340 U.S. 349, 71 S. Ct. 295, 95 L. Ed. 329 (1951)
Dean Milk Co. is an Illinois corporation engaged in distributing milk and milk products in Illinois and Wisconsin.1 It challenged two sections of an ordinance of the City of Madison, Wisconsin, regulating the sale of milk and milk products within the municipality's jurisdiction.2 One section made it unlawful to sell any milk as pasteurized unless it had been processed and bottled at an approved pasteurization plant within a radius of five miles from the central square of Madison.3 Another section prohibited the sale of milk or the importation, receipt or storage of milk for sale in Madison unless from a source of supply possessing a permit issued after inspection by Madison officials, but expressly relieved municipal authorities from any duty to inspect farms located beyond twenty-five miles from the center of the city.4
Dean Milk Co. purchased and gathered milk from approximately 950 farms in northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin, none being within twenty-five miles of Madison.5 Its pasteurization plants were located at Chemung and Huntley, Illinois, about sixty-five and eighty-five miles respectively from Madison.6 The company was denied a license to sell its products within Madison solely because its pasteurization plants were more than five miles away.7 The milk it sought to sell was supplied from farms and processed in plants licensed and inspected by public health authorities of Chicago and labeled Grade A under the Chicago ordinance adopting the rating standards recommended by the United States Public Health Service.8
The City of Madison is the county seat of Dane County, within which are some 5,600 dairy farms with total raw milk production in excess of 600,000,000 pounds annually and more than ten times the requirements of Madison.9 The area defined by the ordinance with respect to milk sources encompassed practically all of Dane County and included some 500 farms which supply milk for Madison.10 Within the five-mile area for pasteurization were plants of five processors, only three of which were engaged in the general wholesale and retail trade in Madison.11 Inspection of these farms and plants was scheduled once every thirty days and was performed by two municipal inspectors, one of whom was full-time.12
Dean Milk Co. contended below that both the five-mile limit on pasteurization plants and the twenty-five-mile limit on sources of milk violated the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the five-mile limit on pasteurization and ordered the complaint dismissed for want of a justiciable controversy as to the twenty-five-mile limitation.13 Dean Milk Co. appealed, contesting both rulings and invoking the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).14
The Health Commissioner of Madison testified that he had submitted the provisions in controversy and an alternative proposal based on section 11 of the Model Milk Ordinance recommended by the United States Public Health Service, which imposes no geographical limitation on location of milk sources and processing plants but excludes milk not produced and pasteurized conformably to standards as high as those enforced by the receiving city.15 Both the Health Commissioner and the milk sanitarian of the Wisconsin State Board of Health agreed that a local health officer would be justified in relying upon the evaluation by the Public Health Service of enforcement conditions in remote producing areas.16
Whether the five-mile limitation on the location of pasteurization plants in the City of Madison milk ordinance violates the Commerce Clause?17
The Commerce Clause forbids local ordinances that discriminate against interstate commerce by erecting economic barriers protecting local industry unless reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives exist that adequately protect legitimate local interests such as public health.18
Yes. Dean Milk Co. is an Illinois corporation engaged in distributing milk and milk products in Illinois and Wisconsin.19 It challenged two sections of a Madison ordinance after its application for a license was denied.20 The record established that Dean gathered milk from approximately 950 farms in northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin.21 Dean operated pasteurization plants at Chemung and Huntley, Illinois, sixty-five and eighty-five miles from Madison.22 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the five-mile pasteurization limit while dismissing the twenty-five-mile claim for want of a justiciable controversy.23
After trial, evidence showed that Dean's milk was labeled Grade A under Chicago's ordinance, which adopted United States Public Health Service standards.24 Madison's Health Commissioner had submitted both the challenged provisions and an alternative based on section 11 of the Model Milk Ordinance.25 The City of Madison is the county seat of Dane County, which contains some 5,600 dairy farms producing more than 600,000,000 pounds of raw milk annually.26 The five-mile area contained plants of five processors, only three engaged in general wholesale and retail trade in Madison, with monthly inspections performed by two municipal inspectors.27
The area defined by the twenty-five-mile provision encompassed practically all of Dane County and included some 500 farms supplying Madison.28 Dean was denied a license solely because its plants lay outside the five-mile radius, even though its milk originated from farms and plants licensed and inspected by Chicago authorities.29 Madison contended that the geographical limits promoted convenient, economical, and efficient plant inspection.30 The Health Commissioner testified that he had proposed the model ordinance provision imposing no geographical limitation yet requiring equivalent sanitary standards.31 Both he and the Wisconsin State Board of Health sanitarian agreed that a local health officer could justifiably rely on Public Health Service evaluations of remote producing areas.32 Consumers in Madison would be safeguarded adequately under the model approach.33
The five-mile limitation excludes wholesome milk produced and pasteurized in Illinois while favoring local processors inside the five-mile zone, thereby erecting an economic barrier against interstate commerce in practical effect.34 The ordinance discriminates even though enacted for health purposes because reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, such as charging actual inspection costs to out-of-state producers or adopting the model ordinance's equivalent-standards approach, are available and were shown by testimony to protect public health adequately.35 Application of the rule to these facts therefore establishes that the limitation imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce.36
The five-mile limitation violates the Commerce Clause.37
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Douglas And Justice Minton
Justice Black dissented, contending that the ordinance does not exclude wholesome milk because Dean could pasteurize within five miles of Madison and that the provision represents a good-faith health measure rather than discrimination against interstate commerce.38 He argued that the Court should not invalidate bona fide local health regulations merely because alternative inspection methods might exist, noting that no prior decision had struck down such a law on that ground.39 Black further observed that the record failed to demonstrate that the proposed alternatives would assure milk as safe as the Madison ordinance requires, particularly given uncertainties in fee-based inspection systems and the sampling limitations of spot checks under the model ordinance.40
He would have upheld the law or at minimum remanded for evidence comparing the relative effectiveness of the alternatives.41
Whether the twenty-five-mile limitation on sources of milk supply in the City of Madison milk ordinance violates the Commerce Clause?42
The Commerce Clause forbids local ordinances that discriminate against interstate commerce by erecting economic barriers protecting local industry unless reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives exist that adequately protect legitimate local interests such as public health.
No. Dean Milk Co. challenged the twenty-five-mile limitation because none of its approximately 950 supplying farms lay within that radius of Madison, resulting in denial of a permit even though the farms and plants were inspected by Chicago authorities.43 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin dismissed the claim for want of a justiciable controversy after upholding the five-mile provision.44 Upon the Supreme Court's reversal of the five-mile ruling, the twenty-five-mile issue became ripe for determination under the same Commerce Clause principles.45
The same discrimination analysis applies because the twenty-five-mile limit similarly excludes out-of-state milk sources while relieving Madison of inspection duties beyond that distance, thereby favoring local Dane County farms.46 Reasonable alternatives such as reliance on equivalent standards or Public Health Service ratings remain available, as the Health Commissioner testified.47 The limitation therefore cannot stand without further examination of whether nondiscriminatory means would suffice.48 The Supreme Court therefore vacated the judgment below on this issue and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the principles that local regulations may not place the state in economic isolation when adequate alternatives protect health.49
The twenty-five-mile limitation requires further proceedings to determine its validity under the Commerce Clause.50
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Douglas And Justice Minton
Justice Black dissented from the majority's approach to the twenty-five-mile limitation as well.51 He maintained that the Court should not invalidate bona fide local health regulations on the ground that alternative methods of inspection might suffice.52 Black emphasized that the record contained no findings establishing that reliance on distant inspections or model ordinance ratings would match the safety assured by Madison's own permit and inspection system.53
He would have upheld the ordinance or remanded the case for the parties to present evidence comparing the relative effectiveness of the alternatives suggested by the majority.54