369 U.S., at 479 n.20
In December 1949, petitioner Dairy Queen, Inc. entered into a written licensing contract with the respondent owners of the DAIRY QUEEN trademark under which petitioner agreed to pay $150,000 for the exclusive right to use the trademark in portions of Pennsylvania.1 The payments consisted of a small initial sum followed by 50 percent of amounts received on sales and franchises together with minimum annual payments regardless of receipts.2
In August 1960, the respondents sent petitioner a letter claiming a material breach of the contract due to default in excess of $60,000 on the payment provisions and notifying petitioner of the termination of the contract and cancellation of its rights to use the trademark unless the default was remedied immediately.3 When petitioner continued to deal with the trademark despite the notice of termination, the respondents brought an action based upon their view that a material breach of contract had occurred.4
The complaint alleged that petitioner had ceased paying as required, that the default constituted a material breach, that petitioner was contesting the cancellation and continuing business as an authorized dealer, that this constituted trademark infringement, that petitioner's financial condition was unstable, and that respondents faced irreparable injury with no adequate remedy at law.5 It sought temporary and permanent injunctions against future use of the franchise and trademark, an accounting to determine the exact amount owing with a judgment for that amount, and an injunction pending the accounting to prevent collection of money from Dairy Queen stores.6
Petitioner answered by denying any breach of contract and alleging that the parties had entered an oral agreement in January 1955 modifying the written contract to remove the minimum annual payment requirement.7 Petitioner also raised defenses of laches and estoppel arising from respondents' delay in asserting the claim after petitioner had expended large sums developing the trademark rights, and alleged antitrust violations by respondents.8 Petitioner endorsed a demand for trial by jury on the answer.9 The district court granted respondents' motion to strike the jury demand on the alternative grounds that the action was purely equitable or that any legal issues were incidental to equitable issues.10 Petitioner sought mandamus in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to compel the district judge to vacate the order striking the jury demand.11 After that court denied the request without opinion, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
Whether the respondents' claim for a money judgment under the licensing contract or for trademark infringement damages presents legal issues?13
Yes. The respondents' complaint alleged a default in excess of $60,000 on the payment provisions of the December 1949 licensing contract.16 It sought a judgment for that amount together with damages for continued trademark use after the August 1960 termination notice.17 These allegations describe a claim for money judgment that is legal in nature, whether viewed as recovery of a contractual debt or as damages for infringement.18
The petitioner's answer raised defenses including an alleged oral modification of the contract that present purely legal questions.19
The respondents' claim presents legal issues for which a timely jury demand must be honored.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Douglas
Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment while accepting that the complaint could be read as seeking an accounting for trademark infringement rather than contract damages.21 He emphasized that an accounting is not automatically equitable and requires either a claim cognizable only in equity or accounts so complicated that only equity can unravel them.22 In his view the face of the complaint showed neither, because a jury could readily calculate the damages from the alleged infringement just as courts of law do in copyright and patent cases.23
He therefore concluded that the joinder of legal and equitable prayers could not deprive the petitioner of the constitutional right to jury trial on the legal claim.24
Whether the right to a jury trial on legal issues may be lost when those issues are characterized as incidental to equitable issues or when the complaint seeks an accounting?25
The right to jury trial on legal issues cannot be lost through prior determination of equitable claims absent the most imperative circumstances.26 A request for an accounting does not convert a legal money claim into an equitable one unless the accounts are so complicated that only equity can unravel them and no adequate legal remedy exists.27
No. The district court struck the jury demand on the alternative grounds that the action was purely equitable or that any legal issues were incidental to equitable issues.28 The complaint sought an accounting to determine the exact amount owing plus injunctive relief, yet the underlying money claim rested on an alleged contractual default exceeding $60,000 and trademark infringement.29 No facts indicate complicated accounts beyond a jury's capacity with the assistance of a master under Rule 53(b), and the legal defenses such as the alleged oral modification of the minimum-payment requirement remain triable to a jury.30
The right to a jury trial on the legal issues cannot be lost by characterizing them as incidental or by casting the claim as one for an accounting.31