481 U.S. 186 (1987)
On March 15, 1982, Jerry Cruz was murdered.1 The investigation into that killing led police to solve the November 29, 1981 murder of a Bronx gas station attendant.2 On April 27, 1982, Norberto Cruz, Jerry's brother, told police that Eulogio Cruz and his brother Benjamin had visited the apartment Norberto shared with Jerry on November 29, 1981.3 Norberto reported that Eulogio, wearing a bloodstained bandage around his arm, confessed that he and Benjamin had attempted to rob the gas station the night before, that the attendant had shot Eulogio in the arm, and that Benjamin had then killed the attendant; Norberto also stated that Benjamin gave a similar account.4
On May 3, 1982, while being questioned about Jerry Cruz's murder, Benjamin spontaneously confessed to the gas station murder.5 Later that evening Benjamin gave a detailed videotaped confession to an Assistant District Attorney in which he admitted that he, Eulogio, Jerry Cruz, and a fourth man had robbed the station and that he had killed the attendant after the attendant shot Eulogio.6 Benjamin and Eulogio were indicted for felony murder of the station attendant.7
The brothers were tried jointly over Eulogio's objection.8 Over the same objection the trial court permitted the prosecutor to introduce Benjamin's videotaped confession while instructing the jury that the confession could not be used against Eulogio.9 The prosecution also called Norberto, who testified about the November 29 conversation, and introduced police testimony, forensic evidence, and photographs of the murder scene that corroborated Benjamin's videotaped confession and the statements Norberto recounted.10 At the close of trial Norberto's testimony remained the only evidence admissible against Eulogio that directly linked him to the crime.11 Eulogio's attorney argued that Norberto had fabricated his testimony to avenge Jerry's murder, but the jury convicted both defendants.12
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed Eulogio's conviction, adopting the reasoning of the plurality opinion in Parker v. Randolph.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
Whether the Confrontation Clause bars admission at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant's incriminating confession when the defendant's own confession is introduced against him and interlocks with the codefendant's confession?15
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of a criminal defendant to be confronted with the witnesses against him.16 In Bruton v. United States, the Court held that a defendant is deprived of this right when a codefendant's incriminating confession is introduced at their joint trial.17 This holds even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the codefendant. The Court now holds that this bar applies even when the defendant's own confession is introduced against him and interlocks with the codefendant's confession.18 The codefendant's confession may be considered at trial in assessing whether it is supported by sufficient indicia of reliability to be directly admissible against the defendant. It may be considered on appeal in assessing whether any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless.19
Yes. The facts establish that Benjamin's nontestifying codefendant confession was introduced at the joint trial despite Eulogio's objection and with only a limiting instruction to the jury.20 Norberto's testimony supplied the only direct evidence admissible against Eulogio, and that testimony was open to challenge as a fabrication motivated by revenge for Jerry Cruz's murder.21 Benjamin's detailed videotaped confession corroborated the essential facts that Norberto attributed to Eulogio, creating precisely the risk that the jury would consider the codefendant's statements against Eulogio.22
The interlocking character of the confessions does not diminish that risk; rather, the more the codefendant's account confirms the defendant's alleged confession, the more devastating its improper use becomes.23 Because Benjamin's confession was not directly admissible against Eulogio, its admission at the joint trial violated the Confrontation Clause under the rule reaffirmed today.24
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals affirming Eulogio Cruz's conviction must be reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the holding that the Confrontation Clause bars admission of the nontestifying codefendant's incriminating confession even when the defendant's own interlocking confession is before the jury.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White dissented on the ground that extending Bruton to cases of interlocking confessions makes little sense.26 He observed that a defendant's own confession is the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him and that a codefendant's out-of-court statements have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion.27 In his view, when the defendant's confession is already properly before the jury, there is no longer the same substantial threat that the jury will rely on the codefendant's confession in violation of the limiting instruction.28
Justice White argued that common sense and judgment should prevail over remorseless logic and that the traditional presumption that juries follow instructions should apply in interlocking confession cases.29 He would adhere to the plurality opinion in Parker v. Randolph and find no constitutional error requiring application of the Bruton rule.30 He further noted that the codefendant's confession may often be admissible against the defendant under Lee v. Illinois because of its indicia of reliability, in which event no Bruton issue would arise.31