565 U.S. 95 (2012)
Respondents are individuals who applied for and received an Aspire Visa credit card marketed by petitioner CompuCredit Corporation and issued by Columbus Bank and Trust, now a division of petitioner Synovus Bank.1 In their applications they agreed to be bound by a provision stating that any claim, dispute or controversy arising from or relating to the account or agreement would be resolved by binding arbitration upon the election of either party.2
In 2008, respondents filed a class-action complaint against CompuCredit and Columbus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging violations of the CROA.3 The claims largely involved the defendants' allegedly misleading representation that the credit card could be used to rebuild poor credit.4 They also involved the assessment of multiple fees upon opening of the accounts, which greatly reduced the advertised credit limit.5
The District Court denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration of the claims, concluding that Congress intended claims under the CROA to be non-arbitrable.6 A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, Judge Tashima dissenting.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.8
Whether the Credit Repair Organizations Act precludes enforcement of an arbitration agreement in a lawsuit alleging violations of that Act?9
The Federal Arbitration Act provides that a written arbitration provision in a contract involving commerce shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.10 This mandate applies to federal statutory claims unless overridden by a contrary congressional command in another statute, which must be evident from the text, legislative history, or inherent conflict with the statute's purposes.11
No. The Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate according to their terms.12 This requirement applies even when the claims at issue are federal statutory claims, unless the FAA's mandate has been overridden by a contrary congressional command.13
The CROA regulates the practices of credit repair organizations, defined as certain entities that offer services for the purpose of improving any consumer's credit record, credit history, or credit rating, or providing advice or assistance to any consumer with regard to any activity or service described in clause (i). In its principal substantive provisions, the CROA prohibits deceptive practices by credit repair organizations, establishes requirements for contracts with consumers, and gives consumers a right to cancel.14 Enforcement is achieved through the Act's provision of a private cause of action for violation, as well as through federal and state administrative enforcement.15
The arbitration agreement in the respondents' credit card applications must be enforced because the CROA is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitral forum.16 The disclosure provision's reference to a right to sue and the liability provision's references to action, class action, and court do not create a nonwaivable right to initial judicial enforcement.17 Materially indistinguishable language in the ADEA, RICO, and Clayton Act has been held not to preclude arbitration.18 The nonwaiver provision therefore does not bar enforcement of the agreement because the right at issue is the right to enforce liability, which arbitration satisfies.19
The Credit Repair Organizations Act does not preclude enforcement of the arbitration agreement.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment.21 She observed that claims alleging the violation of a statute such as the Credit Repair Organizations Act are generally subject to valid arbitration agreements unless Congress evinces a contrary intent in the text, history, or purpose of the statute.22 While the Act's creation of a cause of action, denomination of a right to sue in the disclosure statement, and prohibition on waiver of rights made the case closer than the majority suggested, the arguments remained in equipoise.23
Precedents requiring that doubts be resolved in favor of arbitration and placing the burden on the opponents of arbitration therefore required enforcement of the agreement.24 She added that Congress could amend the statute if it disagreed with the result.25
Justice Ginsburg dissented.26 She maintained that three sections of the CROA considered together indicate Congress' intention to preclude mandatory arbitration of CROA claims.27 The Act requires credit repair organizations to inform consumers before any contract that they have a right to sue, refers in the liability provision to suits consumers may bring in court for damages and attorneys' fees, and renders void any waiver of any right the Act grants.28
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the right to sue means the right to litigate in court rather than the obligation to submit disputes to binding arbitration.29 Allowing arbitration would permit credit repair organizations to make a false or misleading disclosure, contrary to the Act's goals.30