(1977)
GTE Sylvania Inc. manufactures and sells television sets through its Home Entertainment Products Division.1 Prior to 1962, like most other television manufacturers, Sylvania sold its televisions to independent or company-owned distributors who in turn resold to a large and diverse group of retailers.2
Prompted by a decline in its market share to a relatively insignificant 1% to 2% of national television sales, Sylvania conducted an intensive reassessment of its marketing strategy and in 1962 adopted the franchise plan challenged here.3 Sylvania phased out its wholesale distributors and began to sell its televisions directly to a smaller and more select group of franchised retailers.4 Sylvania limited the number of franchises granted for any given area and required each franchisee to sell his Sylvania products only from the location or locations at which he was franchised.5
In the spring of 1965, dissatisfied with its sales in San Francisco, Sylvania decided to franchise Young Brothers, an established San Francisco retailer of televisions, as an additional San Francisco retailer.6 The proposed location of the new franchise was approximately a mile from a retail outlet operated by petitioner Continental T.V., Inc. Continental protested that the location of the new franchise violated Sylvania's marketing policy, but Sylvania persisted in its plans.7 Continental then canceled a large Sylvania order and placed a large order with Phillips, one of Sylvania's competitors.8
During this same period, Continental expressed a desire to open a store in Sacramento, Cal., a desire Sylvania attributed at least in part to Continental's displeasure over the Young Brothers decision.9 Sylvania denied the request.10 In the face of this denial, Continental advised Sylvania in early September 1965 that it was in the process of moving Sylvania merchandise from its San Jose, Cal., warehouse to a new retail location that it had leased in Sacramento.11 Two weeks later, Sylvania's credit department reduced Continental's credit line from $300,000 to $50,000.12
In response to the reduction in credit and the generally deteriorating relations with Sylvania, Continental withheld all payments owed to John P. Maguire & Co., Inc., the finance company that handled the credit arrangements between Sylvania and its retailers.13 Shortly thereafter, Sylvania terminated Continental's franchises, and Maguire filed this diversity action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking recovery of money owed and of secured merchandise held by Continental.14
Continental brought cross-claims against Sylvania and Maguire.15 The most important claim was that Sylvania had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by entering into and enforcing franchise agreements that prohibited the sale of Sylvania products other than from specified locations.16 At the close of evidence in the jury trial of Continental's claims, the District Court instructed the jury that if Sylvania exercised dominion or control over the products after parting with title and risk, any effort to restrict outlets or store locations would be a violation regardless of reasonableness.17 In answers to special interrogatories, the jury found that Sylvania had engaged in a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust laws with respect to location restrictions alone, and assessed Continental's damages at $591,505, which was trebled to produce an award of $1,774,515.18
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed by a divided vote.19 The Supreme Court granted Continental's petition for certiorari to resolve this important question of antitrust law.20
Whether Sylvania's restriction on retail locations is a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act as interpreted in Schwinn?21
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, per se rules of illegality apply only to conduct manifestly anticompetitive with no redeeming virtue.22 Vertical nonprice restrictions instead require rule-of-reason analysis because they simultaneously reduce intrabrand competition while potentially stimulating interbrand competition.23
No. Sylvania's location restriction after passage of title does not constitute a per se violation because the Schwinn per se rule is overruled.24 Sylvania's 1% to 2% national market share and its use of the restriction to attract competent retailers and promote interbrand competition demonstrate that the restraint is not obviously destructive of competition, so the rule of reason governs.25
Sylvania's location restriction is not a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White concurred in the judgment.27 He agreed that the location clause is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act and should be judged under the rule of reason.28 However, he would have distinguished Schwinn rather than overruled it.29
Sylvania possessed negligible market power unlike Schwinn's leading 22.5% share as the dominant bicycle producer.30 Sylvania's location clause left retailers free to sell to any customers, including discounters.31 This produced less restraint on intrabrand competition than Schwinn's customer restrictions and territorial limitations at both the wholesale and retail levels.32
The differences provide a principled basis for applying the rule of reason without discarding Schwinn entirely.33
Whether the decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. should be reconsidered?37
Although Schwinn is supported by the principle of stare decisis, the need for clarification of the law in this area justifies reconsideration of the decision.38
Yes. Schwinn's per se rule for sale transactions was an abrupt unexplained departure from White Motor four years earlier and has generated widespread criticism and inconsistent lower-court applications.39 The distinction drawn in Schwinn between sale and nonsale transactions is not sufficient to justify the application of a per se rule in one situation and a rule of reason in the other.40
Schwinn should be overruled and vertical nonprice restrictions evaluated under the rule of reason.41
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White argued that considerations of stare decisis carry particularly strong weight in the area of statutory construction.42 The majority's cursory examination failed to justify overruling Schwinn when the present location clause could be distinguished on the basis of Sylvania's insignificant market share and lesser restraint on intrabrand competition.43 Three Courts of Appeals and the District Court on remand in Schwinn had already concluded that the per se rule does not apply to location clauses such as Sylvania's.44
A more deliberate approach is required before discarding a recent interpretation of the Sherman Act.45
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented and would not overrule the per se rule stated in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365 (1967).46
He would therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.