522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975)
The City of Petaluma is located in southern Sonoma County, about 40 miles north of San Francisco.1 In the 1950s and 1960s, Petaluma experienced steady population growth from 10,315 in 1950 to 24,870 in 1970.2 By November 1972, unofficial figures placed its population at about 30,500.3 From 1964 to 1971, the following numbers of residential housing units were completed each year: 270 in 1964, 440 in 1965, 321 in 1966, 234 in 1967, 379 in 1968, 358 in 1969, 591 in 1970, and 891 in 1971.4 In 1970 and 1971 combined, builders won approval of 2,000 permits although only 1,482 were completed.5
Alarmed by the accelerated rate of growth in 1970 and 1971 and the sprawl eastward, the City adopted a temporary freeze on development in early 1971 to study housing and zoning patterns.6 In 1972 the City adopted the Petaluma Plan.7 The Plan fixed a housing development growth rate not to exceed 500 dwelling units per year for projects of five units or more.8 This limit applied over the five-year period from 1972 to 1977.9 The Plan positioned a 200-foot-wide greenbelt around the City as a boundary for urban expansion.10 It established a Residential Development Control System using a point system for awarding permits based on conformity with general and environmental design plans, architectural design, and provision of low- and moderate-income units and recreational facilities.11 The Plan directed even division of allocations between east and west sections and between single-family and multiple units.12 It required infilling of close-in vacant areas first and mandated that 8 to 12 percent of approved units be for low- and moderate-income persons.13 The City also solicited Sonoma County to establish stringent subdivision controls outside the urban extension line.14
The City described the Plan's purpose as ensuring development would occur in a reasonable, orderly, attractive manner and protecting its small town character and surrounding open space.15 The Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County argued, and the district court found, that the Plan was primarily enacted to limit Petaluma's demographic and market growth rate in housing and immigration of new residents.16 Housing permits had been allotted at the rate of about 1,000 annually in 1970 and 1971.17 The 500-unit limitation applied only to projects of five units or more and exempted all projects of four units or less.18 Expert testimony indicated that if the Plan were adopted by municipalities throughout the region, the shortfall in needed housing for the decade 1970 to 1980 would be about 105,000 units.19
Two landowners and the Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County instituted suit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and its officers and council members.20 The district court ruled that aspects of the Plan limiting the natural population growth of the area unconstitutionally denied the right to travel and enjoined the City and its agents from implementing the unconstitutional elements.21 The order was stayed by Justice Douglas pending appeal.22
The City appealed to the Ninth Circuit, challenging the district court's jurisdiction, the standing of the Association and Landowners, and the merits of the remaining claims on the record.23
Whether the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to entertain a suit against members of a city council?24
District courts possess jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 over suits against city council members because such officials qualify as persons within the meaning of § 1983.25
Yes. The City challenged the power of the district court to hear the suit on two grounds, contending that its councilmen are not persons under § 1983.26 This court has recently held that a city official is a person within the meaning of § 1983.27 A district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 over an action to enjoin him from enforcing an unconstitutional statute.28
The district court also had jurisdiction under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.29 It does not appear to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy is less than $10,000.30
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to entertain the suit against members of the city council.31
Whether the Association and the Landowners have standing to assert a right-to-travel claim on behalf of third parties?32
No. Although appellees have suffered or are threatened with direct personal injury, the zone of interest requirement poses a large obstacle to their attempt to show standing for the primary federal claim here, the right to travel or migrate.35 That claim is asserted on behalf of a group of unknown third parties allegedly excluded from living in Petaluma.36 While individual builders, the Association, and the Landowners are adversely affected economically, their interests are outside the zone of interest to be protected by any purported constitutional right to travel.37 Appellees do not fall within any exceptions to the general rule that litigants may not assert the rights of others.38
The Association and the Landowners lack standing to assert a right-to-travel claim on behalf of third parties.39
Whether the Association and the Landowners have standing to challenge the Petaluma Plan on due process and commerce clause grounds?40
Yes. The Association alleges monetary damages due to lost revenues because Sonoma County builders contribute dues proportionate to business done in the area.43 A restriction on building in Petaluma causes economic injury to the Association.44 The two Landowners assert that the Petaluma Plan operated to adversely affect the value and marketability of their land for residential uses.45
Such an allegation is sufficient to show that they have a personal stake in the outcome.46 Accordingly, appellees have standing to challenge the Petaluma Plan on the grounds that the Plan is arbitrary and thus violative of their due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.47 They also have standing to challenge the Plan on the ground that it poses an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.48
The Association and the Landowners have standing to challenge the Petaluma Plan on due process and commerce clause grounds.49
Whether the Petaluma Plan is arbitrary and unreasonable in violation of the plaintiffs' due process rights?50
Zoning regulations must find their justification in some aspect of the police power asserted for the public welfare.51 A federal court must determine only whether the exclusion bears any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest without weighing or reappraising the factors considered by the legislative body.52
No. In attacking the validity of the Plan, appellees rely heavily on the district court's finding that the express purpose and the actual effect of the Plan is to exclude substantial numbers of people who would otherwise elect to move to the City.53 The existence of an exclusionary purpose and effect, however, reflects only one side of the zoning regulation.54 Practically all zoning restrictions have as a purpose and effect the exclusion of some activity, type of structure, or a specific density of inhabitants.55 In reviewing reasonableness the court must determine whether the exclusion bears any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.56 If it does, the zoning regulation is valid.57
The Petaluma Plan is less restrictive than the ordinances upheld in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas and Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills.58 It does not freeze population at present levels.59 It does not have the effect of walling out any particular income class or racial minority group.60
The concept of the public welfare is sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma's desire to preserve its small town character, its open spaces and low density, and to grow at an orderly and deliberate pace.61
The Petaluma Plan is not arbitrary and unreasonable in violation of the plaintiffs' due process rights.62
Whether the Petaluma Plan unreasonably burdens interstate commerce?63
A state regulation validly based on the police power does not impermissibly burden interstate commerce where the regulation neither discriminates against interstate commerce nor operates to disrupt its required uniformity.64 It is beyond a court's limited authority under the Commerce Clause to review state legislation by balancing reasonable social welfare legislation against its incidental burden on commerce.65
No. The district court found that housing in Petaluma and the surrounding areas is produced substantially through goods and services in interstate commerce and that curtailment of residential growth in Petaluma will cause serious dislocation to commerce.66 Our ruling that the Petaluma Plan represents a reasonable and legitimate exercise of the police power obviates the necessity of remanding the case for consideration of appellees' claim that the Plan unreasonably burdens interstate commerce.67
The local regulation here is rationally related to the social and environmental welfare of the community.68 It does not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity.69 Therefore, appellees' claim that the Plan unreasonably burdens commerce must fail.70
The Petaluma Plan does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.71