412 U.S. 291 (1973)
The victim died by strangulation in her home in the city of Portland.1 Abrasions and lacerations were found on her throat.2 There was no sign of a break-in or robbery.3 Word of the murder reached respondent Daniel Murphy, who was not then living with his wife.4 Upon receiving the message, Murphy promptly telephoned the Portland police and voluntarily came into Portland for questioning.5
Shortly after Murphy's arrival at the station house, where he was met by retained counsel, the police noticed a dark spot on his finger.6 Suspecting that the spot might be dried blood and knowing that evidence of strangulation is often found under the assailant's fingernails, the police asked Murphy if they could take a sample of scrapings from his fingernails.7 Murphy refused.8 Under protest and without a warrant, the police proceeded to take the samples.9 The samples contained traces of skin and blood cells and fabric from the victim's nightgown.10 This incriminating evidence was admitted at trial.11
Murphy was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder.12 He appealed his conviction, claiming that the fingernail scrapings were the product of an unconstitutional search under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.13 The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.14 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.15 Murphy then commenced the present action for federal habeas corpus relief.16 The District Court denied the habeas petition.17 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional question presented.19
The trial court, the Oregon Court of Appeals, and the Federal District Court all agreed that the police had probable cause to arrest Murphy at the time they detained him and scraped his fingernails.20 At the time the detectives took these scrapings they knew the bedroom showed no signs of disturbance, indicating a killer known to the victim.21 The decedent's son did not have fingernails that could have made the lacerations.22 The marriage was stormy.23 Murphy had been at the home on the night of the murder yet volunteered information without concern for his wife's fate.24
It is undisputed that the police did not obtain an arrest warrant or formally arrest Murphy under Oregon law.25 Murphy was detained only long enough to take the fingernail scrapings and was not formally arrested until approximately one month later.26 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not disagree with the conclusion that the police had probable cause to make an arrest.27
Whether the warrantless taking of fingernail scrapings from a suspect during a brief station-house detention without a formal arrest violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments?28
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of the person.29 Under Chimel v. California a warrantless search incident to arrest is permitted to protect officer safety and preserve evidence.30 The scope must be limited to the area within the arrestee's reach.31 When no formal arrest occurs the same rationale permits only a very narrow intrusion to preserve highly evanescent evidence if probable cause exists and destruction is imminent.32
No. The victim died by strangulation in her home in the city of Portland with abrasions and lacerations on her throat and no sign of a break-in or robbery. Word of the murder reached respondent Murphy who was not living with his wife.33 He promptly telephoned the Portland police and voluntarily came to the station for questioning.34 Shortly after arrival, where he was met by retained counsel, officers noticed a dark spot on his finger and, suspecting dried blood, asked to scrape his fingernails.35
He refused. Under protest and without a warrant the police took the samples that contained skin, blood cells, and fabric from the victim's nightgown, and this evidence was admitted at trial.36 Three courts found probable cause from the stormy marriage, Murphy's presence at the home that night, the lack of disturbance in the bedroom, and the son's inability to have caused the lacerations.37 The detention lasted only long enough for the scrapings.38
Murphy rubbed his hands after refusing consent.39 The evidence was readily destructible.40 The limited search was justified under Chimel principles without requiring a full arrest or warrant.41
The warrantless taking of the fingernail scrapings did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.42
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Justice Marshall joined the opinion of the Court.43 He stressed that the detention constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure though not an arrest under Oregon law.44 Once officers alerted Murphy to their interest in the fingernails there was no way to preserve the status quo while obtaining a warrant.45
The evidence could be destroyed and close surveillance would not suffice.46 He emphasized that the intrusion was strictly limited to the precise area that occasioned the detention.47 The Fourth Amendment would not have justified a more extensive search.48
Justice Douglas dissented.49 He agreed that exigent circumstances existed making it likely that the fingernail scrapings might vanish if Murphy were free to move about.50 The police would have been justified in detaining him while a search warrant was sought.51
Whether there was probable cause is difficult to determine on this record because the Court of Appeals never reached the question. The month-long delay before formal arrest created doubt whether probable cause existed at the time of the scraping.52 The police action was supported only by suspicion rather than the probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment.53
He would have remanded for a determination of probable cause before approving the warrantless search.54
Justice Brennan dissented in part.55 He agreed with Justice Douglas that whether probable cause existed was difficult to determine on the record.56 The Court of Appeals had never considered the question.57
Without effecting an arrest and without first seeking a search warrant, the police decided to scrape respondent's fingernails for destructible evidence. He would therefore have remanded to that court for an initial determination of probable cause before reaching the validity of the warrantless search.58 There is simply no need for this Court to decide upon a disputed record whether the instant search would be permissible if probable cause existed.
Whether the existence of probable cause to believe the suspect committed murder, combined with the risk that evidence under the fingernails could be destroyed, justified the limited search?59
When probable cause to arrest exists and officers reasonably believe that evidence on the suspect's person is highly destructible, a very limited warrantless search confined to preserving that evidence is permissible even without a formal arrest.60 The intrusion must be no broader than necessary to prevent loss of the evidence.
Yes. The trial court, Oregon Court of Appeals, and District Court all found probable cause from the specific facts that the bedroom showed no disturbance indicating a known killer.61 The son could not have caused the lacerations.62 The marriage was stormy.
Murphy had been at the home that night yet volunteered information without concern for his wife's fate.63 Murphy was aware of the detectives' suspicions.64 He refused consent and appeared to rub his hands together.65 This created an immediate risk that the traces of skin, blood, and nightgown fabric would be destroyed.66
The police therefore conducted only the narrow scraping necessary to preserve that evanescent evidence rather than a full search of the person or surroundings.67
The combination of probable cause and the risk of immediate destruction justified the limited search.68
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Justice Blackmun joined the Court's opinion with the explicit understanding that its holding applies only where no arrest has been made.69 He noted that far different factors would govern the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest.70 The Court today permits a search for evidence without an arrest but under circumstances where probable cause for an arrest existed, where the officers had reasonable cause to believe that the evidence was on respondent's person, and where that evidence was highly destructible.71
Whether the procedural history of the state conviction and federal habeas proceedings properly presented the constitutional claim for review?72
A Fourth Amendment claim is properly presented for federal habeas review when the prisoner had a fair opportunity to raise and litigate the issue through the state courts.73 The lower federal courts must have addressed the merits.
Yes. Murphy raised the Fourth Amendment claim on direct appeal in state court where the Oregon Court of Appeals rejected it.74 After the Supreme Court denied certiorari he filed a federal habeas petition.75 The District Court denied the petition on the merits.76 The Ninth Circuit reversed on the merits.77 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the constitutional question.78 The claim therefore received full consideration at every level and was properly before the Court.
The procedural history properly presented the constitutional claim for review.79
Related opinions on this issue
In this case the District Court and the Court of Appeals entertained a habeas corpus attack upon a state court conviction on the ground that the evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment had been wrongly admitted at the state trial.80 For the reasons set forth in his concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, ante, p. 250, he thinks a claim such as this is properly available in federal habeas corpus only to the extent of ascertaining whether the prisoner was afforded a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state courts.81
The Court today, however, reaches the merits of the respondent’s Fourth Amendment claim, and on the merits he joins the Court’s opinion.82