223 U.S. 442 (1912)
Gabriel Diaz was initially tried before a justice of the peace on a charge of assault and battery arising from an incident in San Carlos, Occidental Negros.1 After the death of the injured person, Diaz was charged with homicide and bound over following a preliminary examination.2 He was arraigned in the Court of First Instance at Bacolod on September 26, 1906, and entered a plea of not guilty.3 The trial began on August 15, 1907, with Diaz and his counsel present; two prosecution witnesses were examined before the hearing was suspended for fourteen days to secure absent witnesses.
The trial resumed on August 29, 1907, when two additional prosecution witnesses testified, after which the proceedings were suspended again for thirty days.4 On September 20, 1907, Diaz sent a telegram from San Carlos stating that he waived his right to be present during examination of government witnesses.5 That day the court examined one prosecution witness, the prosecution rested, and defense counsel introduced a certified copy of the justice of the peace proceedings that contained testimony of witnesses not appearing at the later trial.6 The next day a rebuttal witness was examined, both sides presented argument, and the case was taken under advisement.7
On December 24, 1907, the Court of First Instance found Diaz guilty and sentenced him to six years and one day of imprisonment, all without Diaz being present.8 Diaz appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philippines, which increased the sentence to fourteen years of reclusion temporal.9 The case reached the Supreme Court of the United States after the Philippine Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in its modified form.10
Whether the prior trial of the accused for assault and battery before a justice of the peace barred the subsequent prosecution for homicide on double jeopardy grounds?11
The provision against double jeopardy in the Philippine Civil Government Act is restricted to instances where the second jeopardy is for the same offense as the first.12 Homicide and assault and battery are distinct offenses both in law and in fact because the death of the injured person is the principal element of homicide but forms no part of assault and battery.13 At the time of the assault and battery trial the death had not ensued, so the homicide had not yet been committed.14 The justice of the peace also lacked jurisdiction to try the homicide charge.15
No. The prior assault and battery trial did not bar the homicide prosecution.16 The offenses were distinct in law and fact because the death of the injured person had not occurred when the justice of the peace tried the assault and battery charge. The justice of the peace lacked jurisdiction over homicide, so the jeopardy from that trial extended only to assault and battery and did not protect against the later homicide prosecution.
The plea of former jeopardy disclosed no obstacle to the prosecution for homicide.17
Whether the admission into evidence of testimony given at the prior assault and battery trial and preliminary investigation violated the accused's right to meet the witnesses face to face?18
No. The record containing the prior testimony was offered by the accused himself without qualification or restriction.21 By placing the testimony in evidence the accused waived his right of confrontation as to that testimony and cannot complain of its consideration by the court.22 The testimony included both favorable and unfavorable elements to the defense, yet because the accused introduced it the court properly treated the entire record as admitted generally and available to either party.23
There was no violation of the right to meet the witnesses face to face.24
Whether the trial court could proceed with portions of the homicide trial in the accused's absence after he sent a telegram waiving his presence?25
Yes. The homicide was a non-capital felony and Diaz was not in custody.28 The trial had already begun in his presence when he voluntarily sent a telegram waiving his right to be present during examination of government witnesses and absented himself.29 The court therefore could proceed with the remaining portions of the trial in the same manner and with the same effect as if he were present.
There was no infraction of the right to be present at trial.30
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Lamar dissented because the trial was conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Spanish law and in disregard of the fundamental changes made by the Bill of Rights of the Philippine Islands.31 He emphasized that the public has an interest in the defendant's life and liberty and that the defendant cannot waive the right to be present when liberty is at stake.32 The procedure followed the Spanish law rather than the American manner required by the Philippine Civil Government Act, and the multiple adjournments without urgent necessity placed the defendant in repeated jeopardy.33
Whether the evidence presented at trial was adequate to support the conviction for homicide?34
Yes. Both the Court of First Instance and the Supreme Court of the Philippines found Diaz guilty under the evidence presented.37 Following the rule that concurring findings are entitled to great respect, an independent examination of the evidence as set forth in the record confirms that the conviction was warranted by the proof adduced at trial.38
The evidence presented at trial was adequate to support the conviction for homicide.39