479 U.S. 523 (1987)
In the early morning of October 24, 1980, William Barrett was transported from New Haven, Connecticut, to Wallingford as a suspect in a sexual assault that had occurred the previous evening.1 Upon arrival at the Wallingford police station, Officer Peter Cameron advised Barrett of his rights, and Barrett signed and dated an acknowledgment that he had received the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona.2 Barrett stated that he would not give the police any written statements but he had no problem in talking about the incident.3
Approximately 30 minutes later, Barrett was questioned by Officer Cameron and Officer John Genovese.4 Before this questioning, he was again advised of his Miranda rights and signed a card acknowledging that he had been read the rights.5 Barrett stated that he understood his rights and told the officers that he would not give a written statement unless his attorney was present but had no problem talking about the incident.6 Barrett then gave an oral statement admitting his involvement in the sexual assault.7
After discovering that a tape recorder used to preserve the statement had malfunctioned, the police conducted a second interview.8 For the third time, Barrett was advised of his Miranda rights by the Wallingford police, and once again stated that he was willing to talk about the incident verbally but he did not want to put anything in writing until his attorney came.9 He then repeated to the police his confession regarding the previous evening's events.10 When the officers discovered that their tape recorder had again failed to record the statement, Officer Cameron reduced to writing his recollection of respondent's statement.11
The trial court, after a suppression hearing, held that the confession was admissible.12 It found that respondent not only indicated that he understood the warnings, but also offered the statements that he did not need anything explained to him because he understood.13 Barrett's decision to make no written statement without his attorney indicated to the Court that he certainly understood from having his rights read to him that he was under no obligation to give any statement.14 The court held that Barrett had voluntarily waived his right to counsel and thus allowed testimony at trial as to the content of Barrett's statement.15 Barrett took the stand in his own defense and testified that he had understood his rights as they were read to him.16 He was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of 9 to 18 years.17
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that respondent had invoked his right to counsel by refusing to make written statements without the presence of his attorney.18 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Fifth Amendment issues regarding invocation of counsel presented by this holding.19
Whether Barrett's statements that he would not give a written statement without counsel but had no problem talking about the incident invoked his right to counsel for all purposes under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?20
Under Miranda v. Arizona, once an accused states that he wants an attorney, interrogation must cease until an attorney is present, but this rule is prophylactic and requires interpretation of the defendant's words as ordinary people would understand them; a limited request for counsel is honored as stated without requiring a broad interpretation that disregards the ordinary meaning.21
No. In the established facts, Barrett repeatedly stated he would not give a written statement without his attorney present but had no problem talking about the incident, and the trial court found that he understood the warnings and voluntarily waived his right to counsel for oral statements.22
Barrett's limited invocation did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel for all purposes, and the oral statements were admissible.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment on different grounds from the majority.24 He observed that Barrett's contemporaneous waiver of his right to silence and limited invocation of counsel suggested he might not understand that anything he said could be used against him.25 However, the State eliminated this ambiguity through Barrett's trial testimony establishing that he understood his Miranda rights.26
Barrett knew he need not talk without a lawyer and that anything said could be used against him.27 Under these circumstances, the waiver of the right to silence and limited invocation were valid.28
Justice Stevens dissented, first questioning why the Court granted certiorari in this unique case with no recurring significance or conflict among courts.29 He argued that the state court had granted more protection than the federal Constitution requires.30 Second, he contended that Barrett's request for counsel before a written statement was no less ambiguous than the request in Edwards v. Arizona.31
The police compliance with the literal terms did not make the request any less one for assistance of counsel.32
Whether the Connecticut Supreme Court erred in holding that Barrett's oral statements should have been suppressed because he had not initiated further discussions with police after invoking counsel?33
The Edwards rule requires that after invocation of the right to counsel, the suspect must initiate further discussions for interrogation to resume, but this applies only when the right to counsel has been invoked for all purposes; a limited invocation does not trigger the full prohibition.34
Yes. The facts established at the suppression hearing demonstrate that Barrett's invocation of counsel was expressly limited to written statements. He affirmatively announced his willingness to speak orally about the sexual assault to Officers Cameron and Genovese after each of the three Miranda advisements. The trial court found that Barrett understood the warnings and made a voluntary waiver of his right to counsel for oral statements.35
Because the invocation was limited rather than all-inclusive, the Edwards requirement that Barrett initiate further discussions did not apply, and the Connecticut Supreme Court therefore erred in suppressing the oral confessions.36
The Connecticut Supreme Court erred in suppressing the oral statements.37