512 U.S. 267, 114 S. Ct. 2251, 129 L.Ed.2d 221, 1994 AMC 2855 (1994)
The Department of Labor applied its “true doubt” rule in two separate benefits claims adjudications under the Black Lung Benefits Act and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.1 Under that rule, when the evidence submitted by the claimant and the party opposing the award is of equal weight, the claimant prevails because the rule shifts the risk of nonpersuasion to the opponent.2
In the first case, Andrew Ondecko, who had worked as a coal miner for 31 years, applied for disability benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act after developing pneumoconiosis.3 The Administrative Law Judge found that Ondecko had the disease, was totally disabled by it, and that it resulted from his coal mine employment, relying on the true doubt rule for the first two findings and on a regulatory presumption for the third.4 The Benefits Review Board affirmed the award, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision.5
In the second case, Michael Santoro suffered a work-related back and neck injury while employed by Maher Terminals.6 He was soon diagnosed with nerve cancer and died shortly thereafter.7 His widow filed a claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act alleging that the injury caused his disability and death.8 The Administrative Law Judge found the evidence on both sides equally probative and awarded benefits under the true doubt rule, a decision the Benefits Review Board affirmed but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases to resolve a conflict among the circuits concerning the validity of the true doubt rule under section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act.10
Whether section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act applies to adjudications under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act and the Black Lung Benefits Act?11
Section 7(c) of the APA applies to LHWCA and BLBA adjudications because those statutes incorporate the APA without clearly exempting the burden of proof provision from its reach.12
Yes. The LHWCA expressly requires that any hearing held under the chapter be conducted in accordance with the APA.13 The BLBA incorporates the APA except as otherwise provided by regulation of the Secretary, yet the regulation invoked by the Department fails to mention the true doubt rule, burden shifting, or section 7(c) itself.14
In the Ondecko case under the BLBA and the Santoro case under the LHWCA, the Department applied its true doubt rule during ALJ hearings that determined benefits eligibility after weighing conflicting medical and employment evidence.15
Section 7(c) therefore governs the allocation of the burden of proof in these benefits adjudications.16
Whether the term 'burden of proof' in section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act refers to the burden of persuasion?17
Yes. Although the phrase once carried dual meanings, by the early twentieth century courts had largely resolved the ambiguity in favor of burden of persuasion.20 This resolution is reflected in Hill v. Smith and later decisions that carefully distinguished it from the separate burden of production.21 Treatises of the 1930s and 1940s confirmed this consensus.22 Congress itself distinguished the two concepts in the Communications Act of 1934.23
The legislative history of the APA does not displace this ordinary meaning.24 Steadman v. SEC reinforces that the burden imposed is one of persuasion measured by a preponderance of the evidence.25
The APA therefore places the burden of persuasion on the proponent of a rule or order, including a benefits claimant.26
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun And Justice Stevens
Justice Souter dissented from the majority's reading of section 7(c).27 He argued that in 1946 the term 'burden of proof' remained ambiguous.28 Congress intended it to denote the burden of production rather than persuasion.29
He relied on the Senate and House Judiciary Committee Reports.30 Those reports state that the proponent has the burden of coming forward with a prima facie case.31 Other parties seeking a different result also bear a burden to maintain their position.32
This reading aligns with the Court's earlier decision in Transportation Management.33 It permits the true doubt rule to stand.34
Whether the Department of Labor’s true doubt rule is consistent with section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act?35
The true doubt rule, which awards benefits to the claimant whenever the evidence is evenly balanced, is inconsistent with section 7(c) because it shifts the burden of persuasion away from the proponent of the claim.36
No. In both the Ondecko and Santoro cases the ALJs found the evidence submitted by each side equally probative on material issues.37 They applied the true doubt rule to award benefits to the claimants.38 Under section 7(c), however, when the evidence is evenly balanced the party bearing the burden of persuasion—the benefits claimant—must lose.39
The rule therefore violates the APA by placing the risk of nonpersuasion on the party opposing the award rather than on the claimant.40
The true doubt rule is inconsistent with section 7(c) of the APA.41
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun And Justice Stevens
Justice Souter would have sustained the true doubt rule.42 He concluded that section 7(c) is silent on the burden of persuasion, leaving agencies discretion under their organic statutes to assign the risk of nonpersuasion.43 The legislative history and contemporaneous usage confirm that Congress used the phrase to denote only the burden of production.44
This assignment to employers in LHWCA and BLBA cases comports with the remedial policies of both statutes and the long-standing judicial practice of resolving doubts in favor of claimants who suffer occupational injuries.45 The approach diverges from the majority by preserving rather than invalidating the true doubt rule.46