487 U.S. 1012 (1988)
In August 1985, appellant was arrested and charged with sexually assaulting two 13-year-old girls earlier that month while they were camping out in the backyard of the house next door to him.1 According to the girls, the assailant entered their tent after they were asleep wearing a stocking over his head, shined a flashlight in their eyes, and warned them not to look at him; neither was able to describe his face.2
In November 1985, at the beginning of appellant’s trial, the State made a motion pursuant to a recently enacted statute, Act of May 23, 1985, § 6, 1985 Iowa Acts 338, now codified at Iowa Code §910A.14 (1987), to allow the complaining witnesses to testify either via closed-circuit television or behind a screen.3 The trial court approved the use of a large screen to be placed between appellant and the witness stand during the girls’ testimony.4 After lighting adjustments in the courtroom, the screen would enable appellant dimly to perceive the witnesses, but the witnesses to see him not at all.5
Appellant objected strenuously to use of the screen, based first of all on his Sixth Amendment confrontation right.6 He also argued that his right to due process was violated, since the procedure would make him appear guilty and thus erode the presumption of innocence.7 The trial court rejected both constitutional claims, though it instructed the jury to draw no inference of guilt from the screen.8
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed appellant’s conviction, 397 N. W. 2d 730 (1986).9 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, 483 U. S. 1019 (1987).10
Whether the use of a screen placed between the defendant and the two complaining witnesses during their testimony at trial violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation?11
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, which includes at minimum a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.12 Although the rights conferred by the Clause are not absolute and may give way to other important interests when necessary to further an important public policy, any exception to the literal right of face-to-face confrontation at trial must rest on something more than a generalized legislative finding and, when the exception is not firmly rooted in jurisprudence, requires individualized findings that the particular witnesses need special protection.13
Yes. The screen at issue was specifically designed to enable the complaining witnesses to avoid viewing appellant as they gave their testimony, and the record indicates that it was successful in this objective.14 In August 1985, appellant was arrested and charged with sexually assaulting two 13-year-old girls earlier that month while they were camping out in the backyard of the house next door to him. In November 1985, at the beginning of appellant’s trial, the State made a motion pursuant to a recently enacted statute to allow the complaining witnesses to testify behind a screen.15
The trial court approved the use of a large screen to be placed between appellant and the witness stand during the girls’ testimony. After lighting adjustments in the courtroom, the screen would enable appellant dimly to perceive the witnesses, but the witnesses to see him not at all. Appellant objected strenuously to use of the screen based on his Sixth Amendment confrontation right.16 The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed appellant’s conviction on the ground that the ability to cross-examine the witnesses was not impaired.17
It is difficult to imagine a more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant’s right to a face-to-face encounter.18 The State suggests that the confrontation interest at stake here was outweighed by the necessity of protecting victims of sexual abuse, but since there have been no individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection, the judgment here could not be sustained by any conceivable exception.19
The use of the screen violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O’Connor agrees with the Court that appellant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated in this case.21 She writes separately only to note her view that those rights are not absolute but rather may give way in an appropriate case to other competing interests. This permits the use of procedural devices designed to shield a child witness from the trauma of courtroom testimony. She emphasizes that if a court makes a case-specific finding of necessity, as is required by state statutes, the strictures of the Confrontation Clause may give way to the compelling state interest of protecting child witnesses.22
Because nothing in the Court’s opinion conflicts with this approach, she joins it.23
Justice Blackmun dissents from the conclusion that the procedures violated the Confrontation Clause.24 He argues that the ability of a witness to see the defendant while testifying does not constitute an essential part of the protections afforded by the Clause.25 He maintains that the important public policy of protecting child witnesses embodied in the Iowa statute outweighs the narrow preference at issue.26
He would affirm the conviction because the girls’ testimony was given under oath, was subject to unrestricted cross-examination, and allowed the jury to observe demeanor.27
Whether any Confrontation Clause violation that occurred was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?28
Violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to harmless-error analysis under the standard of Chapman v. California.29 Harmlessness must be determined on the basis of the remaining evidence rather than speculation about whether the witness’ testimony or the jury’s assessment would have been altered by confrontation.30
No. The Iowa Supreme Court had no occasion to address the harmlessness issue, since it found no constitutional violation.31 In the circumstances of this case, rather than decide whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court leaves the issue for the Iowa Supreme Court on remand.32
The question whether the Confrontation Clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is left for determination by the Iowa Supreme Court on remand.33