioned the Circuit Court for Harford County, sitting as the orphans’ court, to be named personal representative and to deny probate of the 1998 will.12 An evidentiary hearing was held February 17, September 29, and September 30, 2005.13 On September 30, 2005 the orphans’ court admitted the will to probate and appointed Rubenstein personal representative; Jay noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.14
Whether the orphans’ court erred in concluding that the testator’s false belief that his son had stolen money from him was not an insane delusion?15
A testator’s insane delusion, also called monomania, is a type of unsoundness of mind that will invalidate a will for lack of capacity if the delusion produced the disposition made in the will.16 The testator’s delusion must have been insane and the will must have been a consequence of the insane delusion.17 An insane delusion is a belief in things impossible or a belief in things possible but so improbable under the surrounding circumstances that no man of sound mind could give them credence. It is also a false belief for which there is no reasonable foundation concerning which the testator’s mind is not open to permanent correction through argument or evidence.18 Insane delusion or monomania insanity is not a general defect of the mind but an insanity directed to something specific, a particular person or thing. A testator can be laboring under the influence of an insane delusion while otherwise acting and appearing competent.19
No. The orphans’ court found that James’s false belief that Jay had stolen from him had caused James to disinherit Jay, satisfying the element that the delusion produced the will.20 The court also found that James’s delusion was an outgrowth of a stubborn conviction that Jay had done something wrong by imprisoning him at the Cantler Home. This was a true belief arising from the actual events of the December 1997 stroke, the January 5, 1998 placement at the Cantler Home, and Rubenstein’s removal of James while Jay was away. Although the belief that Jay stole money was false and prompted disinheritance, it was not an inexplicable delusion that only could have come into being as the product of an insane mind.
This differs from the delusions in Johnson v. Johnson, Doyle v. Rody, and Benjamin v. Woodring where negative false beliefs about close relatives had no connection to any reality or true experience. The facts as found by the orphans’ court therefore did not compel a finding that James was suffering from an insane delusion under the law of testamentary capacity. The court’s determination that the delusion was not insane was a reasonable interpretation of the evidence.
The orphans’ court did not err in concluding that the testator’s false belief that his son had stolen money from him was not an insane delusion.21
Whether the trial court committed legal error by requiring proof that the delusion was the product of a mental disease in addition to being insane and producing the will?22
The controlling cases hold that proof that the testator was suffering from an insane delusion gives rise to a reasonable inference that he was mentally ill. Therefore the existence of a mental disease need not be separately proven.23 The insane delusion rule requires only that the delusion be insane and that it result in the disinheritance. References to mental disease are interchangeable with insanity and do not add an element of proof.24
No. The trial judge framed the question as whether James’s false belief that Jay had stolen from him was the product of a mental disease. He ultimately found that the evidence did not show that the delusion or incorrect belief was the product of a mental disease. The judge was using mental disease and insanity interchangeably. This reflects the understanding that it is not sufficient that the testator have held a false belief or a delusion but also necessary that the false belief or delusion was insane, that is, the product of a mental disease.
The court did not add an element to the insane delusion rule and therefore did not commit legal error.25
The trial court did not commit legal error by requiring proof that the delusion was the product of a mental disease in addition to being insane and producing the will.26